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Abstract 
This thesis examines the effects of internet use on Australian citizens' 
propensity to participate in political activity. The study applies the 'civic voluntarism' 
model of political participation to the Australian case, theorising that internet use 
comprises a resource. It hypothesises that participation in Australia is a factor related 
to an individual's free time, time spent using the internet, money, civic skills, internet-
related skills, recruitment and engagement. 
Australia is an appropriate case study due to its institutional and cultural 
similarities with other advanced democracies, as well as its notable differences. Voting 
is compulsory for Australian citizens, and they are compelled to vote frequently and in 
complex systems. Previous research has found that compulsory voting has positive 
effects on participation between elections, as well as on the stability of the country's 
political parties. Australians have ample opportunity to participate in politics. 
The thesis analyses 2010 (and earlier) Australian Election Study data, 
supplemented by data from previous Australian Election Studies, the World Values 
Survey and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Descriptive, logistic regression 
and ordinary least squares regression analyses find that internet use leads to 
participation earlier in life than would occur otherwise, but that participants possess 
the high socioeconomic status of participants in other advanced democracies. Skills are 
particularly important: across a range of behaviours including electoral, campaign, 
communal and protest participation, the positive influence of internet proficiency over 
time spent online is evident. However, the determinants vary greatly between types of 
participatory act, revealing lowered costs of entry, and opportunities for low-resourced 
citizens to equip themselves to participate. The findings have implications for 
understanding how the internet impacts the changing face of participation in Australia, 
how citizens can be mobilised in the future and the prognosis for the health of 
Australia's participatory democracy. 
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Introduction 
The rapid rise in global internet access and use has changed many assumptions 
about how citizens engage with politics. Much has been written on internet effects, 
from optimistic predictions of the mass sharing of political information online and the 
mobilisation of new generations of political activists, to fears about the atomisation of 
desk-bound internet users and the overabundance of political information. The 
implications for democracy are largely viewed positively, as new opportunities emerge 
to share information, discuss politics and participate online. 1 To date, research has not 
found overwhelming evidence of any specific effects. The literature on political 
participation, by contrast, is large and well established. A broad, accepted definition of 
participation exists: "those legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly 
aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and /or the actions they 
take" (Verba eta!., 1978, p. l). 
Participation is a critical element in a democratic system (Dahl, 2000, 1994; 
Lijphart, 1999, 1997). Dahl (20 00) contends thatthe capacity to participate, rather 
than the observed rates of participation, is a measure of a system's democratic health. 
Where the opportunity to participate is extended, as in liberal demo-cracies, who 
chooses to participate - including both the profile and the number of participants - has 
implications for the quality of representation and the welfare of minorities and 
disadvantaged groups (Fiorina, 1999; Schlozman et al., 2012; Verba et al., 1995). 
Further, citizens who participate in civic and political life are shown to accrue positive 
feelings of (internal and external) political efficacy, political trust and satisfaction with 
their democratic system (Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Finkel, 1985; Kaase, 1999; Kenski 
and Stroud, 2006). By potentially making it easier for all citizens to participate, the 
internet's effects on participation in Australia may resonate throughout the political 
system. 
A history of political participation can be traced through the seminal studies of 
Almond and Verba (1963), Milbrath (1965), Verba and Nie (1972),Verba, Nie and Kim 
(1978) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). The 1995 study by Verba, Schlozman and 
1 For example Norris (2002) , Jennings and Zeitner (2003), Gibson and Rommele (2004) , 
Anduiza et al., (2009), Boulianne (2009), Cantijoch, (2009), Hirzalla et al., (2010) , Schlozman 
et al., (2010), Bimber and Copeland (2013) and Scarrow, 2013 . 
1 
Brady draws on its own findings as well as those before it to propose a consolidated 
model of political participation. The accumulated knowledge of participation argues 
that the most active citizens are not just socioeconomically advantaged but that they 
also possess specific resources that enable them to participate. Could this theory 
explain the role of the internet in political participation? Does internet access - and by 
extension, exposure to information online and proficiency at using the internet to its 
full capacity - constitute a resource? Importantly, does possessing that resource affect 
whether an individual will participate in political activity? 
Drawing on Verba et al.'s (1995) 'civic voluntarism' model of political 
participation, this thesis proposes that 'internet use' is a resource that increases the 
likelihood that internet users will participate in political activity. There are two specific 
components to this resource: the amount of time spent online and proficiency at using 
the internet. The study analyses the effects of these 'internet resources' on a range of 
participatory acts: voting, political party membership, donations of time and money to 
parties, contacting a government official, working with others to express a view, signing 
a petition and marching or demonstrating. Further, it explores the different effects of 
internet resources on acts with an equivalent online and offline form, such as online 
and offline donating or online and offli ne petition signing. 
Online participation can work as a gateway to offline participation, as it is 
cheaper, faster and often easier to perform than offline participation (Schlozman et al., 
2010). For example, the act of sending an email takes less time and is cheaper than its 
offline equivalent, sending a letter. The effects of internet use on both the processes of 
political engagement and political participation are consequently expected to be 
positive. The barriers to entry should be lower than in the pre-internet era, as 
explained by Schlozman et al.: 
2 
" ... political participation is inhibited when individuals face deficits in time, 
money or skills, thus making it difficult for them to take part; when they lack 
the motivation to be active because they are not politically interested or 
knowledgeable and are not concerned about political issues and outcomes; and 
when they are not exposed to attempts to mobilize them to political action. 
Because the internet lowers each of these barriers to citizen political activity, it 
would seem to provide multiple avenues by which political participation might 
be enhanced. With respect to the capacity to participate, certain forms of 
political participation are simply easier on the Internet" (2010, p. 488) . 
Two hypotheses are proposed, based on existing research: first, that the 
internet, through the civic voluntarism framework, can substitute for offline resources 
in enabling participation, or; second, that the internet, through this framework, cannot 
substitute for offline behaviours but can supplement them. The study presents a 
comprehensive picture of the effects of internet use on a wide range of participatory 
behaviours, using Australian data to test the hypotheses. Australia is chosen as an ideal 
case for several reasons. Australia offers a similar case to the more commonly studied 
United States, British and Canadian context, meaning that findings from those cases can 
be reasonably hypothesised in Australia, too. Australia has an established democratic 
system, with strong and stable parties and high rates of voter turnout, due to 
compulsory voting laws. 
Australia also has high rates of internet penetration (83 per cent of the 
population in 2010), allowing for analys is of how Australians have incorporated the 
internet into their civic lives (McAllister et al., 2010). Internet use found mainstream 
popularity in Australia throughout the 1990s, with the development of the World Wide 
Web and downloadable browser software at the start of that decade (Norris, 2001a). It 
can consequently be considered the 'early adoption' period of internet use in Australia, 
characterised by users' mean high incomes and educational qualifications (Willis and 
Tranter, 2006) . Atthe turn of the century, internet adoption enterea a period of 
'transition', as more than half the population embrace d the medium, socioeconomic 
biases among users declined and it became a more frequent part of everyday life 
(McAllister et al., 2010a) . By 2007, two important developments in internet technology 
had changed the nature and reach of the medium: Web 2.0 applications and 
smartphones. The interactivity and portability afforded by these developments 
brought with it the next, and current, period of internet use in Australia, 'social 
internet'. This study analyses the first data from the period of social internet in 
Australia, with a high rate of internet penetration, plus established interactivity and 
portability. 
Aims of this study 
This study measures the effects of two dimensions of internet use on political 
participation in Australia, at the individual level: time spent online, and internet skills. 
3 
It assumes that the relationship is not necessarily direct, nor is it simple. Therefore, 
using the framework of political participation proposed by Verba et al. (1995), it is 
expected that a range of factors will predict participation: time, money, civic skills, 
recruitment and political engagement. The internet is expected to interact with time 
(as internet use both takes time to perform and has the capacity to reduce the time 
taken to participate) and civic skills (as proficiency in using the internetshould smooth 
the path to particularly online participation, in the same way that language proficiency 
or experience writing letters smooths the path to offline participation). If it is shown 
that internet-related resources can substitute for traditional resources, a conclusion 
can be made that the internet is not just reinforcing the existing profile of participants, 
but mobilising previously disengaged citizens into action (Norris, 2000). 
Data and methodology 
The empirical study of Australian politics is a comparatively small field, but the 
Australian case has much to offer political science. Institutionally, it is comparable to 
the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand in having Westminster-style 
parliaments, with election of representatives to the legislature and appointment by the 
head of state of an executive government from within that legislature. Australia 
compares well with Canada, the United Kingdom and United States in having a 
bicameral legislature, and with Canada and the United States in having a federal system 
of government. Australia stands on its own among the major advanced democracies in 
having compulsory voting laws. Outside of South America, very few democracies have 
enforceable compulsory voting. Compulsory voting laws have effects beyond just 
sustaining high levels of voter turnout: they ensure that, at least every two years or so, 
citizens have to become at least mildly engaged with the political process, including the 
parties, candidates and issues of the day (Mackerras and McAllister, 1999). 
There are sound reasons to expect that compulsory voting also leads to higher 
rates of political participation than would occur otherwise (Hill, 2001). Further, 
Australia has a history of innovation in its electoral institutions (Sawer, 2001). The 
bicameral national parliament is elected by two different electoral systems, while the 
various state elections are conducted using minor variations of majoritarian and 
proportional representation systems. The result is that Australians vote frequently, in 
diverse and complex ways. However, voter-friendly innovations such as Saturday 
elections and simple registration processes work to maintain high levels of voter 
4 
turnout. The Australian electoral system is considered among the world's most voter-
friendly (Birch, 2009; Mackerras and McAllister, 1999). 
Culturally, Australia shares a post-colonial history with the United States, 
Canada and New Zealand, adding to the similarities with those cases. The assumptions 
and expectations contained in this study are based on evidence predominantly 
gathered from the United States and Europe. A single case was chosen for study to 
allow for deep, rather than broad, examination of internet use and participation. 
Moreover, little comparative data exist on internet use and political participation, and 
what does (for instance in the World Values Survey) gives little insight to the different 
facets and purposes of internet use. The Australian Election Study dataset contains 
measures that correspond to those used by Verba et al. (1995) in their civic 
voluntarism study. 
Since 1967, the Australian National Political Attitudes Survey (ANPAS), and 
from 1987 the Australian Election Study (AES), has documented the political attitudes, 
behaviours and demographic characteristics of Australian citizens following federal 
elections. The 2010 AES dataset contains several batteries of measures relevant to this 
study, including - for the first time in the series - measures of respondents' free time, 
internet skills and job-related skills, as well as ongoing measures of_time spent online, 
household income, educational attainment, organisational membership and language 
proficiency. The range of dependent variable measures includes offline and online 
forms of each of partisan, communal and protest participation. As the AN PAS and AES 
samples are drawn from the Australian electoral roll, they do not measure individuals' 
failure to enrol. To fill this gap, Australian data from the World Values Survey (WVS) 
and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) census are used. 
This study offers an in-depth analysis of the different forms of political 
participation in Australia both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Trend data 
provides an overview of how participation rates have changed over time, showing (for 
expmple) declines in membership numbers among the major Australian parties or the 
increase in e-petition signing at the apparent expense of offline petition signing in 
r~cent years. Descriptive, cross-sectional analysis of the mean characteristics of online 
participants, offline participants and a~stainers reveals the prime facie differences 
between each of the groups, for example the youth bias among internet users compared 
with non-users. Descriptive data on the real world traits of participants allow the 
5 
reader to visualise and compare them easily. The descriptive analysis makes use of the 
2010 AES dataset. 
Detailed multivariate analysis of the 2010 AES data examines the partial effects 
of each of the predictive factors on the different forms of participation. Depending on 
how the dependent variable is measured and coded, ordinary least squares regression 
and binary logistic regression techniques are employed. Specifically, two models are 
tested to predict participatory behaviours. First, a restricted model consists of 
measures of money, recruitment and the control variables, and a range of offline or 
online time and civic skills, depending on whether the model is predicting an offline or 
on line behaviour. A second, unrestricted model consists of measures of money, 
recruitment, controls, and both offline and online measures of time and civic skills. 
This two-step analysis shows the partial effects of offline and online resources in the 
absence and then the presence the other. Interpretation of the two sets of results helps 
to answer the question of whether the internet can substitute for or merely 
complement traditional, oftline resources in predicting participation. The software 
. employed for the analysis is IBM SPSS Statistics 19 (SPSS). Chapter 1 provides more 
detail on the multivariate analyses, including model specification. 
Thesis outline 
Chapter 1 begins with an overview of the political participation literature, 
tracing a history through the landmark studies of Almond and Verba (1963), Milbrath 
(1965), Verba and Nie (1972), Verba, Kim and Nie (1978), Rosenstone and Hansen 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). It explains 
the path that led to the civic voluntarism model proposed in 1995, and why that is 
chosen as the theoretical basis for this study. Next, the study proposes the inclusion of 
internet use as a resource, per the civic voluntarism model. Internet use is 
disaggregated into two particular aspects: time spent online and internet skills. It is 
theorised that the internet has diminished the predictive value of the civic voluntarism 
factors, and that time spent online and internet skills will both positively predict 
participation. The effects of these internet resources will either exist alongside or in 
the place of the positive effects of traditional resources. The chapter concludes by 
detailing the data and methodology used throughout the study, including why they are 
the most appropriate choices and how they will answer the research question. 
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Chapter 2 describes the Australian case. As a single case study, the detailed 
description in this chapter assists with the interpretation of the findings presented 
later, as well as comparison with international research. First, the chapter explains 
Australia's institutional characteristics: its federal system of government, including 
bicameral legislatures at the federal and most state levels of government; compulsory 
voting laws and the associated features of Australian politics; and the electoral system 
generally. These three institutional characteristics work together t o create a stable 
political culture. Australians demonstrate comparatively high levels of satisfaction 
with democracy and trust in government. They similarly display overwhelming 
support for compulsory voting, including a willingness to vote even if not compelled. 
The chapter explores the history of political participation in Australian in detail. Trend 
survey data show changes in electoral, campaign, communal and protest participation. 
These changes are explained by political events but also by institutional effects, such as 
changes to the electoral system and the roll-out of internet access across the country. 
The study next considers the independent variable, internet use. Chapter 3 
explains why the internet is expected to affect political participation in Australia. It 
first compares the diffusion of internet access across Australia and globally, noting the 
high rates of penetration in Australia compared with the rest of the developed world. It 
also observes the recent, rapid diffusion of mo bile internet access among developed 
countries, providing internet users with unprecedented opportuniti es to be online . 
Here, the typology of internet adoption is described using AES data. The chapter 
examines the 'digital divide' within Australia, comparing the socioeconomic 
characteristics of internet users and the remaining non-users. It goes into more detail 
describing the relationships between individuals' internet use and factors from the 
civic voluntarism model, namely time, money and civic skills. Here the concept of 
multidimensi onal internet use is explored, differentiating between what Australians do 
online, how much time they spend online and how proficient they are at using the 
internet These categories of internet use are employed throughout the study's 
quantitative analyses. 
Chapter 4 analyses the effects of internet use on participation in Australia by 
focusing on electoral participation: enrolling to vote and casting a ballot. Due to 
compulsory voting laws sustaining comparatively high levels of voter turnout, turnout 
is not used as a dependent variable in the study. Instead, electoral enrolment (which is 
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compulsory, but not sanctioned) and informal voting (in which citizens spoil their 
ballot papers to avoid casting a vote) are studied. First, the chapter sets out the 
hypothesised effects of the civic voluntarism model, including time spent online and 
internet skills alongside Verba et al.'s (1995) 'offline' predictors, on electoral enrolment 
and voter turnout Next, it turns to the supply side of the equation, looking at how 
political parties and electoral management bodies in Australia use the internet to 
mobilise citizens to enrol and vote. The quantitative analysis of internet effects on 
participation begins with ecological regression analysis predicting enrolment and then 
voter turnout at the federal electoral division level, using data from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics and Australian Electoral Commission. 
Chapter 5 explores the effects of internet use on campaign participation, 
measured by political party membership and contributions of time and money to 
parties and candidates and using AES data. The chapter focuses on the concept of 
democratic linkage between parties and citizens. It considers the competing arguments 
made by Katz and Mair (1995) and Dalton, Farrell and McAllister (2011) on how well 
parties are currently fulfilling their linkage function, noting that Australian parties have 
comparatively low rates of membership but that they are beginning to embrace online 
communications and more flexible membership and supporter networks. Quantitative 
analysis in this chapter uses AES and WVS data to examine the effects of the online and 
offline predictors on strength of individuals' party identification, party membership 
and contributions of time and money to parties' or candidates' campaigns. 
Chapter 6 analyses the effects of internet use on communal participati on: 
contacting a government official and working with like others to express a view. Two 
approaches to predicting communal participation are discussed. The first considers the 
costs and benefits of worki ng for an outcome where benefits are shared among a group, 
the costs outweigh the benefits and people who do not help to achieve the benefit are 
nonetheless able to claim the same benefits as those who did help. In this case - a 
typical collective action problem - the costs of participation vis a vis the benefits are so 
large that only very few, if any, people are likely to participate. Those that do are likely 
to be the most able to bear the costs of participating; in other words, participants will 
be characterised by their high socioeconomi c status. Alternatively, people who engage 
in communal participation will be characterised by their high levels of social capital, 
being embedded in social networks and demonstrating social trust The chapter uses 
AES data to explore how internet use can both produce and reduce social capital among 
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Australian citizens, and how internet resources, social capital and the offline civic 
voluntarism measures each affect communal participation in Australia. 
The final section of the analysis, Chapter 7 examines the effects of internet use 
on protest participation, namely petition signing and demonstrating or marching. The 
civic voluntarism model is compared with the 'relative deprivation' theory of protest, 
which contends that protestors are characterised by their lack of resources, in contrast 
with more conventional forms of political activists. The chapter examines the role of 
internet use as a resource per the civic voluntarism model, comparing its effects with 
more traditional, offline resources. Next, drawing on Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon's 
(2010) finding that opportunity is the most important determinant of protest, the 
chapter discusses the mobilisation campaigns of online organisations such as GetUp!. 
Quantitative analysis focuses on the effects of internet use on petition and e-petition 
signing, and demonstrating. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarising the four main findings 
from the analysis. It situates the Australian findings within the international context, 
finding notable similarities with like countries, but divergences which can be traced to 
Australia's institutional characteristics. A range of implications for Australian 
democracy are posited, from the effects of further internet access rQll-out to the 
capacity of the political parties to mobilise citizens. The findings also have implications 
for the academic literature, particularly the debate surrounding the internet's 
mobilisation or reinforcement of political participation. The findings also inform the 
large literature on the apparent decline of political engagement across advanced 
democracies, and questions about whether the observed trends reflect generational or 
life-cycle changes. The analysis constitutes the most comprehensive study of political 
participation in Australia to date and contributes substantially to the study of 
Australian politics. 
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Chapter 1 - theory, context and 
methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
The study of political participation has changed relatively little over the past 50 
years. Many findings from early studies still stand, for example the important role of 
education as a pathway to participation or the mobilising effect of belonging to a 
church congregation. Over time, the explanations for those findings have become more 
sophisticated and more nuanced, providing a comprehensive, thoroughly tested and 
much debated body ofresearch from which to derive hypotheses about participation in 
Australia. What is meant by participation? Verba and Nie (1972, p. 2) define 
participation as "acts that aim at influencing governmental decisions", but are 
"interested more abstractly in attempts to influence the authoritative allocations of 
values fo r a society, which may or may not take place through governmental decisions". 
Indeed, the contrast between the discrete and abstract concepts of participation is easy 
to demonstrate. Voting is an instrumental act of participation that seeks to influence 
governmental decisions, by affecting who forms government. Signing a petition, on the 
other hand, may be more value-laden than instrumental and moreover may target 
extra-governmental decisions, for instance a petition on the portrayal of women in the 
mass media. While the discrete definition is an appropriate touchstone for thinking 
about participation, this study does deviate from it occasionally. 
V\lhy is participation important? Two reasons stand out: the relationship 
between participation and representation, and the role of participation in civic life . 
Using the example of political party membership, the effects of participation on 
representation are straightfonvard. The members of a political party select (to varying 
degrees) that party's candidates to stand at general elections. Should that candidate 
win the election, she \t\rill hold public office and may in time gain ministerial 
responsibility or become Prime Minister. However, she is always at the mercy of a 
small constituency of party members. Who those members are, and how closely they 
represent the population of the electorate, matters. To use another example, who votes 
- deciding vvho forms government - matters. Participation has effects on civic life at 
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both the individual and aggregate levels. The process of participating helps to create 
and sustain social capital, which is vital to a functioning democracy. An individual who 
participates in political life is expected to also express higher levels of trust in his peers 
and politicians (Putnam, 2001). At a broader level, the greater the number of citizens 
who participate, the more vibrant and cooperative a society is expected to be. 
Finally, what is known about participation? The various models of participation 
(theorising the variables that affect an individual's propensity to participate) are 
discussed, before arguing that Verba, Schlozman and Brady's (1995) civic voluntarism 
model is the most valuable. It then examines the normative problems of participation, 
specifically declining rates of participation across advanced democracies and 
socioeconomic inequalities between participants and non-participants. Evolving forms 
of participation are discussed next, with reference to the argument that observed 
declines in participation rates are artefacts of poor measurement and not political 
apathy (Dalton, 2008a) . The chapter then operationalises the dependent variable by 
specifying various forms of political participation to be studied, based on the 
mainstream literature as well as emerging behaviours. Finally, the methodology is 
outlined, first by detailing the quantitative data used, the process of sorting and 
preparing the data for analysis, and the analytical techniques chosen. 
1.2 Determinants of participation: who participates and 
why 
The empirical political participation literature can be traced chronologically 
from Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (1835), through to the first major 
survey-based study of the modern era, Almond and Verba's (1963) Civic Culture. 
Comparing United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico, The Civic Culture was both 
the first major empirical study of participation and the first research to categorise types 
of participation and citizens. The study identifies three types of citizens: participants, 
who are politically aware, politically engaged and active; subjects, who engage 
primarily with government institutions, and; parochials, only dimly aware of 
government and politics (Almond and Verba, 1963). Democracy is optimised by a mix 
of citizen types; too much citizen activity hinders government representatives trying to 
identify genuine issues or crises. The typical citizen has: 
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" ... a reserve of influence. He is not constantly involved in politics, he does not 
actively oversee the behavior of decision makers ... He is rarely active in politics. 
But he thinks that he can mobilize his ordinary social environment, if necessary, 
for political use. He is not the active citizen: he is the potentially active citizen" 
(Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 480). 
Published two years after The Civic Culture, Political Participation (Milbrath, 
1965) proposes a more complex typology of participation. Milbrath defines 
participation as only that behaviour intended to affect government decisions; 
participation in this sense is strictly instrumental. Like Almond and Verba (1963), he 
argues that "there is doubt that a society as a whole would benefit if intense interest 
and active involvement in politics became widespread throughout the population .. . 
such a permeation of politics into all aspects oflife is antithetical to the basic principle 
of limited government in a constitutional democracy" (Milbrath, 1965, p. 14 7). 
Milbrath (1965) proposes a hierarchy of activities rather than citizens: acts are 
gladiatorial (for example volunteering for a political campaign, active party 
membership, or nominating for or holding political office); transitional ( donating to a 
· campaign or attending a rally), or; spectator (voting, persuading others how to vote or 
displaying political paraphernalia). Citizens who engage in none of these are 
'apathetics': a group which commands little attention. Milbrath does· anticipate several 
later developments in participation, namely expressive participation, while cautioning 
that participatory behaviours likely mean different things to different citizens (1965, p. 
12) . 
The role of socioeconomic status (SES) in political participation has been a 
common thread throughout the discipline. Milbrath (1965) theorises participation as a 
function of stimuli, personal characteristics, social position and political setting, but 
notes that finding a correlation between SES and participation is a "simple matter" 
(1965, p. 110). Verba and Nie's (1972) Participation in America concurs, finding that 59 
per cent of the least politically active American citizens were from either the middle or 
lower classes. In contrast, 57 per cent of the most active citizens were from the upper 
class (Verba and Nie, 1972). Both Verba and Nie (1972) and Milbrath (1965) observe 
the effects of on political engagement, the antecedent of participation·; after controlling 
for political interest, efficacy and political, the effects of SES oh most participatory 
activities are only marginal (Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 135). 
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The Participation in America model was then tested across different political 
systems and cultures: in Austria, India, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, the Netherlands, Japan and 
the United States (Verba et al., 1978). The comparative findings concur with earlier 
works. Holders of political office are likewise disproportionately from upper social 
classes and have higher educational qualifications than the population at large. 
Moreover, socioeconomic inequality between participants and non-participants is 
common to all seven countries, but the larger effects in Yugoslavia, India and the United 
States, and smaller effects in Austria and Japan suggest country-level factors at work. 
Verba et al. observe that "where there is explicit contestation among social groups and 
where that contestation is reflected in the institutional structure of politics, the implicit 
class bias in political activity can be diminished" (1978, p. 307). 
The focus on SES stems from rational choice theories of social action, which 
emphasise the different costs and benefits of participation (or any other activity) to the 
individual. Downs (1957a, 1957b) popularised a model of voting in which potential 
voters have imperfect information about which candidate or party would provide them 
with the most utility, according to their own calculation, and that to gather the requisite 
information to make a rational choice is prohibitively expensive for most citizens. 
Moreover, with the very small relative value of each vote (1/n, where n is all voters in 
an election), a rational citizen should choose to stay home, and turnout should be 
confined to citizens with ample information or clear preferences in terms of utility 
maximisation. This basic equation informs later research on rational choice and voting 
(Aldrich, 1993; Blais, 2000). 
However, as Downs himself notes, the equation underestimates both voter 
turnout and participation in other forms of political activity. Subsequent rational 
choice studies have considered the effects of citizens' sense of civic duty and desire to 
express their political beliefs or partisanship on the decision to vote (Blais, 2000; Riker 
and Ordeshook, 1968). These and similar factors help to explain why citizens 
overcome the collective action problem inherent to most forms of participation, 
whereby the benefits gained ( e.g. a change of government, policy innovation or 
electoral reform) accrue to all citizens, and not just participants. Downs' (1957a, 
1957b) equation concludes that most citizens should 'free ride' rather than participate: 
reap the benefits of participation without having to actually participate. This is likely to 
be most observable among citizens with low SES, for whom participating is relatively 
costly (for example Ostrom, 1998). 
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Beyond civic duty and political expression, social capital can also explain why 
citizens participate in spite of their apparent rational interests. The social capital 
explanation accords with Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Blais' (2000) theories of 
civic duty and voting. Where a citizen possesses feelings of social trust, confidence in 
generalised reciprocity among society, and is embedded in social networks (per the 
common definitions of social capital), she is more likely to vote in spite of the rational 
calculation (Coleman, 1988; La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998; Putnam, 1995, 2001; 
Stolle, 2007). Likewise, the civic duty thesis argues that although citizens are 
heterogeneous in their civic duty, "the belief that in a democracy every citizen should 
feel obliged to vote induces many people to vote in almost all elections" (Blais, 2000, p. 
113). In both the social capital and civic duty explanations, the voter maximises his 
utility by contributing to society and/ or democracy, rather than accruing a 
personalised benefit. 
Other major participation studies have explored apparent negative 
relationships between SES and participation, arguing the effects of factors similar to 
civic duty and social capital. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) propose a 'political logic' 
model of participation. Political logic attempts to explain why, for instance, 
participation among African-Americans in the United States increased in the 1960s, 
before decreasing in the 1970s, in contrast to slow increases in thei r socioeconomic 
resources. Participation is instead hypothesised as the product of strategic interactions 
between citizens, politicians and institution, and not just the spontaneous outcome of 
accumulated socioeconomic resources. Particularly, Rosenstone and Hansen observe 
the effects of mobilisation, both by political institutions (such as candidates and 
political parties) and social networks (family, friends and colleagues; this reinforces the 
social capital explanation). Citizens tend not to participate spontaneously, but need to 
be asked. The political logic model also goes some way to explaining easily observable 
phenomena, for instance the relationship between levels of participation and the 
tightness of an election contest, or the organisational activities of African-Americans 
pr~ceding the civil rights movement of the 1960s. 
The next major study of participation in the United States, Voice and Equality: 
Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Verba _et al., 199 5) follows Rosenstone and 
Hansen (199 3) by proposing a 'civic voluntarism' model, combining socioeconomic 
factors and exposure to recruitment to explain participation. Civic voluntarism 
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encompasses three broad factors: resources, which include socioeconomic-related 
resources such as money and education, but also free time and civic skills; engagement, 
which describes a citizen's attitudes towards politics; and recruitment, namely the 
social networks and institutional mechanisms which can draw a citizen into political 
activity. The first notable feature of the civic voluntarism model is that it broadens the 
traditional conception of socioeconomic resources to include some that affect 
participation but are not distributed along socioeconomic lines, including free time and 
civic skills. Second, Verba et al. (1995) are open about the trade-off between 
parsimony and variable omission, arguing that models that exclude mobilisation ignore 
vital determinants of participation. Many participation studies since 1995 have drawn 
on the civic voluntarism model as the bases or justification for their own models (Mutz 
2002; Stolle et al. 2005; Best & Krueger 2005; Zukin et al. 2006). 
A 'long list' of theorised determinants of political participation can be compiled 
by drawing on the major empirical studies (see Table 1.1).2 Grouping the wide range of 
theorised determinants categorically, there is clear overlap between studies and over 
time. Socioeconomic status is the most enduring factor, although the more recent 
studies have paid increasing attention to the effects of institutions, political 
circumstances and social networks in mobilising citizens into action. Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) summarise the move away from a primarily socioeconomic model of 
participation by observing that very few citizens participate in politics spontaneously. 
Socioeconomic resources can consequently be described as necessary but not sufficient 
conditions of participation. Mobilising forces are common but not necessary or 
sufficient conditions of participation. Citizens have the capacity participate in politics 
without being mobilised, but they rarely do. On the contrary, even an enthusiastic, 
heavily mobilised citizen will find participation difficult without basic resources. 
To consolidate the established determinants of participation in the form of a 
comprehensive but workable model, this study applies three categories of independent 
variables: resources, engagement and mobilisation. These categories are broadly in 
line with Verba et al.'s (1995) civic voluntarism model. The first category- resources -
includes socioeconomic status (i.e. education, occupation, income and wealth, and 
social class), free time and civic skills. Free time in this context describes "the residual 
2 Rational choice and social capital theories of participation are not included in this list, as they 
have largely been incorporated into the theoretical assumptions of the major participation 
studi es. Moreover, studies such as by Verba et al. (1995) specifically seek to overcome the 
problem with rational choice models (i.e. underestimation). 
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Table 1.1: theorised determinants of political participation in six major academic studies 
Almond and 
Verba {1963} 
Milbrath 
{1965} 
Education Social 
Decision- position 
making skil ls 
Gender 
Family 
socialisation 
Personal 
factors 
Politica l 
setting 
Stimuli 
Verba and 
Nie {1972} 
Socia l status 
Age 
Race 
Organisation 
membership 
Community 
membership 
Verba, Nie 
and Kim 
{1978) 
Socia I status 
Social/ 
political 
conflict 
Rosenstone 
and Hansen 
(1993} 
Verba, 
Sch/ozman 
and Brady 
(1995} 
Money 
Time 
Civic skills 
Attitudes Psychological 
Interests engagement 
Identification 
Beliefs 
Direct 
mobilisation 
Indirect 
mobilisation 
Recruitment 
time available to an individual after accounting for the hours spent doing necessary 
household tasks of all sorts including child care, working for pay including commuting 
and work taken home (for those in the work force), studying or going to school (for 
those taking courses towards a degree), and sleeping" (Verba et al., 199 5, p. 289). It 
becomes apparent that free time is not necessarily associated with socioeconomic 
status. For instance, a retired pensioner is likely to have more free time than money. 
On the contrary, a 3 5 year old with full-time employment and two young children may 
have a relatively high household income but little free time. 
Civic skills are likewise not necessarily related with socioeconomic status, They 
comprise language, decision-making, public speaking, letter writing and planning 
competencies (Verba et al., 1995), The measurement of civic skills takes into account 
more variance and nuance than the more blunt measurement of socioeconomic status, 
Civic skills can be attained independently of socioeconomic resources. Church 
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attendance, for example, is more popular among African-Americans and women than 
Anglo males, who are the embodiment of high socioeconomic status. Membership of a 
church is also unrelated to family income; instead, it is distributed evenly among across 
all income categories (Verba et al., 1995 et al). However, job-related skills and 
educational attainment are associated with socioeconomic status, and more heavily 
concentrated among the wealthy. Indeed, educational attainment is commonly one of 
the major measures of socioeconomic status. Overall, civic skills are differentially 
distributed, just as they are differentially useful among types of participatory 
behaviours (Verba et al., 1995): letter writing is aided by job-related skills, while 
working with others is aided by church-related skills, for instance. 
The second category of participatory factors is engagement. Engagement 
describes how a citizen feels about politics: the subjective feelings of political efficacy, 
identification with a party, interest in politics generally, attitudes towards civic life, 
including civic duty and citizenship, and how much he knows about politics. Political 
efficacy measures the extent to which a citizen feels that he can achieve something 
within the political system, whether that protesting can effect a change in policy, or 
voting can be an expression of a political preference. Party identification - or 
partisanship - is a simple measure of a citizen's attachment to any of the major political 
parties in a system. Political interest is likewise a straightforward measure of 
engagement and awareness of politics. Civic attitudes are more complicated, measured 
commonly by the importance a citizen places on aspects of citizenship. Dalton (2008a, 
p. 30), for example, uses attitudes towards voting, military service, taxation, obedience 
to the law, social activity, government accountability, parochialism, consumerism and 
social understanding as proxies for citizenship norms. Political knowledge describes 
how much factual information someone possesses. While some measures of 
engagement - particularly efficacy and knowledge - increase with socioeconomic 
status, they nonetheless have a significant role in predicting participation after 
controlling for resources and civic skills (Verba et al., 1995, p. 352)3. Resources and 
engagement are interdependent in the process of participation : 
"It is not suffi'cient to know and care about politics. If wishes were resources, 
then beggars would participate. Political engagement, however, does not 
produce resources, and the resource-poor are less politically active that those 
who are better endowed with resources" (Verba et al., 1995, p. 355). 
3 Verba et al.'s (1995: 352) ordinary least sq uares regression finds beta scores of 0.24 for 
political interest, 0.12 for political efficacy and 0.6 for partisan strength, with p<0.01 for each. 
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Resources and mobilisation share a similar interdependence in the 
participation model: "people participate in politics for a host of reasons, but 
mobilization makes citizen participation both more common and more consequential" 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, p. 37). There are two broad types of mobilisation: 
direct and indirect. Direct mobilisation describes the provision by political actors of 
opportunities to participate which would not otherwise exist: political party meetings, 
rallies, circulation of petitions and 'get out the vote' phone calls, for instance. This kind 
of mobilisation is contingent upon the political and institutional environment, including 
voter registration laws, electoral systems and political party structures. Laws that 
mandate voting, such as in Australia, have arguably the largest mobilising effect 
(Lijphart, 1997). Indirect mobilisation refers to informal social networks: the influence 
of friends, family, colleagues and neighbours in encouraging participation. One 
example is an invitation to go along with a friend to a political party meeting. The 
internet, by enabling quick, easy and cheap diffuse communications, has the capacity to 
mobilise large numbers of citizens across time and space (Norris, 2002) . 
1.3 Normative approaches to political participation 
The study of political participation tends to take two normative positions: that 
rates of participation should be high ( although not ubiquitous), and that those who 
participate should be as representative of the citizenry as possible. Arguments abound 
that democracy is failing on both fronts . Participation rates are falling across a range of 
measures, but most notably with regard to voter turnout. Putnam (2001) argues that a 
golden era of high levels political participation is rapidly behind us. Democracy also 
appears to be failing on the second position: that participants should be as 
representative as possible (Altman and Perez-Linan, 2002; Fiorina, 1999; Lijphart, 
1997; Putnam et al., 1994; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Lijphart's (1997) address 
to the American Political Science Association, in which he calls for solutions to 
'democracy's unresolved dilemma', the upper-class bias among participants, suggests 
compulsory voting - among other reforms - to redress to inequality. This section 
explores evidence of international trends in political engagement and participation and 
of socioeconomic biases among the politically engaged and active, noting that the larger 
the number of participants, the more representative they are of the population. 
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Declines in engagement and participation 
Falling voter turnout among citizens in advanced democracies is the most 
widely cited example of larger, downward trends in rates of political participation.4 
Figure 1.1 shows the compelling nature of the data: average voter turnout (as a 
proportion of the voting aged population) in the largest advanced democracies has 
clearly declined over the past 70 years. The same trend holds among registered voters, 
with Blais (2007) observing that turnout in a sample of advanced democracies has 
fallen 83.1 per cent ofregistered voters in the 1970s to 73.9 per cent in the 2000s. 
Declines in turnout - and other, non-electoral forms of participation - have two 
possible sources. 
The first is generational; that rates of political participation have possibly 
peaked, and as current generations die out they will be replaced by apathetic 
successors. This position is typified by Putnam, who observes that participation rates 
decline among every generational cohort born later than 1930: "every year the Grim 
Reaper removes another swath of the most politically engaged generation in the 
American electorate" (2001, p.34-5). Other studies to find evidence for generational 
declines in turnout include Miller (1992), Blais, Gidengil, Nevitte and Nadau (2002) and 
Franklin (2004). Given evidence that voting is habit-forming, falling numbers of young 
people voting now will lead to lower turnout rates in the future (see for example 
Gerber et al. 2003; Denny & Doyle 2009; Cutts et al. 2009; Aldrich et al. 2011) . Franklin 
warns that "elections that do not stimulate high turnout among young adults leave a 
'footprint' of low turnout in the age structure of the electorate as many individuals who 
were new at those elections fail to vote at subsequent elections" (2004, p. 115). 
The second possible source of declining turnout is a lifecycle effect, whereby 
citizens do not vote when they are young, but will become active later in life. While the 
first signs of generational effects on turnout are seen in the growing numbers of young 
people not voting, some researchers argue (for example Wattenberg, 2008) that young 
people have never voted in the same numbers as their parents or grandparents, but 
that b·end data suggest that they do end up voting eventually. However, it is also the 
case that young people are not inactive, but are choosing more expressive acts not 
traditionally considered 'participation', such as working with others in their 
4 Voter turnout is used here as a typical example of political participation for the sake of 
parsimony, but it must be noted that other, nonconventional forms of participation such as 
protests and consumer boycotts are increasingly in popularity. They are discussed in detail 
in Chapter 7. 
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community, boycotting a consumer product or expressing political beliefs and ideas 
online (Bang, 2004; Dalton, 2008a; Vromen, 2008a, 2007, 2003a; Wattenberg, 2008). 
Outside of the polling booth, other forms of political participation have experienced 
different trends in popularity in recent times. 
Figure 1.2 provides an overview of a range of attitudes, political activities and 
civic behaviours in Australia and the United States, to situate the Australian case both 
against another major (and the most studied) democracy, as well as over time. A 
person's political interest is generally stable over his lifecycle (Prior, 2010), and so this 
appears to be a generational decline in interest. The reasons for this are not clear; 
while lifecycle events can affect political interest, generally people return to the level of 
political interest into which they were socialised O ennings and Niemi, 1968; Langton 
and Jennings, 1968; Prior, 2010). Among the political behaviours graphed in Figure 1.2, 
rates of petition signing and boycott activity have downward trends, while lawful 
demonstration behaviour is stable. The civic behaviours have a more consistent 
pattern, with active membership of a political party, church congregation, labour union 
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Figure 1.2: Trends in political interest and non-electoral forms of political and civic participation, 
1981 to 2013 
Data points on the x-axes represent WVS waves: 1=1981-84, 2=1994-99, 3=1999-2004, 4=2005-07 
and 5=2009-13. Y-axes represent percentage of population . Lines represent Australian data (black) 
and United States data (grey). 
Source: World Va lues Survey (World Va lues Survey Association 2009; 2013). 
and environmental organisation all becoming less common si nce 1991. These, and 
other examples of civic activities, form the basis of Putnam's (2001) argument on th e 
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loss of social capital in American communities and the consequent loss of opportunities 
to participate in political life. 
Any decrease in participate rates has negative implications for representative 
democracy, and particularly for groups that find themselves underrepresented. More 
people voting ensures more representative electoral and policy outcomes (Hill et al., 
1995; Pacek and Radcliff, 1995). On the other hand, several studies have found 
evidence that a socioeconomically biased electorate does not affect policy outcomes 
(for example Tucker et al., 1986; Citrin et al., 2003). Nonetheless, who participates, 
why they participate and why some people choose not to participate all have potential 
implications for representation and public policy (Schlozman et al., 2012). This 
encapsulates the second component of the participation problem: the socioeconomic 
disparity between participants and non-participants. Explanations for the 
overrepresentation of well-resourced citizens - those with good educations, high 
incomes and well-developed civic skills - are discussed at length throughout the study. 
What matters in the first instance is that the "systematic class bias" exists (Lijphart, 
1997, p.1) . 
Increasing inequality between participants and abstainers 
Compounding the problems of overall decline in turnout ancfinequality among 
those who do participate is their inverse relationship. For instance, when voter turnout 
is lower, inequality between voters and non-voters is higher (Rosenstone & Hansen, 
1993). Likewise, the positive relationship between socioeconomic status, particularly 
education, and voting turnout is both strong and enduring, being first documented in 
the United States in the 1920s (Lijphart, 1997 p.2). Rational choice theory argues that 
the costs of participating, while generally outweighing the benefits, have less impact on 
the wealthy and educated than other citizens in a population. The collective action 
problem of participation therefore sees those citizens without ample time or money the 
first to abstain from participating. While arguments are made elsewhere (for example 
Dal.ton 2008a) that socioeconomic deprivation is a factor in mobilising a citizen to 
participate in political activity, the socioeconomic bias among participants suggests 
that under-resourced citizens free-ride, or abstain while enjoying the policy outcomes 
gained by participants. Lijphart (1997) argues forcefully that compulsory voting is the 
only antidote to the free-riding problem. 
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Four key socioeconomic differences between politically active and inactive 
citizens populate the literature: education, income, age and gender. As the two key 
measures of socioeconomic status, this section discusses education and income 
together. Alternatively, Milbrath (1965) describes them as measures of 'social 
position', which encompasses what many researchers have found regarding the effects 
of education and income: that participants in political life are established in their 
communities, financially comfortably and have enough formal education to form and 
express their views confidently (for example Almond & Verba 1963; Milbrath 1965; 
Verba & Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Putnam 2001). Verba et al. (1995) extend the 
description of participants to include having not just money and education, but free 
time (and are therefore commonly retired) and civic skills including language 
proficiency and experience organising meetings, among others. 
The second major difference between participants and non-participants is their 
mean age. However, the age gap varies with the type of activity. Formal modes of 
participation such as voting and political party membership tend to be the domain of 
the middle aged and elderly, while protestors are on average young (Dalton, 2008). 
The age bias is consequently not as problematic as the socioeconomic bias among 
participants, as young citizens instead represent their views in other, non-traditional 
ways (for example Vromen 2003; Dalton 2008; Wattenberg 2008). Finally, participants 
are for the most part disproportionately male, reflecting the political socialisation 
process - within the family, but also in the workplace and among peers - which has 
entrenched highe r levels of political knowledge and interest among men than women 
(Bennett and Bennett, 1989; Coffe and Bolzendahl, 2010; Schlozman et al., 1994; Verba 
et al., 1997).5 Gender may come to differentiate participants and non-participants less, 
particularly as increasing numbers of women attain university education and ongoing 
professional employment. 
Any skew in the characteristics of those who participate in politics has 
implications for electoral, representative an d policy outcomes. First, there is evidence 
that low voter turnout affects parties' electoral fortunes: some argue that left-wing 
voters are the most likely to stay home, and right-wing parties benefit as a consequence 
(De Nardo, 1980; McAllister, 1986), others that low turnout benefits the challenger over 
5 However, Dolan (2011) finds that the gender gap in political knowledge decreases when 
female respondents are asked questions about women's representation; the gap as it stands 
reflects the corresponding gap in representation. Other researchers have noted 
methodological problems with the measurement of political knowledge (Delli Carpini and 
Ke eter, 1997; Luskin, 1990; Mondak, 2001). 
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the incumbent (Tucker et al., 1986). Others still have argued that any effects follow 
random patterns and are inconsequential (Lutz and Marsh, 2007). Electoral outcomes 
in turn have effects on the representation of certain groups and individuals in an 
electorate. In a non-compulsory system such as the United States, an institutional 
design as small as voter registration requirements can keep citizens without an 
adequate education or with poor civic skills from voting, resulting in electoral 
outcomes against their interests (Lijphart 1997, p.6). 
Research suggests automatic registration alone could increase voter turnout by 
as many as 15 percentage points (Lijphart 1997), and potentially change electoral 
results. Further, while some evidence has exists that turnout directly affects policy 
outcomes ( with higher turnout leading to greater spending on social welfare, for 
example (Fowler, 2013; Hill et al., 1995) most effects on policy are expected to be 
mediated by electoral outcomes. Most research finds little or no difference in policy 
opinions between voters and non-voters (see Lutz & Marsh 2007 for examples). In 
terms of non-electoral participation, the representation of the opinions and concerns of 
a plurality of citizens is vital to democracy (Schlozman et al., 2012). Or, in another way: 
"the blunt truth ... that politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay 
much heed to classes and groups of citizens that do not vote'JKey, 1949, p. 147, 
in Lijphart, 1997, p. 4) . 
Who participates therefore has implications for the quality of representative 
democracy. Any effects of the internet in reducing the socioeconomic bias among 
participants will likewise have far-reaching consequences for democratic health. 
1.4. 'Traditional' and 'emerging' forms of participation 
Dalton (2008, ·p.3) argues that behind the concern about declining rates of 
participation turnout is old-fashioned inter-generational angst: younger generations 
not living up to their elders' expectations of proper civic duty. Also feeding into this 
a11gst is discomfort with changing social attitudes, technological innovation, and what is 
widely described as the generalised apathy of'Generations X and Y' (Dalton 2008, 
p.37). To describe and measure participation as a static concept- as something that 
can be measured and tracked over a long period of time, across different countries, 
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regimes, systems of government, socioeconomic conditions and experiences of conflict 
or war - is misleading. Almond has described political culture as a "many dimensioned 
variable, [which] responds quickly to structural change" (1995, p.S). Accordingly, 
research needs to move towards a more fluid concept of participation, focusing on what 
citizens do rather than on what researchers necessarily expect them to do (Vromen, 
2003). 
It is therefore necessary to disaggregate what is meant by the term 
'participation'. It is instructive to think about participation in a practical context. 
Political scientists have traditionally adopted measures of participation with inherent 
emphasis on what constitutes active citizenship. For Putnam (2001), group 
membership and the associated social capital is central to being a good citizen; he 
famously laments the decline of bowling leagues in the United States, but also the 
decline of voluntary civic and political organisations. On the other hand, Norris (2002) 
and Dalton (2008) broaden the measurement of participation to include new 
behaviours based on what is observable on an a priori basis. Consequently, the Norris-
Dalton conceptualisation of participation involves illegal protest and exclusively online 
associations - political behaviours that are a world away from the voluntary 
associations described by Putnam. 
The distinction between Putnam (2001), on the one hand, and Norris (2002) 
and Dalton (2008a) on the other, is not new. Traditional and emerging forms of 
participation have variously been described as materialist and post-materialist 
(lnglehart, 1977), conventional and unconventional (Barnes and Kaase, 1979), 
institutional and non-institutional (Kaase, 2007) and duty-based and engaged (Dalton, 
2008b ). These labels generally describe the same phenomenon: a cultural shift and 
consequent decline of political participation that is supportive of a regime or 
institution, and the concurrent increase in participation which supports institutional 
reform or regime change. Inglehart (1977, 2008) describes a culture shift among 
citizens of Western democracies based on theories of needs found in the psychology 
literature. Citizens, Inglehart argues, place the highest value on what they most 
desperately need. With the advent of expansive access to education (including higher 
education) and post-war economic prosperity across advanced nations, citizens saw 
their most primal needs - of physical security - filled, and could look to have less 
material needs filled. Moreover with increasing rates of tertiary education, citizens 
began to express broad, thoughtful, 'postmaterial' needs. 
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Postmateralist value shifts permeate much political participation literature, 
even where they are not mentioned. Dalton (2008a) describes the consequent shift in 
citizenship norms, based on the postmaterialist expression of needs, as moving from 
duty-based to engaged citizenship. Measures of the two types of citizenship norm are 
shown in Table 1.2. According to Dalton (2008b, p.38), traditional notions of 
citizenship are widespread among citizens born before 1960 and exist in equal 
measure to emerging notions of citizenship among members of Generation X (those 
born after 1960 and before 1972, per Dalton's categorisation). Among Generation Y, 
born after 1972, the "erosion of duty-based norms ... is offset by increased support for 
engaged citizenship, which stresses alternative forms of political participation, concern 
for the less privileged, and attention to the views of others" (Dalton 2008b, p.3 8). 
Viewing the same phenomenon from the opposite perspective, Putnam (2001) laments 
the decline of instrumental, community-based forms of political participation in place 
of individualised, expressive and in many cases unmeasured forms of participation. 
A critical approach to the study of emerging modes of participation congregates 
around Bang's (2004) conception of'elite citizens' and 'everyday makers'. Bang argues 
that participants increasingly "do not address their participation specifically towards 
the state, as either state driven or civil society driven, but rather engage in the building 
and running of governance networks and reflexive political communlties" (Bang, 2004, 
p. 5). Professional, full-time members of these communities - for example lobbyists for 
welfare organisations - are termed 'expert citizens', and volunteers, supporters and 
others who work toward similar ends 'everyday makers'. Unlike traditional 
conceptualisations of participation, wherein citizens agitate in favour or opposition to a 
government decision, elite citizens (who comprise the 'new republican elite') and 
everyday makers form around <;ommon projects. 
As with Dalton's (2008a; 2008b) measures of engaged citizenship, existing 
mass surveys and datasets have not measured participatory behaviour as envisaged by 
Bang and others; rather, a literature consisting of qualitative and survey research has 
emerged to explore these new concepts (O'Toole et al., 2003). Li and Marsh (2008) find 
that the demographic and socioeconomic profile of British expert citizens resembles 
thbse of traditional participants: they are predominantly male, middle-aged and highly 
educated. British everyday makers tend more towards Dalton's (2008a) engaged 
citizens: younger, female and not married. I,n the Australian context, Vromen (2003a) 
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Table 1.2: Measures of two types of citizenship, per Dalton (2008a)'s 'good citizen' thesis 
Citizen duty 
Vote in elections 
Never evade taxes 
Serve in military 
Obey the law 
Report a crime 
Serve on a jury 
Engaged citizen 
Active in association/voluntary groups 
Understand others 
Choose products (i.e. consumer boycotts) 
Help worse off in the world 
Help worse off in America 
Form own opinions 
Source: Dalton 2008a, p.7, based on 2004 General Social Survey and 2005 Center for Democracy and 
Civil Society survey data from the United States. 
finds that 22 per cent of Australian members of Generation X have been involved with 
an activist group, while 69 per cent have had an involvement with a community 
organisation ( excluding sport and recreation groups). Elsewhere (200 3b ), Vromen 
observes that female members of Generation X are more participatory than males, 
based on acritical definition of participation. However, while expert citizens and 
everyday makers can be identified among young Australians, researchers and policy 
makers tend to give more weight to the voices of expert citizens, to the exclusion of 
everyday makers (Vromen and Collin, 2010). 
For other researchers, the more remarkable shift in participatory behaviours is 
shaped by the internet. Eschewing the 'Generation Y' label as premature - "generations 
are shaped by shared experiences and are clear only in history's rear-view mirror" -
Zukin et al. (2006, p.15) refer to citizens born after 1976 as 'DotNets': the first citizens 
whose defining characteristics will be shaped by the internet. The internet is placed at 
the forefront of these citizens' lives: 
"Information has always been virtually costless and universally available to 
them; technology cheap and easily mastered; community as much a digital place 
of interest as·a shared physical space" (Zukin et al., 2006, p. 15). 
The advent of online political participation demands even further disaggregation of 
participation measures (Gibson and Rommele, 2004). It further requires ongoing 
revision of what constitutes 'good' citizenship, and the role of social capital and 
community in the political process. To begin, does community among members of 
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Generation Y mean online participatory spaces of many (Vromen, 2007) or the "anomic 
bedroom community" of one (Nie, 2001, p. 420)? A rapidly growing literature has 
emerged around these issues: the potential of online networks to lead to offline 
engagement (Rojas and Puig-i-Abril, 2009; Gil de Zuniga and Valenzuela, 2011); 
political expression online (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2009; Macnamara, 2012; Park, 2013; 
Shah et al., 2005); and the creation of social capital on the internet (Best and Krueger, 
2006; Robinson and Martin, 2010) . 
This study contributes to the emerging literature, but draws on the traditional 
models of participation for its empirical basis. The measures of participation draw 
from both the traditional and emerging literatures: electoral and campaign acts reflect 
Milbrath (1965), Verba and Nie (1972), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), and 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), among others; measures of communal and protest 
participation are taken from Verba and Nie (1972), Verba et al. (1995), Dalton, 
(2008a), Dalton et al., (2010), Caren et al., (2011) and Schlozman et al., 2012. 
Measures of political discussion and other forms of expression are excluded to restrict 
the focus on participation. Similarly, forms of protest such as political consumerism, 
boycotts, and building occupations are omitted due to a lack of available data. There is 
some debate over the classification of participatory acts, both as participation and as 
particular types of participation (Claggett and Pollock, 2006; Teorell~2006). However, 
by drawing from the major participation studies in delimiting and categorising 
participation, this study contributes to a literature well established over both time and 
breadth of cases. 
1.5 Research on the different forms of participation 
'Political participation' describes a diverse range of politics-related behaviours. 
Each behaviour in turn encompasses a different set of participants, intentions, 
. . 
processes and outcomes. The act of voting, for example, in Australia occurs according 
to legislation passed by the legislature and the executive, and the act itself serves to 
elect members of the legislature. Voting is inextricably nested within those institutions. 
Participating in a demonstration, on the other hand, can be an act of defiance towards 
those institutions. A demonstration may seek to bverthrow the executive's power or to 
remove members from the legislature. It has the capacity to undermine state 
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institutions, in direct contrast to voting. Accordingly, there are different theories as to 
who engages in different forms of participation, and why. This section looks at what is 
known about electoral, campaign, communal and protest participation. 
It is well established that electoral participation, as measured by voter turnout 
at general elections, is declining internationally. This is not just an empirical but also a 
normative problem: writing about the US, Wolfinger and Rosenstone observe that 
" ... elections are at the core of the American political system. They are the way 
we choose government leaders, a source of the government's legitimacy, and a 
means by which citizens try to influence public policy. And for most Americans, 
voting is the only form of political participation" (1980, p. 1). 
Declining turnout means fewer citizens deciding the vital questions of who governs and 
how. Moreover, declining turnout is associated with a more socioeconomically biased 
voter base, as the less educated and lowest income earners are the most likely to 
abstain (Lijphart, 1997; Verba et al., 1978). The theoretical literature on electoral 
participation centres on rational choice theory: there are costs incurred in voting but 
also benefits to be gained, and that a rational citizen will weigh those costs and benefits 
in making the decision whether ixt is worth voting (see for example Downs 1957; Blais 
2000). Certainly, this is evident at the aggregate level, as the wealthiest and most 
educated citizens, for whom voting has relatively few costs, turn out in the highest 
numbers in many democracies (Blais, 2000; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995, 
1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). 
However, Blais (2000) argues that reliance on rationality as a predictor of voter 
turnout omits other important factors and is often entirely wrong. First, the benefits of 
voting are remarkably small: the probability of any individual's vote determining an 
electoral outcome is too miniscule as to be worth incurring the costs of participating 
(Blais, 2000). Further, there is a range of other factors that have been found to affect 
voter turnout, including electoral laws (Powell, 1982), mobilisation by political parties 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) and a learned sense of civic duty (Blais, 2000). 
Compulsory voting laws mandate that all eligible citizens both enrol to vote and cast a 
ballot in federal and state parliamentary elections, or pay a fine. Lijphart (1997) 
commends compulsory voting as a panacea to the socioeconomic bias among voters in 
voluntary systems, however little research has examined the characteristics of 
Australian voters. With more than 80 per cent of the voting age population casting a 
ballot at the 2010 election Australia's turnout rate is comparatively high, but not 
30 
complete. The majority of abstainers in Australia are not enrolled to vote (Australian 
Electoral Commission, 2012a). Very little is known aboutthese citizens, exceptthat 
they are disproportionately young and residentially mobile (Australian Electoral 
Commission, 2012a). 
Research into the internet's effects on voting has focused on two main 
questions: whether generalised internet use increases the likelihood than an individual 
user will vote in an election; and whether internet-based voting has the potential to 
increase turnout. The first question takes into account the increased volume of 
political, election and campaign information circulated online as more citizens become 
internet users. Online campaigns by political parties and other interested groups to 
mobilise voters have been found to be as effective as offline mobilisation campaigns 
(Hooghe et al., 2010), but arguably most effective among those likely to vote anyway, 
producing a reinforcing effect (Krueger, 2006a). The second focus among the literature 
is the potential of online voting to increase turnout. The lack of available data has 
limited the field to date, however Stromer-Galley (2004) observes that electoral laws 
allowing citizens to vote in absentia have increased turnout among traditionally 
underrepresented populations in a range of jurisdictions, while Bochsler (2010) finds 
the opposite effect in Estonia. 
Campaign participation is defined in this study as acts performed by citizens to 
support the cause of a particular political party or candidate. It is measured by 
strength of party identification, membership of a party and the contribution of money 
or time to a party or candidate. The proportion of citizens identifying with a party, 
usually an antecedent condition of these behaviours, is decJining globally (Dalton, 
2002). Increases in mean educational attainment across advanced societies has seen 
corresponding increases in postmaterial values and cognitive mobilisation, and 
decreases in the need to rely on socialised party identification as a shortcut when 
.. 
deciding whom to vote for (Inglehart J 990; Dalton 1984, 2002). Accordingly, rates of 
party member.ships among the po1mlations of advanced democracies are also in decline 
(Mair and van Biezen, 2001; van Biezen et al., 2012). At the same time, parties 
internationally have exerted l~ss effort mobilising voters, and in turn campaign 
su·pporters (Karp et al., 2008; Wattenberg, 2000; Whiteley and Seyd, 1994). 
31 
In Australi a, rates of party identification are comparatively high (Birch, 2009; 
Mackerras and McAllister, 1999). Mackerras and McAllister attribute this to 
compulsory voting: 
" ... [it] ensures that voters cast a ballot and the act of voting means that they are 
forced to think, at least superficially, about the major parties" (1999, p. 229). 
However, with littl e ne ed to mobilise citizens to get out and vote, it may be expected 
that actively recruiting party members (who in voluntary systems provide a 'get out the 
vote' service) is of relatively low importance to Australian parties. For the same 
reason, electoral campaigns in Australia (and other compulsory voting systems) are 
believed to be less costly and less intensive than in advanced democracies with 
voluntary systems (Birch, 2009). 
Like electoral participation, research on the effects of the internet on partisan 
participation fall into two categories: th e generalised effect of increased exposure to 
political information and recruitment by parties and candidates, and the advent of 
formal online political networks, including online membership options. It has been 
cons istently found that online communications reinforce political engagement among 
the already engaged, rather than mobi lising the disengaged into political action 
(including partisan participation) (Lusoli and Ward, 2004a; Norris, 2003a, 2001b, 
2000). Whitely (20 11) finds no evidence that internet use - particularly onlin e political 
participation - is substituting for party membership among would-be members. In 
Australia, research has fo und that parliamentary representatives and political parties 
make only minimal use of the internet to communicate with citizens (Ward et al., 
2007), and that the citizens most likely to engage with parliamentarians on line are for 
the most part already politically engaged (Gibson et al., 2008) . 
Communal participation describes acts performed by citizens alongside others 
seeking change that would benefit more than one person, and usually avoiding 
confrontation (Verba and Nie, 1972). This study measures communal participation in 
two ways: first, by experience working with others to express a view and second, by 
contacting a governnient official to express a view. They incur different costs and 
benefits to those inst itutionalised forms of participation: the costs of becoming 
informed about an issue or cause must be added to the costs of actually participating, 
including any travel required and time spent meeting with other participants, whil e the 
benefits are often split among a group . The communal outcomes also enco urage 'free 
riding', or abstaining from participation while accruing the same benefits as 
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participants (see for example Putnam 2001). Research has found that communal 
activists have above average educational qualificat;ions, income and are 
disproportionately based in suburbs or rural areas (Verba and Nie, 1972). They also 
display high levels of social trust, and minimal partisanship (Almond and Verba, 1963). 
The subjects of communal activity cluster around the environment, education and law 
and order issues (Verba et al., 1995). 
Specific research into the effects of internet use on communal participation is 
similarly scarce. Jensen, Danziger and Venkatesh (2007) find that participants in online 
communal participation are empirically different from offline participants, displaying 
lower socioeconomic status on average and possessing fewer resources. Lusoli and 
Ward's (2004b) find an activist organisation's use of websites and online 
communications can deepen the engagement of its members, but not that online 
participants would necessarily participate offline. Internet use is associated with many 
causes and organisations spanning national borders, such as anti-globalization 
campaigns (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2002), the government transparency movement 
based loosely on the work of Wikileaks (Hood, 2011), and the international supporters 
of Mexican Zapatista revolutionaries (Martinez-Torres, 2001) among others. In many 
cases, the internet has enabled the formation of cross-national and cross-cultural 
organisations where traditional media would fail. For instance, Capffng and Nossa! 
(2001) and Vromen (2008a) note that the internet has allowed Australian citizens to 
participate in virtual protest communities despite large geographic distances. 
Protest participation is similar to communal participation in that it occurs 
outside of the electoral and partisan institutions of a democratic society, but it tends to 
explicitly conflict with those institutions. This study measures two types of protest: 
petition signing and demonstrating or marching. Two theories about who protests and 
why populate the literature: that citizens protest because they have the means and the 
opportunity (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Verba et al. 1995), or alternatively because they 
are deprived and seek reparation (Kaase and Marsh, 1979a; Orum, 1974; Sayles, 1984). 
Comparative evidence shows that, among developing and advanced democracies, 
protestors possess more socioeconomic resources than not (Dalton et al., 2010). In 
Australia, Bean (1991) finds that protestors are younger, less interested in politics and 
hold more postmaterial values than the rest of the population, ·including participations 
in more orthodox political activity. The role of the internet in protest participation is 
. 
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largely covered by the research on internet use and communal participation, as they 
are often conflated. 
1.6 Methodology 
Conceptual framework 
This study is based on the civic voluntarism model of political participation laid 
out by Verba et. al (1995). The model draws on a collection of empirical data and 
theory based on political and civic behaviour published in a long line of influential 
studies. This study accepts the assumptions implicit in Verba et al.'s (1995) study, even 
though the earlier work was formulated and tested using data from the United States 
and not Australia. There are two reasons for this. First, no specifically Australian 
model of political participation exists and second, even if it did, testing the Australian 
case against international findings embeds this study within an international literature, 
not just the Australian literature. Comparing Australian findings to those elsewhere 
will also point to possible institutional effects on participation in Australia (and in other 
cases), suggesting future research questions. 
The framework applied here models a range of independent variables 
predicting participatory behaviours one at a time. While many of the larger studies of 
participation aggregate acts of participation into a single scale of participation ( or at 
times a binary condition of having participated), this study compares the effects of 
independent variables on different acts . The general model (see Figure 1.3) tested 
throughout this study predicts the effects of time, money, civic skills and recruitment 
on participatory behaviours, controlling for age and sex.6 Measures of engagement, 
such as political interest, are excluded from the model as they control for (and detract 
from) the variables of interest. 
Internet use is conspicuously absent from this list, despite its place at the heart 
of the study. Instead of comprising its own category, internet use is first disaggregated 
into two components - time spent online and internet-related skills - and categorised 
as measures of time and civic skills respectively. This measurement of internet use 
achieves two aims. First, it tests whether internet use is interacting with the civic 
voluntarism model, rather than having effects on participation in isolation to the civic 
6 The specific measures of time, money, civic skills and recruitment are described in the 
following section, as they pertain to th e data used for the analyses. 
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Figure 1.3: Path diagram of the hypothesised effects on participation 
volunta1ism factors·oftime, money and civic skills. This is a logical position, as internet 
use is expected to affect those factors as well as having direct effects on participation 
(see Chapter 3 for more details). Moreover this question goes to the heart of the 
study's aims, namely whether the internet constitutes a resource that assists a citizen 
to become politically active. Second, measuring internet use in two parts tests whether 
those parts - time and skills - have distinct and different effects on participation. 
Data sources and preparation 
This study employs data collected by the AN PAS conducted between 196 7 and 
1979, and the AES surveys conducted between 1987 and 2010 (see Table 1.3). The 
ANPAS studies arose through a partnership between Australian academic Don Aitkin 
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Table 1.3: AN PAS and AES dataset information 
Year Survey lnvestigator/s Total Response 
conducted respondents rate{%} 
1967 ANPAS Aitken, D, Kahan, M . and 2054 n/a 
Stokes, D. 
1969 AN PAS Aitken, D., Kahan, M. and 1873 n/a 
Stokes, D. 
1979 AN PAS Aitkin, D. 2016 n/a 
1987 AES McAllister, I. and Mughan, A. 1830 63 
1990 AES McAllister I., Jones, R. 2037 58 
Papadakis, E. and Gow, D. 
1993 AES Jones, R., McAllister, I. , 3023 63 
Denemark, D. and Gow, D. 
1996 AES Jones, R., McAllister and 1797 62 
Gow. D. 
1998 AES Bean, C., Gow, D. and 1897 58 
McAllister, I. 
2001 AES Gibson, R., McAllister, I. , 2010 56 
Bean, C. and Gow, D. 
2004 AES Bean, C. , McAllister, I. , 2019 4S 
Gibson, R. and Gow, D. 
2007 AES Bean, C. , McAllister, I. and 1873 40 
Gow, D. 
2010 AES McAllister, I., Bean, C. , 2214 43 
Gibson, R. and Pietsch, J. 
and the American co-author of The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960), Donald 
Stokes. Australia was late to the fore in this regard - the United States' National 
Election Study (ANES) commenced in 1952 and the British Election Study (BES)in 1964 
- but now has a more estab lished dataset of political behaviour than exists for many 
other advanced democracies. The AN PAS project represented a shift in Australian 
political science towards the 'Michigan model' of political behaviour, emphasising party 
identification as "a relatively stable characteristic of an individual, usually inherited 
from one's parents in much the same way as one might be socialised into a particular 
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religious self-identification; and that for most voters, more of the time, given 
knowledge of a voter's party identification, one can reliably infer their evaluations of 
candidates, their policy preferences, and, most importantly, their vote choice" 
(Jackman, 2003, p. 274). 
The empirical study of Australian political behaviour commenced by Aitkin was 
continued with the first AES survey in 1987. The AES is a nation-wide, randomly-
sampled postal survey (with online completion offered for the first time in 2010). The 
sample is drawn from the AEC's electoral roll. While the AES was designed to be an 
election study, to be conducted following elections so as to best capture the mood and 
behaviour of the electorate at a time of heightened political activity, it continued some 
core questions from the ANPAS studies, allowing for time series analysis. In addition, 
the AES is a member of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project, the 
consortium of national election studies that designs a number of standardised core 
questions to be shared across the national studies, enabling systematic comparative 
analysis. 
The AES questionnaire regularly includes questions from CSES modules as a 
result, including on participation (in CSES Module 2). CSES data are used to benchmark 
Australian data where appropriate, for instance with regard to comp9rative protest 
behaviour. Where the AES does not measure relevant behaviours, for example political 
party membership, World Values Survey (WVS) data are used instead. The WVS is a 
comparative survey of attitudes and behaviours of citizens in a socially, economically 
and politically diverse range of countries, including Australia. Five waves of the WVS 
have been made publically available; the fifth wave is used for analysis at times 
throughout this study.7 
The study uses the 2010 AES for the majority of its analyses. That study 
surveyed 2214 Australian voters in the aftermath of the 2010 federal election, in which 
the incumbent Australian Labor Party was re-elected. The respondents comprise a 
systematic random sample, with a response rate of 42.5 per cent A second, online-only 
version of the study was conducted to achieve a complete sample of young voters. The 
data in Version 2 are weighted by gender, age, state-territory and 2010 voting 
7 More information, including technical details, on the WVS is available at the WVS website 
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org; accessed 26 August 2013) (World Values Survey Association, 
2009). 
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behaviour (McAllister et al., 2010a). In total, 9.5 per cent of respondents completed the 
questionnaire online, with the rest com pleting a mail-back survey.8 Details of the AES 
variables used throughout the study, including question wordings and recoding 
informatio n, are at Appendix 1. Where variables come from other datasets, question 
wording is available throughout the study. 
There is ongoing debate regarding the merits and pitfalls of survey research. 
Curtice (2007) makes three arguments in defence of surveys: they allow scholars to 
assess the empirical generalisability of a study's claims; they enable comparative study 
of contextual influences on political behaviour which are invariant within a country but 
which vary between countries; and survey data from other countries or contexts 
provide useful points of comparison for single-country studi es. A common criticism of 
comparative survey research is measurement error across different countries,9 
however cross-national projects such as the CSES and European Social Survey (ESS) are 
worki ng to overcome this pitfall. Criticism of single-case survey research tends to 
likewise focus on measurement and design: acquiescence bias describes respondents' 
"tendency to endorse any assertion made in a question, regardless of its content"; 
response order bias describes the effects of a question's position in a survey on how 
that question is answered; and social desirability bias describes the "overreporting of 
admirable attitudes and behaviors and underreporting those that are not socially 
respected" (Krosnick, 1999). Moreover, respondents to a voluntary survey are 
inherently biased: apathetic citizens are not likely to return postal surveys, nor are 
they likely to engage in political behaviour (Jackman, 1999; Krosnick, 1999). 
Despite these problems, surveys are exemplary in measuring mass attitudes 
and behaviours. Further, postal and internet questionnaires such as those used in the 
AES incur less response bias than phone or face- to-face surveys (Johnston, 2008). They 
are also easy to administer, allowing the high number of responses ( and consequent 
enhanced generalizabi li ty) of the AES. The combined AN PAS/ AES dataset used in this 
study is statistically representative of the national population, longitudinal with regard 
to some variables and cross-sectional in other areas, and comparable to other CSES 
surveys in core areas·. It is the most comprehensive dataset on Australian politics, and 
8 Further technical details of the study, and others in the AES series, are avai lab le via the 
Australian Data Archive website (www.ada.edu.au; accessed 26 August 2013) (McAllister et 
al., 2010) . 
9 Survey research in China, for example, is restricted by political sensitivities (Kittilson, 2007) ; 
likewise translation and semantic differences between countries can pose reli abi lity 
problems (Curtice, 2007). 
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readily accessible. Even with the problems inherent in conducting secondary research, 
much less using a dataset largely focussed on election campaigns and not political 
behaviour generally, AES data are ideal. Where measures of the behaviours studied 
here are not available in the AES dataset, census and WVS data provide appropriate 
measures, and CSES data assist the external validity and benchmarking of AES data. 
Measures in the 2010 AES are particularly appropriate to this study. Some 
newly included measures refer directly to the civic voluntarism model, for instance a 
question on respondents' free time and a battery of questions on experience with job-
related activities. Tables in Appendix 1 show how survey questi ons have been matched 
to behaviours throughout the analysis, with explanations of the measures where proxy 
measures or recoded data have been used. Variables have been recoded where original 
coding was in the inverse order to that required for analysis here, for instance the 
variable measuring 'political interest' has been recoded so that the highest value 
represents the highest level of interest Further information on recoded variables is 
available in Appendix 1. 
Elsewhere, variables have been recoded to turn ordinal or categorical data into 
binary measures to maximise the n on that measure, for instance the small number of 
respondents reporting as active and inactive members of political pa!_"ties have been 
combined in a binary measure. Where scale variables have been created from binary 
and categorical measures, confirmatory factor analysis has been used to assess the 
internal validity of the new variable. Each of the newly created scale variables was 
found to associate across each factor at statistically significant levels. The measure of 
language proficiency has likewise been recoded from a broad range of countries of 
birth into a binary category of English-speaking countries vis a vis all others. Other 
amendments to AES and WVS data are detailed in Appendix 1. Missing data have been 
excluded list\,vise, maximising the validity of the data while retaining relatively large 
sample sizes. At all times, variables have only been amende_d from the original data to 
assist with analysis. 
Analysis 
This study employs a range of techniques to analyse and present the 
quantitative data detailed above. The analyses follow a general pattern, wherein 
attitudes and behaviours are explained using frequency and descriptive data, before 
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the specific effects of internet use on different forms of participation are explored using 
either binary logistic or ordinary least squares regression analysis methods, as best 
suits the dependent variable. This format reflects the fact that without a broad, 
overarching sense of how people in the population have been behaving, the later 
regression analysis has no meaningful context. Accordingly, the study chooses simple 
analytical techniques over complicated ones where possible, to convey what is 
happening at an aggregate level in a way that is easy to comprehend. Combined with 
theoretical explanations and hypotheses, frequency and descriptive data tell us much 
about changes in behaviour over time. Early chapters, including this one, demonstrate 
trends such as the proportion of voting aged citizens who have participated in 
elections, changes in individual-level interest in politics or the diffusion of internet 
access throughout Australia over time. The AES data are well suited to this purpose, as 
many measures have been repeated over several surveys. 
After the context of each dependent variable is described with data and 
theoretical explanation, t-test analyses are used to examine the statistical differences 
between the mean characteristics of different groups. For the most part, t-test analysis 
here details the differences in mean characteristics between Australians who do 
participate in a certain activity and those who do not. These analyses show a prime 
facie picture of the differences between participants and non-participants without 
controlling for various factors. For instance, t-test analysis finds significant differences 
in how frequently demonstrators and non-demonstrators use the internet. These 
fi ndings do not reveal anything about the effects of the internet - there is no 
specification within the test that denotes the di rection of the relationship - but allows 
the reader to visualise a typical demonstrator vis a vis a typical non-demonstrator. 
Knowing the internet habits, as well as other characteristics such as educational 
atta inment, household income, employment status and political interest, provides 
important context for the following multivariate regression analysis. 
Multivariate regression methods are employed throughout the study to 
measure the linear relationships between a range of independent variables, as specified 
in Figure 1.3, and the dependent variable, a measure of specific forms of participation 
(for example Achen, 1982). The model specificati on is based on Verba et al. 's (1995) 
civic voluntarism model of participation, controlling for age and gender. Logistic 
regression models predict binary dependent variables, assuming a curvilinear, chi-
square distribution wherein y does not breach the parameters of O and 1 (for exam pie 
Long, 1997). Logistic regression is used for the majority of analyses throughout the 
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study, notably where scale or categorical measures have been compressed into binary 
measures to maximise the number of cases being predicted. By comparison, OLS 
regression analysis is only used to predict the effects of a range of factors at the federal 
electoral division level, including rates of broadband and dial-up internet access, on 
voter enrolment and turnout. OLS regression is used for this particular analysis as it 
assumes that the dependent variable has a linear distribution, which turnout and 
enrolment both have, within the broad range of O to 100 per cent. This study uses OLS 
techniques at the aggregate ( or ecological) level. Ecological regression analysis applies 
the same assumptions as when OLS regression is used to predict individual level data, 
but instead predicts data aggregated at any level larger than the individual. In this 
instance, federal electoral division level data comprise both the independent and 
dependent variables. 
Specific problems pertaining to the data and methodology have arisen during 
the analyses, and are accounted for in various ways. First, missing data are excluded 
listwise, as the sample size is large enough to allow to the omission of cases as required. 
While this avoids the problems inherent to imputing missing data values, it at the same 
time encounters the problem of non-response bias, whereby respondents intentionally 
avoid providing certain responses (Allison, 2001). On balance, excluding cases with 
missing data in the model specification is chosen to maintain reliabilil:y and validity. 
Second, the small number of variance among responses to some ordinal measures (for 
example, the small number of respondents who report contributing money to political 
parties or candidates) means that, in order to conduct a valid analysis, they have been 
compressed to dichotomous measures. In so doing, information is lost that would 
otherwise add explanatory power to the analysis. However, to explore different 
dimensions of participation in Australia the variables have been recoded as 
appropriate, and logistic regression analysis used to predict the dependent variable. 
A third methodological probler:n encountered by this study is the availability of 
specific measures. With regards to campaign participation, this is resolved by 
anafysing WVS data rather than AES data. As a result, the findings from Chapter 5 may 
differ in substance from those in Chapters 6 and 7 due to measurement differences, but 
theoretical explanations of the analyses helps to overcome that problem. Similarly, the 
lack of individual-level electoral enrolment and turnout data means that some analyses 
in Chapter 4 predict electoral division-level behaviour. Inferring individual-level 
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behaviour, for instance by comparing these results with the individual-level analysis of 
party identification in Chapter 4, is fraught with problems. Accordingly, the discussion 
of results in Chapter 4 contains that caveat. Finally, the cross sectional analyses in this 
study restrict the causal inferences that can be made from the findings. With this in 
mind, the findings do not make strictly causal claims. However, the statistical results 
coupled with the vast literature and accumulated theories of participation inform the 
findings, including the direction of relationships and exogeneity of independent 
variables. Consequently, regression coefficients are referred to as 'effects' where 
appropriate. 
1. 7 Conclusion 
This study draws heavily on the political participation literature in studying the 
effects of internet use on participation in Australia. Tracing the study of participation 
through the seminal works by Almond and Verba (1963), Milbrath (1965), Verba and 
Nie (1972), Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the model 
of participation proposed by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) is described as the 
most comprehensive to date. Accordingly, the civic voluntarism model described in 
that study has been appropriated for use in this study. The main difference of that 
model from those of previous studies is the specification of resources - namely time, 
money and civic skills - in the place of straightforward measures of socioeconomic 
status. Resources are differentially associated with socioeconomic status, explaining 
the high numbers of low-income earning church-attendees who participate in political 
activity in the United States, for example (Verba et al., 1995). In this study, the civic 
voluntarism is expanded to include internet use. Internet use is first disaggregated into 
two components: time spent online and internet-related skills. Time spent online 
constitutes a second measure of time, alongside free time (after sleep, work and family 
care commitments), while internet skills are a fourth measure of civic skills here, 
alongside educational attainment, language proficiency, active membership of non-
political organisations and job-related skills. 
The definition of political participation has undergone considerable change 
since Almond and Verba's (1963) 'civic culture' study. Primarily, the value shift 
witnessed in advanced democracies and described by Inglehart (1977) as 
'postmaterialism' has seen a corresponding shift from instrumental forms of 
participation (such as voting or party membership) to express behaviours such as 
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petition signing and demonstrating (Dalton, 2008). At the same time, the importance of 
political parties, and their place at the centre of citizens' political activity, has arguably 
wained (Dalton, 2002; Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair and van Biezen, 2001; van Biezen et 
al., 2012). Taking these changes in behaviour into account, the forms of participation 
studied here include both instrumental and expressive activities and the different 
factors that affect them. This chapter details what is known about electoral, partisan, 
communal and protest participation, including why internet use is expected to affect 
each of them respectively. 
Finally, this chapter describes the methodology chosen for the study. The data 
come mostly from the 2010 Australian Election Study post-election survey on 
Australians' attitudes and behaviours. Earlier data from the AES series as well as 
comparative data from the World Values Survey and Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems and census data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics complement the 2010 
AES data as required. The analysis is primarily quantitative in nature, employing a 
range of methods to present a comprehensive picture of Australian political 
participation in 2010. Frequency and descriptive analysis of AES, WVS, CSES and 
census data provides an overview of trends and cross-sectional snapshots of behaviour. 
T-test analysis compares the mean characteristics of participants and non-participants 
to paint a prima facie portrait of who participates in Australian political life and who 
abstains. Finally, multivariate regression analysis - both binary logistic and OLS 
regression techniques - examines the partial effects of a range of factors (per the civic 
voluntarism model) on different participatory behaviours in Australia using 2010 AES 
data, 2005-2007 WVS data and 2011 ABS census data. The following chapter draws on 
the AES data series to describe the Australian case. 
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Chapter 2 - the institutional characteristics 
and history of participation in Australia 
2.1 Introduction 
Research on political participation in Australia suggests that Australia sits 
within the 'cross-national mainstream' of predictive factors (Bean, 1989a). However, 
no study has specifically applied Verba, Schlozmann and Brady's (1995) civic 
voluntarism model of participation in the Australian context. Moreover, Australia 
provides an advantageous case for such a study: it is relatively understudied; its 
political processes and institutions are broadly similar to other advanced democracies 
such as the United States and United Kingdom, which have been studied in far greater 
depth and can offer some a priori assumptions; yet it stands apart from those countries 
by having a system of compulsory voting (among other factors). More instrumentally, 
the Australian case provides a large and representative data source in the Australian 
Election Study (AES). The availability of such comprehensive data allows the 
opportunity to redress the imbalance of participation research, currently weighed 
heavily in favour of the US, UK and Europe: 
"An initial problem is that Australia has lent itself too easily to analysis in terms 
of other countries' experiences, eg those of Britain and America, rather than its 
own" (Erny, 1972, p. 13). 
Australian politics presents something of a puzzle in political behaviour. The 
country demonstrates trends in behaviours and attitudes that broadly mirror the 
United States, United Kingdom and Canada, yet of this group only Australia has 
compulsory voting laws in place. Much is made of'Australian exceptionalism': its early 
adoption of preferential voting systems, secret ballots, universal suffrage and 
compulsory voting, and its ongoing adoption of new techniques. The most outstanding 
feature of political participation in Australia, however, is how little is known about it; it 
seems to have been broadly accepted that generalisations from the US, UK and 
Canadian cases have sufficed. Moreover, the rnsearch that has focused on Australia is 
invariably preoccupied with electoral participation: McAllister notes that "the study of 
political participation in Australia has been dominated by the special characteristics of 
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the political system, most notably the system of compulsory voting" (2009, p. 166). 
This study seeks to make two advances to the existing literature: a systematic, 
comprehensive study into participation in Australia; and an update of the US literature 
- particularly the arguments synthesised in Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba 
et al (199 5) - taking into account the emerging ubiquity of the internet. To that end, it 
is vital to understand the nature of Australian politics. 
This chapter details the institutional, cultural and behavioural characteristics of 
Australia's polity, and how they are likely to shape the effects of internet use on 
Australians' political participation. Section 2.2 discusses Australia's political 
institutions and their likely effects on national rates of participation. It examines the 
role of federalism, and consequently large numbers of political representatives on a per 
capita basis, in mobilising citizens to participate. It then looks at the significant impact 
of Australia's complex electoral system, particularly the law compelling all voting aged 
citizens to cast a ballot at all state and federal elections but also the electoral outcomes 
and proportionality associated with the system. Section 2.3 explores Australia's 
political culture and how it may explain Australians' political behaviour. Section 2.4 
outlines the forms of participation within this study's focus. It looks at the history of 
those behaviours in Australia, using data from the AES and comparative datasets and 
setting the scene for cross-sectional analysis of 2010 data in later chapters. 
2.2 Institutional characteristics 
Australia's political institutions shape who participates in political life. Three 
particular institutional characteristics stand out as being particularly important: 
federalist governance, compulsory voting and the electoral system more generally. 
Australia's system of federalism comprises a large number of parliamentary 
representatives who act as entry points to dealing with government. This should 
facilitate comparatively high levels of participation, particularly in forms such as 
political contacting and communal work that specifically target representatives (Verba 
et al., 1995, p. 7). On the other hand, regular elections at the local, state and federal 
levels may lead to voter fatigue, and fatigue with politics more generally (for example 
Rallings, Thrasher, & Borisyuk, 2003). Compulsory voting laws in Australia work to 
negate any voter fatigue effects (as far as electoral participation is concerned), as well 
as having potential flow-on effects to other, non-electoral forms of participation (Hill, 
2001) . Finally, Australia's electoral system is comparatively proportional (particularly 
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compared to plurality electoral systems such as in Britain), leading to few wasted votes 
and enhancing the benefits of voting. 
Legislature and governance 
Australian federalism is the product of "sixty years of spasmodic official effort 
and fluctuating public interest to bring the Commonwealth into being" (Crisp, 1983, p. 
1). The establishmentofthe constitution of the Commonwealth in 1901, enshrining 
powers to the new states, was a bloodless, stoic process. It brought together six 
colonies to create a federation of six states, that today still comprise the 
Commonwealth of Australia. The United States of America, by contrast, was only 
federated following those colonies' bloody independence from the United Kingdom in 
177 6. Indeed, a 1998 Federal Government television advertising campaign to mark the 
imminent centenary of Australian federation suggested that the Commonwealth's 
bloodless, peaceful foundations may be to blame for its citizen's relatively low levels of 
political knowledge. In other words, who wants to learn about a stable, peaceful 
democracy? 
There are three inherently conservative consequences of Australian federalism: 
major party dominance; constitutional stability; and the checks and balances inherent 
to divided sovereignty. Mackerras and McAllister (1999) observe that federalism 
places a large burden on Australian voters, requiring them to vote frequently and in as 
many as three different jurisdictions, each of which has responsibility for provision of 
different services and policies and the capacity to procure different taxes.1° Lovell et al. 
(1998) likewise argue that by engaging in the act of voting so frequently ( on average 
approximately once each year) the power of the existing major parties is entrenched 
through media exposure and party identification. Crisp (1983, p. 51) notes another 
stabilising aspect of Australia's constitutional federalism, namely the requirement of a 
majority of voters in a majority of states to agree (via referendum) to any changes to 
the constitution; a large obstacle in the way of constitutional reform, compounded 
further by compulsory voting. Indeed, only eight of Australia's 44 referenda between 
1906 and 2011 have been successful (Bennett, 2003). 
10 Voting is compulsory at both federal and state elections, as well as many local government 
elections. Federal elections are held on average every three years; state and local 
government elections between three and four years. 
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As regards the division of sovereignty between the federal and state 
governments in Australia, debate rages over whether democracy is enhanced or 
diminished by multi-level governance (Sawer et al., 2009, p. 295). The question of 
whether it underpins stable, conservative government is less ambiguous: "the tortuous 
and legalistic decision-making processes associated with federalism have been 
favourably interpreted as slowing governments down and hence ensuring due process 
or at least a brake on arbitrary action" (Sawer et al., 2009, p. 295). As will be detailed 
later in this chapter, this view of federalism - as a calming influence on government 
activity - is congruent with the prevailing political culture in Australia. 
Besides federalism, the other key institutional factor in Australia's political 
stability is bicameralism, inherited from the UK's Westminster traditions on which the 
Australian parliament is based. The federal parliament comprises a lower house (the 
House of Representatives, to which Members are elected) and an upper house (the 
Senate, to which Senators are elected), and with the exception of Queensland, each of 
the states has a similarly structured bicameral parliament. Comparatively, the federal 
parliament is a particularly strong example of bicameralism: the two houses are elected 
by different methods and have different term lengths, but similar legislative powers. 
Indeed the Australian Senate has evolved to be more powerful than its antecedents in 
the UK and US (Money and Tsebelis, 1992; Patterson and Mughan, 2001). The 
incongruent methods of electing Members and Senators have meant that, between 
1981 and 2004,11 and since 2007, the party with a majority of seats in the House of 
Representatives did not have a majority in the Senate. The party in government must 
in that case negotiate the passage of legislation with independent and minor party 
Senators, or else ensure the support of the opposition party. 
Much of the time, however, the two major parties work together inside the 
parliament. For instance, of 202 divisions on which Senators were called to vote in 
2009, the ALP and LPA voted as a bloc. Likewise, between February 2008 and April 
2010, 438 bills passed through the House of Representatives, of which only 80 required 
a division, with the others not requiring members to vote (Singleton, 2010); in other 
words, the federal parliament for the most part runs smoothly with biparti san 
cooperation. Tiffen and Gittins (2004) argue that Australia's parliamentary and 
electoral structures constitute one of the most strongly bicameral systems 
internationally. With legislative power divested between both the federal and state 
11 The Liberal-National parties in coalition held a majority in both houses for only one term of 
their four terms in government between 1996 and 2007. 
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governments, and at each level ( excluding Queensland) between lower and upper 
houses of parliament (and with the additional stability of compulsory preferential 
voting), stability and conservatism are inherent to Australian political institutions. 
Electoral characteristics 
The Australian political system is characterised by both innovation and stability 
(Bryce, 1921; Mackerras and McAllister, 1999; Sawer, 2001). Throughout its short 
history as a nation Australia has been a moderniser in regard to electoral reforms. It 
has been said that "much of Australia's early identity as a nation revolved around its 
democratic experiments and the belief that while it was a young nation, it was a 
relatively old democracy" (Sawer, 2001, p. 1). Crisp (1983, p. 137) identifies eight 
electoral and parliamentary reforms initiated in Australia prior to the more established 
Westminister democracies of the United Kingdom (and Canada, in Sawer 2001, p. 3): 
manhood suffrage; adult suffrage; abolition of plural voting; the secret ballot; payment 
of members of parliament; compulsory registration of voters; compulsory voting; and 
preferential voting. While innovation and stability may seem incompatible at first 
blush, the willingness of Australian governments to attempt electoral experiments has 
resulted in a generally stable and well-regarded polity (for example McAllister, 2011, p. 
3; Sawer, 2001, p. 26). 
Each of the aforementioned reforms was largely popular among voters when 
introduced, ensuring smooth implementation. Moreover, they have remained popular. 
The passage of bills legislation in 1924 to enact compulsory voting at the federal level 
attracted bipartisan support and a mere 138 minutes of scrutiny across both the lower 
and upper house (McAllister, 2011, p. 21). Likewise, proportional representation (by 
means of an alternative voting system in the lower house and single transferable vote 
with group voting in the upper house) and associated electoral laws, for instance 
compulsory preferences and the capacity of political parties to publish and distribute 
'how-to-vote cards' directing voters how to use their preferences to the benefit of their 
f~voured party, have worked to consolidate the electoral dominance of Australia's two 
major parties (McAllister, 2011). This section examines the two most salient features 
?f Australia's electoral system, namely compulsory voting and party consolidation. 
Later chapters will explore how these features constrain or facilitate participation in 
Australia. 
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Compulsory voting and voters 
In 1924 the Australian parliament passed legislation requiring all citizens to 
enrol to vote and to attend a polling booth on election days and submit a vote. It 
arguably represents the single greatest difference between not just the electoral 
systems but also the political and civic cultures of Australia and similar countries, 
particularly the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. However, as 
Hill (2001) notes, it attracts little interest within Australia, despite being "probably 
Australia's best known electoral institution, a long-standing rarity among the world's 
democracies, that has helped push turnout in Australian federal elections well above 
ninety per cent since its introduction in 1924, a level unparalleled among the world's 
mature democracies" (Jackman, 1999, p. 29). The disparity between international and 
domestic interest likely has a simple explanation: the crises of voting turnout across 
the northern hemisphere, typified by the preoccupation with apparent declining 
· turnout in the United States and campaigns to mobilise voters. 
In Australia, voter turnout is rarely considered due to compulsory voting. For 
the same reason, it is not a particularly useful measure for comparison with other 
advanced democracies. Instead, Australians' attitudes towards the principles of 
compulsory voting hint at how they would behave was voting a voluntary act. Figure 
2.1 shows that more Australians indicate that they would vote under a voluntary 
electoral system than actually turned out to vote. There are survey respondents who 
presumably did not vote, but indicated that they would either definitely or probably 
have voted were voting not compulsory (see for example Burden 2000; Karp & 
Brockington 2005). Jackman (1997) attributes this apparent discrepancy to 'social 
desirability bias': a survey respondent's desire not to appear uneducated or 
unmotivated, which is particularly acute in face-to-face and telephone interviews. Even 
with this bias in mind, and as Jackman notes elsewhere, compulsory voting is popular 
among Australians: "the Australian public has grown accustomed to compulsory voting, 
and, for the most part, internalized it as a more or less permanent and desirable feature 
of the Australian political landscape" (1999, p. 37). Hill concurs: "that compulsory 
voting is a curious or eccentric phenomenon has never, apparently, bothered 
Australians" (2001, p. 130). 
Despite compulsory voting, it is relatively easily - and common - for Australian 
citizens to abstain. Robert Jackman (1987) points out that, by comparison to their 
expressed attitudes, a substantial number of Australians do not vote; non-voters 
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Figure 2.1: Electoral attitudes and behaviour in Australia, 1993-2010 
Source: International IDEA, 2012; McAllister, Bean, Gibson, & Pietsch, 2010 
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Questions (AES): Would you have voted in the election if voting had not been compulsory? Do you 
think that voting at Federal elections should be compulsory, or do you think that people should only 
have to vote if they want to? 
comprised almost 20 per cent of the voting age population in 2010. Jackman attributes 
the existence of these non-voters to an inadequate system of disincentive and 
rnmpliance, noting that "while the presence of mandatory voting laws does provide a 
disincentive to non-voting that should increase turnout, there is no good reason to 
anticipate that such laws generate total compliance (1987, p. 409). Brent and Simon 
Jackman (2007) concur, adding that enforcement of the compulsion on voting-aged 
Australians to enrol with the Australian Election Commission (AEC) is non-existent. If a 
citizen does not enrol to vote, he will receive no punishment for not voting, or for not 
enrolling in the first place. As a -consequence, non-enrolment is used as measure of 
. . 
electoral abstention throughout this study, in the place of non-voting. Deliberate 
informal voting (spoiling a ballot in order to avoid casting a vote) comprises the second 
measure of abstention. 
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The AEC, while working to ensure the largest possible franchise and that the 
opportunity to participate in elections by voting are extended to all Australians 
regardless of physical capacity or geographic remoteness, is also tasked with 
maintaining the integrity of the electoral roll. As a result, more voters have recently 
been removed from the roll than have been added: it is easy for the AEC to remove 
voters who have changed address or are not contactable, but there is a subsequent 
impost on those voters to re enrol. The incentive to reenrol is even weaker if those 
voters view absence from the electoral roll as '"liberation' from the compulsory voting 
requirement (since for all practical purposes, unenrolled citizens are invisible to the 
Commission)" (Brent and Jackman, 2007, p. 12). The means of abstention are discussed 
further in section 2.4, alongside data showing trends in turnout and abstention. 
Compulsory voting and political parties 
Notwithstanding these issues, the vast majority of Australians do turn out to 
vote as required at federal elections (see Figure 2.1). One important consequence of 
such consistently high turnout - compounded by frequent elections at the state and 
federal levels - is party stability, or the "large number of voters who identify with one 
or other of the major parties, and in the preponderance of representatives of the major 
parties in the federal and state parliaments" (Mackerras and McAllister, 1999, p. 229). 
In Australia this has manifested as the long term dominance of the major parties, the 
ALP and LPA. Mackerras and McAllister describe the relationship between compulsory 
voting and party identification as a cognitive prompt: 
"Compulsory voting ensures that voters cast a ballot and the act of voting 
means that they are forced to think, however superficially, about the major 
parties. The frequency of elections at the state and federal levels further 
reinforces the high visibility that parties enjoy within the electorate" (1999, p. 
229). 
Recent analysis suggests that the relationship between compulsory voting and party 
stability is not so straightforward, and that compulsory voting, independently of high 
turnout (i.e. in theoretical models with high turnout and voluntary voting) can actually 
facilitate a greater number of parties represented in a parliament O ensen & Spoon 
2011) . Jensen and Spoon (2011) argue that compulsion leads to a greater number of 
"new, less informed" voters with less predictable motives and more randomly 
distributed support for the entire range of parties nominating for office. 
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However, this does not appear to have been the experience of compulsory 
voting in Australia. Mackerras and McAllister (1999) observe that citizens who express 
weak or no identification with a party act as though they are identified one way or the 
other when they come to vote. Certainly, while 'lifetime voters', those citizens who 
have always voted for the one party, are in decline they still comprised 52 per cent of 
the voters at the 2010 federal election (McAllister, 2011, p. 52). Furthermore, 'habitual 
defectors' or what are commonly referred to as 'swinging voters', are in reality only a 
small number of voters (McAllister, 2011, p. 53). McAllister also argues that when such 
voters do 'defect', they invariably return to their originally preferred party ( or what is 
widely termed the 'homing tendency'); partisan stability may be even stronger than the 
majority oflifetime voters in 2010 suggests, when short-term defections are taken into 
account. 
AES data suggest that Australian voters with very strong attachments to a 
political party are decreasing in number, but the decline is occurring later and more 
gently than in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States (Bean, 1997). For 
instance, Dalton (2002) observes that an increasing number of European voters 
express no feelings of partisanship while American voters are increasingly ambivalent 
toward both the major parties in that country. By 1992, those without partisan 
allegiance had replaced party 'sympathizers' as the largest group oJ European voters 
(Dalton, 2002, p. 27). At the same time in Australia (that is, following the 1993 federal 
election), although 'very strong' partisans were in decline, 'fairly strong partisans still 
comprised 49 per cent of the electorate (McAllister, 2011, p. 41). McAllister ( 2011; 
with Mackerras 1999) in effect argue that compulsory voting proves the differentiating 
characteristic of the Australian case. 
Corripulsory voting works in concert with Australia's systems of alternative 
voting (AV) for lower house elections and a modified form of single-transferable voting 
(STV) for upper house elections. Farrell and McAllister (2006) observe that the two 
electoral mechanisms are in fact _antipathetic; that while compulsory voting bestows 
benefits on the parties, preferential systems are explicitly designed to benefit voters. 
Preferential voting systems ."enable voters, if they wish, to vote both strategically and 
'sincerely'" (Farrell and McAllister, 2006, p. 145). A voter can, for example, award his 
first preference vote to a minor party; in support of a single issue or emerging political 
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entity, and his second, third and onward preferences in such a way as to ensure that the 
vote is eventually exhausted with his preferred major party. 
The reality, however, is that parties nonetheless dominate not only through 
media exposure and more sophisticated campaigning, but also through the provision of 
how-to-vote cards and negotiation of inter-party deals to determine preference flows. 12 
While the number of voters ignoring party-sanctioned how-to-vote cards in favour of 
ordering candidates of their own accord is increasing, on average approximately half of 
Australian voters follow their favoured party's lead; this number is probably inflated by 
the compulsion on unaligned and apathetic citizens to vote. Further, voting to elect 
senators to the upper house of the federal parliament uses a single transferable vote 
system with the option of marking only one preference, in which case the vote is 
transferred at a declining value according to the parties' pre-announced preferences13. 
In sum, "no other electoral system provides parties with that degree of control over 
· events in the ballot box" (Farrell and McAllister, 2006, p. 146). The internet is a 
potential counterpoint to this control. Evidence suggests that minor parties have made 
the most gains from online campaigning to date (Gibson & McAllister 2006; 2009; 
2011), while the abundance of political information available online further loosens the 
major parties' hold on what voters read and discuss. This study furthers the 
understanding of these internet effects. 
2.3 Political culture 
Understanding Australia's political culture is integral to understanding how and 
why Australians participate in politics, and how likely they are to incorporate the 
internet into their political activity; it constitutes one determinant of individual 
behaviour, alongside institutions, social structure and elite behaviour (Bean, 1993). 
Studies of political culture largely draw on either one of the two mainstream 
frameworks: Almond and Verba's (1963) civic culture framework or Inglehart's (1977) 
postmaterialism thesis. Almond and Verba (1963) contend that political ( or civic) 
12 This is particularly acute in Senate elections. Voters are presented with a ballot, under which 
candidates are grouped by party (or as a 'non-aligned' group of independents). Voters can 
then choose to award one party a single vote, in which case the voter's preferences are 
distributed accorded to his chosen party's preference, which are negotiated with the other 
major parties in advance of the election and registered with the AEC. This is referred to as 
group ticket voting. 
13 Voters have the option to vote 'below the line', specifying how they wish their vote to be 
transferred (i.e. their preferences) , but few voters ( <five per cent) choose this option. 
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culture describe citizens' psychological orientations toward political objects, 
particularly to the state, political system, policies and himself as a political actor. In 
their own words, "political culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and 
orientations toward politics among the members of a political system. It is the 
subjective realm which underlies and gives meaning to political actions (Almond and 
Verba, 1963, p. 50). Those orientations have three forms: cognitive orientations 
( namely political knowledge), affective orientations (feelings of attachment or 
involvement) and evaluative orientations (political judgments and opinions). The 
distribution of those orientations, according to the 'civic culture' model developed by 
Almond and Verba (1963) then informs the political culture of a nation as either a 
parochial, subject or participant (or combination of those) culture. 
Cognitive orientation describes what an individual knows about an object, in 
this case, knowledge about politics. Since 1996 the AES has measured political 
knowledge with 'quiz' questions asking respondents to identify statements as true or 
false. Of six questions in each survey, the mean number of correct answers differed by 
only 0.2 across the four survey cycles, ranging from 2.2 to 2.4, or less than 40 per cent 
correct. The strongest predictors of an individual's political knowledge are, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, political interest (r2=.27, p<.01) and tertiary education (r2=.23, p<.01), 
with gender, age and socioeconomic factors held constant (McAllister, 2011, p. 70). On 
a comparative basis however, McAllister (2011, p. 69) points out that "Australian 
citizens would appear to be no better or no less well informed than their international 
counterparts", with specific reference to the US and UK. 
Affective orientations comprise the various ways that an individual thinks 
about a political system, institution or actor based on 'gut feeling' or emotion, while 
evaluative orientations comp1'ise the ways that he thinks about a system, institution or 
actor based on particular criteria or a value standard. Erny's portrait of Australian 
political culture observes three central, defining characteristics: "the ambivalent 
attitude towards political authority, the instrumentalist conception of the state, the 
urban-rural division and the roots of parochialism" (1972, p. 26). These observations 
lead Erny to describe Australia's political culture as 'subject-participant', wherein "the 
majority of the population are still oriented towards the output-aspects of system (ie 
towards the results and benefits they expect and demand from the Government), and 
where relatively few people have developed a strong orientation towards the input 
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aspects (i.e. have not developed a motivation towards the system in terms of their 
reciprocal duties and obligations as active participatory citizens), but still incline to the 
passive role associated with a subject culture" (1972, p. 27). 
Accordingly, Australian citizens know what the state can provide and expect 
that it gets provided, but either do not understand or do not fulfil their roles as citizens: 
they "display only a limited competence; their sense of their own political significance 
(i.e. their ability to affect government policy), their inclination to seek information and 
the information placed at their disposal, are all minimal" (Erny, 1972, p. 27). Almost a 
century ago, Bryce observed the persistent image of Australians as laconic regarding 
civic and political life: "A great cricket match is a more important event than a change 
of ministry" (1921, p. 244) . Empirical data suggest otherwise, however. Immediately 
obvious in the longitudinal AES data presented in Figure 2.2 is that Australians, 
contrary to Erny's (1972) thesis, are confident that their vote makes a difference in 
· deciding which party will govern. In other words, they display external political 
efficacy. Excepting the downturn following the 2010 federal election, 14 Australians 
display generally favourable positive attitudes towards government and the political 
system. While trust in government to do the 'right thing' is relatively scarce, with only 
37 per cent of the population trusting the government 'usually' or 'sometimes' in 2010, 
satisfaction with democracy is very high. 15 The discrepancy between prevai ling levels 
of trust in government and satisfaction with the democratic system suggests that 
Australian citizens are sceptical about the people who inhabit government, but 
confident that political institutions such as the parliament and electoral system keep 
them in check. To put it another way, Australians are 'conservatively cynical' (Bean, 
1993). 
A large body of research has shown that feelings of political efficacy, trust and 
satisfaction are associated with party support; namely, if your preferred party is in 
power, you will feel more positively towards government generally (for example 
Anderson and Tverdova, 2001; Bean and Denemark, 2007; Iyengar, 1980; Wells and 
Krieckhaus, 2006). This effect is mediated by institutions, primarily electoral systems. 
Majoritarian systems favour supporters of the winner, resulting in the loss of efficacy, 
trust and satisfaction among supp orters of the opposition party; in consensus-based 
14 The 2010 federal election produced a rare result in Australian politics: neither the ALP nor 
Liberal/National coalition won a clear majority of seats in the House of Representatives and 
consequently could not govern in their own right. 
15 However, Donovan, Denemark and Bowler note that Australians' trust in government is 
comparatively high (2007, p. 89). 
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systems, these expressions of 'diffuse support' for political system tend to be more 
stable (Anderson, 2007; Anderson and Guillory, 1997). This cycle of 'winners' and 
'losers' displaying trust based on their party support is evident in Australia, with 
supporters of the government consistently reporting higher trust since 1993 (Bean, 
2001; McAllister, 2011, p. 75). Australia's majoritarian political system, then, cannot 
explain Australia's comparatively high rates of trust and efficacy (Donovan et al ., 2007). 
An alternative explanation for the Australian case is that "higher trust is evidence 
where people find participatory opportunities more adequate" (Donovan et al., 200 7, p. 
89). In this regard, compulsory voting may explain why Australian citizens 
demonstrate diffuse support for government, regardless of the majoritarian outcomes 
of the electoral system. By compelling citizens to vote in state and federal elections, the 
government sustains support for its legitimacy. If compulsory voting also encourages 
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citizens to participate in other ways, as has been theorised (Hill, 2001), it may have 
both direct and indirect effects on trust, efficacy and satisfaction among Australians. 
Additionally, Donovan et al. note that social capital positively affects participation, 
which in turn affects trust in ~overnment; again, Australia's comparatively high rates of 
social capital may help to explain why Australians demonstrate high levels of diffuse 
support (Donovan et al., 2007, p. 97). 
Changes in expressions of political trust, efficacy and democratic satisfaction over 
time are at least partially explained by different approaches to measuring political 
values. The postmaterialism thesis focuses on changes in political culture in the post-
war period, offering an addendum of sorts to Almond and Verba's (1966) original 
findings. 16 The postmaterialist theory argues that, as education levels, communications 
technologies, economic development and cultural heterogeneity increased throughout 
the late 20 th century, citizens' most basic needs (for survival and safety) were 
· increasingly sated, and so they began to express "increasing emphasis on needs for 
belonging, esteem and self-realization" (1977). With these emerging values and 
increasing political skills among western populations, citizens have arguably displayed 
new political inclinations and behaviours, as well as demanding reforms at the system 
level: the salience of 'life-style', rather than economic, issues has increased; class has 
declined as a basis for political conflict; the perceived legitimacy of the nation state has 
declined; and the popularity of issue-based and elite-challenging participatory 
behaviours have increased (Inglehart, 1977). As a result of this and other related 
cultural shifts (including declining social capital), Norris (2011) finds that in many 
nations, citizens' expectations of democratic governance are not matched by 
democratic performance, particularly where educational attainment is high and 
citizens have well-defined aspirations. 
Australian studies have found little evidence of generational change in values, 
and little support for Inglehart's prediction that intergenerational value change (from 
materialist to postmaterialist) is correlated with economic prosperity (Western and 
Tranter, 2005). Elsewhere research has suggested that postmaterial values can predict 
major and minor party voting in Australia, but that materialist considerations are still 
16 The 'civic cu lture' and 'postmaterialism' approaches to studying values are not universal. 
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Schwartz (1992; Schwartz et al., 2006, 2010) proposes an alternative typology of values, 
encompassing 'openness to change', 'self transcendence', 'conservation' and 'self-
enhancement'. He argues that values are relatively stable over an individual's lifecycle, 
inferring that changes over time are artefacts of measurement error. Caprara et al. (2006) 
do observe some signs towards a 'general individualising' of society, coinciding with greater 
rates of education and residential mobility. 
more decisive in predicting support for the LPA against the ALP (McAllister, 2011; 
Western and Tranter, 2005). McAllister's (2011) analysis of AES data suggests that 
strictly postmaterial voters are in fact falling in number among the Australian 
electorate, while material voters are becoming more prevalent. However, the majority 
of Australian voters (approximately 60 per cent) display a range of material and 
postmaterial values, suggesting that they coexist within the Australian political culture 
(McAllister, 2011). 
There are a range of disparate views on Australia's political culture. Combined, 
however, they suggest a laidback, even disengaged, people, who have not embraced the 
postmaterial values prevalent in Europe and to a lesser extent the United States. 
Mackerras and McAllister (1999, p. 231) describe a "distinctive utilitarian political 
culture", which Collins (1985) attributes to Australia's importation of the United 
Kingdom's Benthamite traditions; Erny (1972, p. 30) observed a "weakness of the 
impulse to a fuller sense of political participation in Australia, and the lack of significant 
motivating factors for creating a positive orientation amongst individuals towards their 
own roles as political participants". Bean (1993) describes these phenomena as a 
general trait of 'conservative cynicism', but further argues that it is dominated by a 
stronger feature of Australia's political culture, namely respect for authority: "on the 
question of whether Australians are an authoritarian people, the answer would appear 
to be a resounding 'yes'" (1993, p. 66). It is within this culture - a mixture of 
utilitarianism and authoritarianism plus the confidence that participation can make a 
difference, or what within the civic culture framework could tentatively be termed a 
subject-participant political culture - that the study explores political participation in 
Australia. 
2.4 A history of political participation in Australia 
Research into political participation in Australia is scant (McAllister 2009; 
Passey & Lyons, 2005). What literature does exist focuses on three broad areas: 
eJectoral behaviour; social movements; and the qualitative nature of participation. A 
small number of publications have included brief, quantitative overviews of non-
electoral participation, usually in relation to other behaviours and attitudes. Reports of 
the 2003 and 2005 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, for instance, includes chapters 
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on postmaterial values and participation (Western and Tranter, 2005); voluntary 
association membership and participation (Passey and Lyons, 2005); and trust, efficacy 
and participation (Bean & Denemark, 2007; Donovan, Denemark, & Bowler, 2007). 
This study sorts and considers the range of participatory behaviours by four categories: 
electoral, partisan, communal and protest. Citizens' attitudes towards political systems, 
institutions and actors are discussed concurrently in as much as they interact with the 
behaviours; however the preceding section on political culture largely informs the 
analysis and discussion of the AES data in chapters four, five, six and seven. This 
format follows Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) in defining four modes of political 
participation: electoral, campaign, communal and protest. 
Electoral participation 
The fourth chapter of this study considers electoral participation in Australia. 
As discussed previously in this chapter, Australia's system of compulsory voting makes 
voter turnout a less clear measure of political participation than in, for instance, the 
United States, where declining turnout is an ongoing concern. Figure 2.1 demonstrates 
that turnout in Australia is consistently high, while the number of citizens who indicate 
that they would still vote if they were not compelled to do so hovers between 85 and 90 
per cent of the population. This latter figure, however, has been questioned, as it defies 
trends in similar democracies which do not mandate voting. Jackman (1999) cautions 
that surveys such as the Australian Election Study invariably contain a self-selection 
bias: the types of randomly-contacted citizens who respond to the survey are probably 
also more likely to vote without compulsion. Moreover, the imperative to appear 
socially desirable may lead some respondents to overestimate their propensity to vote 
voluntarily. The Australians most likely not to vote are more elusive, since they are 
accordingly less likely to respond to requests to participate (truthfully) in survey 
research. McAllister (2011, p. 24) disagrees, arguing that the Australian case, where 
AES data suggest turnout would fall to around 88 per cent, is more comparable with the 
Netherlands, where compulsory voting was abolished in 1967. There, turnout dropped 
to 84.1 per cent over subsequent voluntary elections. 
Australia's compulsory voting laws have resulted in a growing number of 
'missing abstainers': those who ignore the law (and Australian Electoral Commission's 
campaigns reminding them to enrol) and consequently never appear on the electoral 
roll, are not punished for failing to vote, and do not exist in official AEC statistics of 
(enrolled) non-voters (Brent and Jackman, 2007). As many scholars (for example Brent 
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&Jackman, 2007; Hill, 2002) have noted, Australia's administration of its compulsory 
voting laws has made evasion particularly easy; the 'compulsory' element of Australia's 
electoral system is by no means absolute. Further, enrolled voters are compelled to 
attend a polling booth, but not necessarily to cast a valid vote for any candidate (see 
Pringle (2012) for a discussion of compulsion). There are therefore three types of 
abstainers among Australian citizens: non-voters, non-enrollers and deliberate 
informal voters. 
The first category of Australian abstainer - the non-voter - comprises those 
citizens who have enrolled with the AEC but do not attend a polling booth and cast a 
vote, whether it be valid or invalid. Under Australia's system of compulsory voting, 
failure to attend at a polling booth - either on election day, via a postal ballot or at a 
'pre-polling booth' in the weeks before the election - is punishable by a small fine. 
However, many fines are waived on appeal to the AEC. Details on the AEC's decisions 
to issue an infringement notice and then either pursue prosecution on non-payment or 
waive the infringement are not made public. The AEC reports that at the 2007 election, 
5300 non-voters were sent warning letters rather than being fined in the first instance, 
due to the characteristics of the voters in question (i.e. first-time voter and newly 
settled immigrants) (Australian Electoral Commission, 2008), In short, while the 
financial incentive to attend a polling booth is both clear and strong; it is often avoided, 
and the AEC shows no great vigour in pursuing non-voters (for example Martin 2013). 
Nonetheless, the numbers of this type of abstainer is small in the Australian system, 
particularly when compared to in the United States and other voluntary voting systems. 
The costs of attending a polling booth appear to outweigh the punishments for non-
attendance for most enrolled Australians. 
The second category of Australian abstainer is the non-enroller: the citizen 
who is not enrolled with the Australian Electoral Commission, and consequently does 
not appear on the official electoral roll and can therefore not be punished for not 
voting. Non-enrollers can be further broken down by type: apathetic citizens who 
avoid enrolling at all; and former voters who are removed from the roll upon changing 
address or becoming uncontactable, and who do not reinstate their enrolment Brent 
and Jackman's analysis suggests that the number of former voters who do not reenrol is 
growing: "it is reasonable to surmise that, no doubt in large part due to technological 
advances, the AEC is getting better at taking people off the electoral roll" (2007, p. 9). 
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What cannot be extrapolated from the data are the reasons why former voters do not 
re-enrol. Brent and Jackman (2007, p. 2) offer a tentative estimate that between 
September 2002 and October 2006, the Australian population grew by 4.66 per cent, 
while the number of enrolled voters over that period grew by only 3.12 per cent. The 
figures are, as the authors admit, not indicative of the fuller picture of enrolment in 
Australia. Likewise, the number of never-enrolled citizens is elusive, as are their 
reasons for not enrolling. Quantifying and explaining unenrolled citizens constitute 
genuine gaps in the literature on Australian political behaviour. 
A citizen not wanting to vote in Australia is better off not enrolling at all than 
enrolling, not voting and being required to pay a (small) fine for failing to comply with 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. While non-enrolment is punishable with a fine, 
it is not enforced in practice (Brent and Jackman, 2007). Nonetheless, a small number 
of enrolled Australians fail to vote at each election. The difference between the number 
of enrolled abstainers and unenrolled abstainers is evident in Figure 2.3: turnout 
among enrolled citizens has sat at an average of 94.5 per cent, and turnout amongst the 
entire voting aged population ( enrolled citizens plus unenrolled citizens) more than ten 
points lower at 84 per cent. The number of enrolled citizens who have not voted in 
federal elections since 1946 has been relatively stable, averaging 4.9 per cent of the 
enrolled population. Only in 1955 did fewer than 90 per cent of enrolled citizens turn 
out to vote.17 
The third type of abstainer in Australian politics is the intentional informal 
voter. While there is some debate as to whether Australian voters are compelled to 
cast a valid ballot paper (Pringle, 2012), the reality is that as many as five per cent of all 
lower house votes cast are informal or invalid. There are several possible reasons why 
a vote may be invalid. Australia's system of exhaustive preferential voting requires 
voters to understand a complex electoral system and complete their ballotsaccordingly, 
and likely contributes to relatively high numbers of voters attempting and failing to 
cast a valid vote. McAllister and Makkai (1993) find that these constitute the majority 
of informal votes case in Australian elections, and that they are prevalent among ethnic 
migrants who have little understanding of the preferential voting procedure. The 
17 Th e 1955 fed eral election came only one year after the previous election, and was marked by 
the advent of the anti-Communist Democratic Labor Party (which originated from a split 
within th e Australian Labor Party) . The confluence of factors likely explains the relatively 
low turnout (among enrolled voters and the VAP) in that election. 
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second type of informal vote is intentional, wherein a voter either leaves a ballot paper 
blank or marks it in some way that does not represent at attempt to-vote validly. 
Where a voter has made no attempt to case a formal vote, it is categorised here as an 
example of abstention; the voter has deliberately removed himself from an act that is 
designed to influence governmental decision making, per Verba and Nie's (1972) 
description of political participation. 
To determine the extentto how many informal votes constitute acts of protest 
(by.abstention), Figure 2.4 shows the breakdown of informal votes cast for the House of 
Representatives at the 2001, 2004 2007 and 2010 federal elections. All voted spoiled 
by incorrect numbering, including incomplete and non-sequential numbering and ticks 
or crosses instead of numbers, are combined under 'numbering'. Marks, comments and 
other overt signs of protest comprise 'marks/scribbles'. While Hill and Young (2007) 
maintain that it is impossible to be certain that blank ballot papers are an expression of 
protest, they are nonetheless an expression of abstention, with the voter making no 
effort to express a preference for any candidate. Consequently, the combined number 
63 
100% 
90% 
80% 
~ 70% 
u 
"' (lJ 
0 
> 
-;;; 
E 
.2 
C 
ro 
0 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
6 
6 
2001 
3 3 
14 14 
2004 2007 
3 
17 
2010 
Other 
Marks/scribbles 
■ Blank 
■ Numbering 
Figure 2.4: Breakdown of informal votes by category at 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 Federal 
El ection s 
Source: Australian Electoral Commission, 2011. 
of blank and marked votes is used to represent the total number of enrolled abstainers 
here. Since 2001, the percentage of abstainers among informal voters has increased 
from less than 30 per cent to approximately 46 per cent in 2010. 
Further, International IDEA data from Australian elections suggest that a strong 
relationship (r=.69, p=.000) exists between the percentage of enrolled cibzens who do 
not turn out to vote and the percentage of informal votes cast in elecbons since 1946 
(lnternabonal IDEA, 2012). That relationship is evident in Figure 2.5. Two peaks and 
three troughs are also notabl e. The 1955 spike in abstention due to the split in the 
Australian Labor Party, formabon of the new anti-Communist Democrabc Labor Party 
and short time following the previous (19 54) election. The spike at the 1984 in 
informal votes is a result of electoral reform that changed the procedure for completing 
Senate ballot papers, confusing voters and leading to spoiled ballots. On the other 
hand, the 2007 trough in abstenbon came at the end of the Liberal Party / Nabonals 
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coalition's 11-year government and marked the election of a new, revitalised Labor 
government (Bean & McAllister, 2009) . It follows that contextual factors work to 
discourage voting, which manifests as either not turning out or attending but 
intentionally spoiling the ballot. 
The major parties discussed in this study are the ALP,LPA, the Nationals, and 
AG. They are characterised as 'major' by being the only parties represented in the 
federal House of Representatives (i.e. the lower house) at the 2010 election, from when 
the data used here were collected. The AG would not ordinarily be considered a major 
party, however they were an early adopter of internet technology and so is included for 
the purpose of comparison. It also broadens the scope beyond the three more 
established parties. The ALP had 71 members elected in 2010, the LPA 64,18 the 
Nationals 6 and the AG one, with the ALP forming government in coalition with the AG 
18 The Liberal Party of Australia total here includes seats won by candidates registered under 
the Liberal National Party (LNP) name. The LNP is an amalgam of the Queensland-based 
divisions of the LPA and Nationals. LNP candidates campaign as members of the LNP, and if 
elected to the federal parliament, choose whether they will join the LPA or Nationals caucus. 
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and two independent members. Each of the parties has a federalist structure, with 
state-based organisations coming under a national umbrella organisation. 
Memberships are administered at the state level, and members consequently belong to 
the state organisation. Membership numbers among the parties has varied over time, 
as shown in Figure 2.6 ( excluding the AG). 
Definitive information on party membership trends is notoriously hard to 
extract from the parties themselves, and they are not required to disclose membership 
data in the way that they must disclose receipt of large financial contributions, for 
instance. Bean's (1997) compilation of data from various sources, presented here, is 
the best available overview of membership trends in Australia. The number of ALP 
members remains stable over the period from 196 7 to 1996, however that figure does 
not include the number of members of trade unions affiliated with the ALP and who are 
represented within the ALP organisation. Individual members have, however, 
· numbered between 42,000 and 57,000 over the 30 years. The coalition of the LPA and 
Nationals has maintained a remarkably stable number of members. However, within 
the coalition the LPA has seen a marked decline in members and the Nationals a 
concurrent increase. There is no obvious reason for this; however there appears to be 
a rural bias among other forms of participation in Australia, including voting (see for 
example Sheppard, 2012). 
Where )aensch et. al (2004) describe declining partisan activity as a global 
trend, McAllister (2011) describes a particularly Australian phenomenon. The crucial 
difference between Australia and like nations is, again, compulsory voting: parties in 
the United States or example mobilise citizens to vote - hoping that mobilising voters 
will also attract their support - and instrumental to that process is providing resources 
to local branches of the party organisation which can then forge relationships with 
potential voters. Table 2.1 shows rates of political party membership as a percentage 
of population among a range of advanced democracies, from a collection of sources. 
Those data have two notable features: most countries have experienced a decline in 
rates of party membership, including Australia, and that Australia has a comparatively 
low rate of party membership. There is a range of explanations for variation in party 
membership rates, including the age of a democracy, political culture and electoral 
system, but what is clear is that Australians are comparatively uninterested in joining a 
party. Australians participate in other campaign activities to varying degrees. 
Comparative data show that the number of Australians attending party meetings and 
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Figure 2.6: Membership of political parties in Australia, 1967 to 1996 
Source: Bean, 1997; Jaensch, Brent, & Bowden, 2004; Rudd, 2013 
2002 2010 
rallies or donating money to parties or candidates is much lower than in the United 
States. In 2008, 10 per cent of US citizens ( compared with five per cent of Australians 
in 2010) attended a political meeting and 13 per cent (compared with 1.9 per cent of 
Australians in 2010) donated money to a party or candidate (McAllister, 2011, p. 99). 
Nationals 
Comparing US and Australian data reveals some notable differences between 
the countries (Figure 2.7). First, American citizens are more likely to contribute money 
than to volunteer for a party or candidate ( a contribution of time) during an election 
campaign. Australians are more likely to contribute time than money. This likely 
reflects the large amounts of money spent on American campaigns compared wi th 
Australia and the subsequent focus on attracting donations. Second, the number of 
Australians contributing time has increased dramatically since 1998, compared with 
stability in the US over the same period. Finally, over the long term, both activities have 
seen fairly stable popularity in both countries, save the recent decline in contributions 
of money in Australia (which is stabilised somewhat by the addition of online 
donations). Overall, Australians' campaign participation has trended similarly 
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Table 2.1: Political party membership as percentage of population in a range of Eu ropean count ries 
and Austral ia, 1980 to 2008 
1980 1990 1999 2008 
Austria 29 24 18 17 
Fin land 16 14 10 8 
Norway 15 13 7 5 
Switzerland 11 8 6 5 
Ita ly 10 9 4 6 
Belgium 9 9 7 6 
Sweden 8 8 6 4 
Denmark 7 6 5 4 
Ire land 5 5 3 2 
Germany (West) 5 4 2 2 
Netherlands 4 3 3 2 
Portugal 4 5 4 4 
United Kingdom 4 3 2 1 
Australia 3 2 2 n/a 
· Greece 3 6 7 7 
Spain 1 2 3 4 
Mean 9 8 6 5 
Sources: Bean, 1997; Mair & van Biezen, 2001; van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012 
to that of the United States. They.appear unwilling to take the next step of actually 
joining a political party, however. 
Communal participation 
Communal participation comprises contacting a government official to express 
views and working with others who share a view to express that view. This 
conceptualisation of communal participation is based on Verba and Ni e's (1972) study, 
but other major studies of participation (for instance Verba et al., 1978, 1995) use 
similar measures. Despite being an ostensibly solo activity, an individual contacting a 
government official to express his view tends to seek a collective outcome, rather than 
an outcome which will specifically and only benefit themselves (Verba and Nie, 1972). 
The different types of political contacting are described in Chapter 6. Contacting and 
working with others differ from other forms of non-partisan participation such as 
protest or petition signing by being generally non-confrontational. More 
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Figure 2.7: Trends in contributions of money and time during (presidential and parliamentary) 
election campaigns as a proportion of the population, US and Austra lia, 1992 to 2008 
Source: 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 Australian Election Studies; American National 
Election Study cumulative file, 1992-2008 (American National Election Studies, 2010; Bean et al., 
2007, 2004, 1998; Gibson et al., 2001; Jones et al. , 1996, 1993; McAllister et al. , 2010a) 
Questions (AN ES): During an election year people are often asked to make a c,.rntribution to support 
campaigns. Did you give money to a political party during this election year? Did you give money t o 
an individual candidate running for public office? Did you do any {other} work for one of the parties 
or candidates? Did you wear a campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car, or place a sign 
in your window or in front of your house? 
confrontational forms of participation are discussed later in this section. 
The most comprehensive empirical analysis of communal participation in 
Australia draws on cross-sectional Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (ASSA) data, 
and finds that "Australia is a nation of joiners" (Passey and Lyons, 2005, p. 66). Earlier 
comparative research concurs, finding that, of 15 nations, only American, Dutch and 
Norwegian citizens were more likely to join a voluntary association (Curtis et al., 1992). 
The ASSA analysis ranks membership of consumer and automobile associations (the 
latter providing a road-side mechanical assistance service, with advocacy on behalf of 
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drivers arguably a secondary service) and sporting organisations or service clubs 
(such as gaming venues owned by service organisations) as by far the most common. 
Moreover, most organisation members are relatively passive. Almost three 
quarters (74 per cent) of'joiners' describe themselves as 'ordinary', or inactive, 
members; only 20 per cent view themselves as active members and 6 per cent hold an 
official position with an organisation. Those most populous organisations, such as 
automobile associations and service clubs, employ professional staff to manage their 
operations; the extent to which they are voluntary organisations when compared with 
a sporting club, environmental management group or even a trade union (which 
commonly engages voluntary members atthe lower levels of its hierarchical structure) 
is questionable. There also appears, at face value, to be a negative relationship between 
the level of political activity within or by a voluntary organisation and that 
organisation's number of members: political parties and policy-oriented (including 
· human rights based) lobby groups attract the fewest members (Passey and Lyons, 
2005). Passey and Lyon (2005) also find that, while membership of a politically-
oriented organisation is a strong predictor of other forms of political behaviour, even 
an inactive member of an automobile association is more likely than a non-member to 
be politically active. 
Cross-sectional data from the Comparative Survey of Electoral Systems survey 
(2007) show that Australians are more likely to contact government officials and work 
with like others to express their views than citizens of many other nations (Figure 
2.8).19 There are several probable explanations for this. Primarily, the countries with 
the three highest rates of citizens contacting officials in the previous five years -
Canada, the US and Australia - have federal systems of government, with at least two 
levels of government and a consequently high number of politicians per capita. The 
division of policy responsibility between state and federal level governments increases 
the number of points of contact available to citizens with opinions or concerns. It is no 
great surprise that federal countries such as Australia have high rates of contacting 
among citizens. 
Federalism does not explain the different rates of citizens working together to 
express their views. Accordingly, the most communally active nations are not 
19 CSES module 2 data are used here as the core survey consisted of comparative questions on 
contacting and working with like others; these same questions have been asked by the AES 
since 2001. The CSES data therefore provide the best benchmark against which to measure 
Australi a's rate of communal participation. 
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Figure 2.8: Percentage of citizenswho contacted a politician or official to express views in previous 
five years, 2005-2006 
Source: The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems {2007) 
Question : Over the past five yea rs or so, have you done any of the following things to express yo ur 
views about something the government shou ld or should not be doing? {Have you) contacted a 
politician or government official eith er in person, or in writing, or some other way? 
federations. In Figure 2.9, the US ranks behind Albania, and Canada by Denmark and 
Norway. Australia is still further down the table; ninth among the countries included in 
the CSES dataset. Curtis, Grabb and Baer (1992) observe the high rates of association 
membership among relatively 'new' Anglo nations such as Australia and the US, which 
as Passey and Lyons (2005) show, is a pathway to some forms of political (including 
communal) participation. There are likely also specific political culture effects on the 
observed rates of communal work The US, for example, has high rates of religious 
observance as well as an established sector of professional associations, which may 
combine to produce high rates of participation (Curtis et al., 1992) . Certainly, there is 
nothing particularly remarkable about Australia's standing among the nations 
presented in Figure 2.9. 
Over time, the rate of communal participation in Australia compares closely 
with its nearest neighbour, New Zealand. Election studies in both countries began 
asking respondents about contacting and working with others in the early 2000s, 
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Figure 2.9: Percentage of citizens who worked with others who shared their concerns in previous 
. five years, 2005-2006 
Source: The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2007) 
Question: Over the past five years or so, have you done any of the following things to express your 
views about something the government should or should not be doing? (Have you) worked together 
with peop le who shared the same concern? 
providing a useful comparative dataset. Institutionally, the countries differ in several 
ways: Australia has compulsory voting, New Zealand has voluntary voting; Australia 
has a bicameral federal parliament, New Zealand has a unicameral, unitary parliament; 
Australia has an alternative vote, single member electoral system in its lower 
house, whi le New Zealand has a highly proportional, mixed member electoral system. 
They do share a Westminster-based parliamentary system as well as a history of 
English settlement. They also share similar trends in communal participation. It would 
stand to reason that Australia has higher rates of contacting, given the effects of 
federalism discussed above. Fewer New Zealand citizens (Figure 2.10) report 
contacting officials to express their views, although that trend was reversed between 
2008 and 2010. The number of Australians working with like others (Figure 2.11) 
decreased between the 2007 and 2010 elections, but is otherwise stable between 20 
and 25 per cent of the population. New Zealand's rate of participation is likewise 
stable, but lower at between 17 and 22 per cent of the population. In terms of at least 
recent trends, Australia appears to be tracking similarly to New Zealand. Future study 
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Figure 2.10 : Percentage of population who contacted an official in previous five years, 2001 to 
2011, New Zealand and Australia 
Source: 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 Australian Electi on Studies; 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011 New 
Zealand El ecti on Studies (Bean et al., 2001, 2004, 2007; McAllister et al., 2010; Vowles, Banducci , 
Karp, Aimer, & Miller, 2002; Vowles, Banducci , Karp, Mil ler, & Sullivan, 2005; Vowles et al., 2008; 
Vowles, Cotterell , M iller, & Curtin, 2011). 
Question (NZES): There are various forms of pol itica l action that people take to express their views 
about something the government should or should not do. For each one, have you: Contacted a 
politician or government offi cia l in person, in writing, or oth er way. 
will confirm whether or not recent changes in rates of contacting are long term 
phenomena or short term responses to political stimuli. 
The lack of data on political contacting in Australia prior to 2001 makes it difficult to 
determine whether the internet has affected the amount of overall correspondence to 
officials. Gibson, Lusoli and Ward's (2008) study of Austr_alian citizens finds a gap 
between what constituents say they want with regard to online communi cations with 
their representatives, and the rate at which they have taken up those options: 
" ... on-line contacting in Australia is not currently leading to any significant 
reconnection or even possibly deepening of existing connections citizens have 
to their representatives and representative institutions. Contacting one's MP 
on-line is largely a result of having done so already and being a high user of the 
Internet" (2008, p. 128). 
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Figure 2.11: Percentage of population who worked with like others to express views in previous 
five years, 2001 to 2011, New Zealand and Australia 
Source: 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 Australian Election Studies; 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011 New 
Zealand Election Studies (Bean et al. , 2001, 2004, 2007; McAllister et al., 2010; Vowles, Banducci , 
Karp, Aimer, & Miller, 2002; Vowles, Banducci, Karp, Miller, & Sullivan, 2005; Vowles et al., 2008; 
. Vowles, Cotterell, Miller, & Curtin, 2011.) 
Question (NZES): There are various forms of political action that people t ake to express their views 
about something the government should or shou ld not do. For each one, have you: Work together 
with people who shared the same concern. 
With little evidence available, either from Australia or internationally, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the diffusion of internet access to date has had little effect on 
the total number of citizens contacting government officials to express their views. It is 
also important to note that, as with the diffusion of access throughout the general 
population, it took Australian representatives some time to embrace the internet. For 
example, only 54 per cent of MPs had a working website in 2005 (Ward et al., 2007). 
In a series of studies, Gibson and McAllister (2006; 2009; 2011a; 2011b) have 
explored Australian representatives and candidates' use of online campaign techniques 
in terms of their electoral outcomes. At the 2001 election, 37 per cent of candidates 
maintained a personal campaign website, climbing only s li ghtly to 39 per cent at the 
2004 election (Gibson & McAllister 2006). At the 2007 election, 64 per cent of major 
party candidates maintained a personal website, while 42 per cent also maintained 
social networking profiles (Gibson & McAllister 2009) . By the 2010 election, those 
figures had risen to 73 per cent and 68 per cent respectively (Gibson & McAllister 
2011a). 
Noting that early electoral gains from online campaign presences, including 
party and candidate websites, and email newsletters, have diminished as these 
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techniques became the norm, Gibson and McAllister find positive effects of Web 2.0 
techniques at the 2007 and 2010 Australian federal elections. So far, the most ready 
adopters - and beneficiaries - ofrelatively cheap, interactive Web 2.0 techniques have 
been the minor parties; in 2010, 84 per cent of minor party candidates used social 
networking profiles and 96 per cent maintained a we blog (Gibson &McAllister 2011a). 
From the demand-side perspective, the following section analyses the characteristics of 
citizens who contacted a government official to express their views in the period from 
2005 to 2010, with particular focus on their internet usage. 
Protest participation 
While communal forms of participation are generally non-confrontational - in 
that they do not usually turn violent or engage directly with opposing forces, including 
police - protest participation often is. Communal and protest participation are further 
differentiated by generational trends: communal participation is in decline while 
protest participation has increased in popularity since the 1970s (Dalton, 2008a, 
2008b ). This study measures protest as signing a petition ( either offline or online) and 
joining in a march or demonstration. Other measures of protest not discussed at length 
here include boycotting ( or buying) a consumer product, joining a legal or illegal strike 
and occupying a building or public place. Petition signing straddles-aspects of 
communal and protest participation, but is discussed as a measure of protest here in 
line with Dalton's (2008a) 'good citizen' study. Chapter 7 explores the characteristics 
of protest participation in more detail. First, however, this section examines the history 
of protest in Australia. 
There has been little systematic research on protest in Australia. Bean's (1991) 
analysis of Australian data shows that participation in communal and partisan acts has 
a causal effect on participation in both 1ow-level' and radical acts of protest, but also 
finds that socioeconomic factors, particularly education, have little direct effect on 
protest participation. Vromen (2003a) finds significant associations between 
ed,ucational attainment and participation in consumer boycotts - an act of protest not 
studied here - and attendance at rallies. She also finds that rally attendees are more 
likely to live in cities than not, which stands to reason as the overall time of attendance 
is lower when travel is minimal. Two publicly available datasets (the Australian 
Electoral Study and the World Values Survey) contain data on protest participation in 
Australia, which are largely unresearched. 
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As an advanced liberal democracy, Australians have perhaps little reason to 
protest but the freedom to do so if they wish. Due to that freedom from sanctions for 
protesting, Dalton et al. find 
" ... striking evidence that a nation's economic and political conditions strongly 
influence that aggregate levels of protest. It is immediately apparent that 
protest is more common in advanced industrial democracies ... the ten highest-
ranking nations are all advanced industrial democracies - this is hardly 
evidence of protest as a tool of a poor and disenfranchised public" (2010, p. 13). 
Accordingly, Australia's relative economic prosperity and socio-political freedoms see 
the country as being among the leaders in mean protest activities per capita: seventh 
among 79 nations in Dalton et al.'s (2010) analysis of World Values Survey data. Table 
2.2 presents frequency data on petition signing from the World Values Survey Waves 1 
to 5, comprising the period from 1981 to 2005.20 Again, Australia is near the top of the 
table, with just less than 80 per cent of the population reporting having signed a 
petition in the five years prior to the Wave 5 survey ( conducted in 2005). Only New 
Zealand and Switzerland report higher rates of petition signing. Moreover, the rates 
reported here are exceptionally high: since 1990 (i.e. Wave 3) more than 78 per cent of 
voting age Australians have signed a petition. That number is higher than the current 
number of internet users and higher than the voting age population turnout in recent 
federal elections in Australia. Petition signing is almost ubiquitous among the 
population. 
The number of demonstrators in Australia - citizens who have attended a 
lawful demonstration - is markedly lower, ranging from 12 per cent in the 1981 survey 
to 22 per cent of the population in 2005. Here Australia sits in sixth place among 221 
countries, and again the countries at the top of the table are advanced democracies. 
The split between advanced democracies and authoritarian regimes or developing 
democracies evident in Table 2.3 is not as clear in Table 2.2. For instance there is a 
nominal difference of 79 percentage points between petition signing in New Zealand 
and Russia in the Wave 5 data, but only 5 points difference between rates of lawful 
demonstration in those countries. Likewise, the rate of petition signing in Australia is 
50 points above the mean of all countries reported in Table 2.2, and only 5 points above 
the mean rate of lawful demonstration in Table 2.3. This is in part due to 
2° Countries are included in thi s analysis on the basis of available data, with at least two data 
points the minimum for inclusion. 
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Table 2.2: Percentage of population who signed a petition in previous five years, WVS countries 
between 1981 and 2005 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
1981-84 1989-93 1994-99 1999-2004 2005-08 
New Zea land 91 87 
Switzerland 63 68 80 
Austra lia 70 50 79 80 
Sweden 72 87 79 
United Stat es 71 81 74 
Canada 74 73 
Norway 65 69 
Great Britain 58 68 
Japan 48 62 55 63 60 
Brazil 47 56 
Finland 30 39 50 
Germany 62 47 
South Korea 20 42 40 52 34 
Argentina 34 22 31 23 32 
Serbia 19 27 30 
Uruguay 36 30 
India 25 27 29 29 
Peru 21 22 25 
Poland 14 20 24 
Spain 19 22 26 23 
Mexico 10 35 32 19 21 
Chile 23 17 20 19 
South Africa 20 34 19 27 15 
Turkey 14 20 16 13 
Russia 30 11 8 
Mean score 33 31 30 25 30 
Blank cells represent data not collected by WVS. 
Source: World Values Survey cumulative file, Wave 1-5 (World Values Survey Association 2009) 
Question : Waves 1-4: Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms 
of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have 
actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, 
do it. Wave 5: Have you or have you not done any of these activities in the last five years? Signing a 
petition. 
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Table 2.3 : Percentage of population who participated in a lawful demonstration in previous five 
years, WVS countries between 1981 and 2008 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave4 Wave 5 
1981-84 1989-93 1994-99 1999-2004 2005-08 
Spain 26 22 26 36 
Sweden 30 36 31 
Norway 26 29 
Switzerland 16 17 28 
Serbia 8 22 22 
Austra lia 12 18 22 
New Zea land 21 21 
Argentina 23 15 16 13 20 
India 17 13 23 19 
Moldova 8 18 18 
Ch ile 30 15 16 18 
Mexico 9 22 11 4 16 
Russia 33 21 15 
United States 16 21 15 
South Afri ca 8 15 11 14 15 
South Korea 7 20 15 28 11 
Poland 12 12 11 
Fin land 14 13 10 
Japan 9 13 10 13 10 
Turkey 6 9 8 6 
Jordan 3 4 
Mean score 12 19 15 14 17 
Blank ce lls represent data not col lected by WVS. 
Source: World Va lues Survey cumu lative fi le, Wave 1-5 (World Va lues Survey Association 2009) 
Question : Now I'd like you to look at th is card . I'm going to read out some different forms of political 
action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actua lly done 
any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it. 
Attending lawful demonstrations. 
the smaller distribution of rates of protesting, but also to a weaker relationship 
between democracy and lawful demonstration. Nonetheless, Australia sti ll has high 
rates of protestors, higher than New Zealand (in 2005), the United States and Japan. 
Having established that Australia has a higher proportion of demonstrators and 
petition signers compared to other WVS countries, Figure 2.12 shows recent trends in 
those behaviours. Data from the AES date back to 2001 for protest or march 
attendance, and only to 2004 for petition signing. Importantly, e-petition signing is 
measured separately. The trends over that short period are fairly stable, although 
written petition signing falls by 11.2 points between 2004 and 2010. In the same 
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Figure 2.12: Percentage of Australian population who participated in protest activity in previous 
five years, 2001 to 2010 
Source: 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 Australian Election Studies {Bean et al. , 2001, 2004, 2007; 
McAllister et al., 2010) 
period e-petition signing increases slightly, from 12.1 per cent of the population to 
2004 to 15.9 per cent in 2010. This coincides with the continuing diffusion of internet 
access throughout Australia, which should explain at least part of that increase. As 
more Australians begin to use the internet, their exposure to e-petitions will rise 
accordingly. Increased internet use across the population is also likely to lead to more 
e-petitions being created and distributed. Likewise, the decrease in written petition 
signing suggests that creators are choosing to circulate their petitions online rather 
than offline. In other words, the supply of petitions has led the demand online, and not 
the other way around. 
The (albeit small) increase in e-petition signing since 2004 has likely been 
prompted one particular event in Australian civic life. Advocacy group, GetUp! was 
formed in 2005 to promote progressive public policy by helping citizens to contact 
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government representatives via email and letter.21 GetUp's activities then broadened 
to include the creation and distribution of (particularly on line) petitions. Publicly 
available information on the number of GetUp! petition signatories is difficult to 
compile, but GetUp! publishes an annual report listing membership numbers, where 
members comprise any individual who has registered with the organisation's website 
to sign a petition or to receive updates on GetUp! campaigns. Once registered, 
members also have the opportunity to create their own petition; if that petition gets 
enough support from other members, GetUp! administrators may sponsor it as an 
official GetUp! petition. The effects of GetUp! and the online distribution of petitions 
more generally are explored in Chapter 7. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the state of political participation in Australia to be 
relatively healthy. First, the country's political institutions facilitate participation in 
several ways. The system of federal government has resulted in a high number of 
political representatives among the population, at the local, state and national levels of 
government. The electoral system with its combination of alternative vote and single 
transferable vote counting methods leads to a high degree of proportionality, reducing 
wasted votes and increasing the benefits of voting. Most importantly, compulsory 
voting laws maintain a high level of voter turnout. Compulsory voting is also thought to 
have the flow-on effects of stimulating political interest, party identification and 
political stability more generally. Moreover, Australian citizens are overwhelmingly 
supportive of compulsory voting laws, indicating high levels of turnout would be 
sustained was the compulsion removed. 
Australia's political culture is a factor of its institutional arrangements. 
Accordingly, the Australian electorate demonstrates similar features to those 
institutions: its citizens have been described as 'subject-participant', with little 
motivation to agitate or change the existing order (Erny, 1972). They have elsewhere 
been described as possessing a "distinctive utilitarian" outlook towards their role in 
political life (Mackerras and McAllister, 1999). Analysis has found that instrumental, 
materialist attitudes - as opposed to more expressive, postmaterialist values -
predominate among Australians (Western and Tranter, 2005). The consistent message 
21 GetUp/ was founded by two Australian citizens who modelled the website and organisation on 
MoveOn.org, an American on lin e progressive advocacy group . 
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is one of stability and caution; Australians remain primarily concerned with their own 
wellbeing and reluctant to act in order to effect political change. 
Within this context, the chapter concludes by outlining the current state of 
political participation in Australia. Rates of participation in Australia are generally 
high, but vary across different forms of participation. Electoral participation is popular 
in Australia, for the mentioned reasons, however the proportion of Australians 
abstaining from voting appears to be slowly but steadily increasing. The number of 
political party members in Australia is consistently low, but increasing numbers of 
Australians are donating their time and money to parties and candidates during 
election campaigns (save a sharp decline in both at the 2010 election). Rates of 
communal and protest participation compare favourably with similar countries, 
although recent time series data indicate that they are in slow decline. Data from the 
AES show some early increases in the number of Australians participating online, in 
accordance with increasing rates of internet use across the country. 
Finally, the online campaigning is becoming a regular feature of Australian 
political campaigns, among both major and minor parties (2006; 2009; 2011a; 2011b). 
Any electoral advantage that was once possible from having an online presence is 
decreasing, as voters come to expect campaign information to be a~~ilable online. 
Moreover, the use of Web 2.0 techniques, such as web logs and social networking 
profiles, is almost ubiquitous among minor party candidates, pointing to their 
increasing use in future campaigns in Australia. The following chapter looks at 
Australians' internet use in greater depth, from the perspective of the "demand" side. 
Australians have shown their willingness to adopt the internet, with swift diffusion of 
access leading to high current rates of usage. The chapter looks also at what Australian 
users do online, with particular reference to their political browsing, internet-related 
skills and the time they spend online, vis a vis doing other, offline activities. It is well to 
show that Australia's political elites are using the internet, but in this case it is as 
important that citizens are using it, too. 
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Chapter 3 - Internet use and civic 
voluntarism 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the introduction of dial-up internet access in the 1990s, Australians have 
been avid adopters of internet technology. Three in four Australians now have access 
to the internet at home, work or via their mobile phones, making them almost 
permanently connected to the World Wide Web (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011) . 
The emergence of Web 2.0 applications, including social networking, collaboration and 
peer-to-peer information sharing makes for a communications medium drastically 
different from anything seen previously. The interactivity of the internet is vastly 
different to broadcast television radio and mass distribution newspapers and 
magazines. The implications for politics are substantial, particularly with regard to 
how people become interested in politics, inform themselves about current issues, 
discuss events and participate in political life (Kruikemeier et al., 2013). The internet 
allows for faster, cheaper and easier political participation, opening politics up to 
citizens previously deterred by the high costs of entry (Krueger, 2002). 
This chapter has two broad focuses: the first explores who uses the internet in 
Australia, including the history of internet diffusion; the second situates internet use 
within the theory of political participation, particularly the civic voluntarism model. 
Section 3.2 details the rise of internet use in Australia and globally, comparing the 
Australian case with like countries. Next, Section 3.3 compares the characteristics of 
Australian internet users and non-users, focusing on socioeconomic and demographic 
biases differences. Section 3.4 considers the likely effects of internet use on 
participation, per the civic voluntarism model (Verba et al., 1995). The internet has the 
potential to both increase an individual's free time, by making tasks including political 
participation easier and faster to complete, as well as reduce his free time, by taking up 
time that could be spent on offline activities (Nie, 2001). Internet use is not likely to 
affect an individual's income or wealth directly, but online forms of participation 
should require less money to engage in than offline equivalents (Krueger, 2002). 
Where civic skills give an individual the competence and confidence to participate, the 
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online equivalent - proficiency in using the internet, or 'internet skills' - is expected to 
have the same effect one-participation (Best & Krueger 2005; Anduiza et al. 2010). In 
sum, it is expected that internet use makes it easier for Australians to participate in 
both offline and online forms of participation by mediating the effects of the civic 
voluntarism model. Finally, the chapter summarises the implications for the civic 
voluntarism model and its effects on participation in Australia. 
3.2 Internet use in Australia and globally 
Internet use has expanded rapidly since the development of the World Wide 
Web ONWW) in the early 1990s, both in terms of numbers of users and the time they 
spend online. As the medium has transitioned from its original 'read-only' form to the 
interactive, open-source technologies associated with Web 2.0, it has played a growing 
• role in everyday social activities and transactions - from the mechanics of family and 
peer relationships to online shopping, banking and news consumption - among an 
increasing number of citizens internationally. In 2013 however, internet use is not yet 
ubiquitous. This section discusses the advent of internet use globally through the lens 
of the 'digital divide': those characteristics that distinguish internet users from non-
users, a contemporary form of information 'haves' and 'have-nots'. The digital divide, 
according to Norris (2001a), comprises three aspects: 
"The global divide refers to the emergence of Internet access between 
industrialized and developing societies. The social divide concerns the gap 
between information rich and poor in each nation. And finally within the online 
community, the democratic divide signifies the difference between those who 
do, and do not, use the panoply of digital resources to engage, mobilize, and 
participate in public life (p. 4; emphasis in original)." 
Understanding how internet use was developed in the 1990s and proliferated during 
the first decade of the 21st century helps to explain how the digital divide has emerged 
and why it persists. 
The first internet browser software, enabling users to access material on the 
WWW at home (including a network of information previously accessible only to 
computer scientists and academics) was released in 1991 (Norris, 2001a). The earliest 
adopters of the browsing technologies were in "possession of high income, and 
occupational and educational resources" (Willis and Tranter, 2006, p. 45). Moreover, 
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they lived in wealthy countries: until 1993, only 20 countries were connected to the 
WWW. Norris (2001a, p. 28) describes the internet in the 1990s as "email and Web 
pages delivered through wired umbilical cords to beige desktop boxes", and the 
imagery of static information being transmitted to passive users sitting at a desk says 
much about the early WWW. Elsewhere, Norris (2000, p. 122) describes this 
phenomenon as characteristic of "the information society". The internet was, in its first 
ten years oflife, an information medium, in the same sense that newspapers, radio and 
television are information media, concerned with the broadcast of news, opinion and 
entertainmentto a mass audience (Madden and Fox, 2006). The combination of the 
socioeconomic bias among internet users - at the individual and country levels - and 
the medium's focus on information transmission served to reinforce the existing gaps 
between information 'haves' and 'have nots'. Patterns of internet adoption reflected 
patterns of traditional media consumption: regular newspaper readers, for example, 
were more likely to be online in the first decade of the WWW (Chinn and Fairlie, 2007; 
Norris, 2000). In Australia, this 'early adoption' period lasted throughout the 1990s. 
In the second decade of the 21st century, internet use continues to proliferate 
steadily, and not just in developing countries - which were later adopters of the 
technology - but at a similar rate among developed, early adopting countries. For 
example, 83 per cent of Australian voters described themselves as internet users in 
2011 (McAllister et al., 2010a); with allowances made for the very elderly and the 
infirm, there is not much scope for further growth in that number. This is termed here 
the 'transitional' phase of internet use in Australia, as the profile of users moved from 
early adopters to a mainstream mass. Likewise, 80 per cent of American citizens had 
internet access in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012), while across the developed world, 
74 per cent of citizens reported having access in-2011 (see Figure 3.1) . At the top end 
of diffusion, more than 90 per cent of citizens in Iceland, Norway, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Sweden have internet access (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2011) . Figure 3.1 shows a similar trajectory of internet 
di ffusion between developed and-developing countries; although the large numbers of 
internet users in developed countries will invariably see growth slow in those 
countries, while access in developing countries should continue to expand. In regard of 
the social divide, there is evidence that it persists in developed countries, despite data 
suggesting that access is almost ubiquitous in many nations. 
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Figure 3.1: The diffusion of internet access: percentage of population with access to the internet, 
2001 to 2011 
Source: International Telecommunications Union 2011; McAllister et al. 2010 
Question (ITU): Suggested model question: Have you used the Internet from any location in the last 
12 months? Where did you use the Internet in the last 12 months? (International 
Telecommunications Union, 2009). 
According to diffusion theory (Rogers, 1962), global and social divides should 
become less stark as diffusion of a new technology continues, and as consumers of 
lower socioeconomic status follow the lead of the early adopters. Norris (2001a, p. 33) 
observes this effect in the diffusion of telephone, radio, television, cable television, 
video cassette recorder and personal computer technologies. However, as Willis and 
Tranter (2006, p. 45) note, the social divide between internet users and non-users has 
persisted into the new century. In Australia, age and gender gaps have consistently 
declined throughout the 2000s, as the internet became a mainstream medium. Willis 
and Tranter (2006) observe, however, that household composition, geographic location 
and educatio nal gaps between users and non-users persisted into the new century. 
Moreover, "the Australian situation does not appear to be unusual. Global inequalities 
in Internet use remain substantial ... however, the nature of disparities between users 
varies between countries" (Willis and Tranter, 2006, p. 47). Moreover, a divide persists 
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(AES data) 
in many countries between types of internet users, namely skilled, active users and 
under-skilled, passive users (Anduiza et al., 2010; Deursen and Dijk, 2011; Kruikemeier 
et al., 2013). 
The mid-2000s marked the advent of the 'social internet', the third - and 
current- stage of internet diffusion in Australia. It is marked by two things: Web 2.0 
interactivity and the portability or smartphones. 'Web 2.0' is an umbrella term for the 
range of internet applications and websites that moved away from the broadcasting 
functions of the early WWW toward a more collaborative, interactive medium 
(Grossman, 2006; O'Reilly, 2007). Examples of original WWW functions being 
replaced by Web 2.0 equivalents include: the Encyclopaedia Britannica Online versus 
Wikipedia (a collaborative, open source encyclopaedia); personal websites versus 
personal biogs (with capacity for reader input); and online sales of digital media files 
versus peer to peer file sharing (O'Reilly, 2007). In other words, static internet 
applications replaced by interactive ones. For many internet users, the development of 
Web 2.0 applications meant an upsurge in online social networking: sharing photos 
online with friend via email, or with the public via photo-sharing websites such as 
Flickr; creating a personal website or blog; joining mass social networking websites like 
MySpace, Linkedin or Facebook (for example Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011) . 
Another commonly used feature of Web 2.0 - and one vital to understanding 
how people participate in politics in this era - is the delivery of news and current 
affairs reporting online. With the use of customised news websites, including the 
websites of traditional mass media outlets, rich site summary (RSS) feeds and websites 
that exist solely to aggregate the content of other news websites, a consumer can 
insulate himself almost entirely from any news outside his range of interests (Iyengar 
and Hahn, 2009; Slater, 2007; Stroud, 2010). He can customise his news consumption 
to limit exposure to only those subjects, journalists, opinions and commentators of his 
choosing. At the same time, the internet has allowed for relationships to be formed and 
maintained across the previously prohibitive social boundaries of race, socioeconomic 
status, location, religion and partisan identification (Gibson & McAllister 2009; Kittilson 
& Dalton 2011; Dalton & Kittilson 2012). The effect of this phenomenon on political 
behaviour - namely the accumulation of political knowledge, attitudes towards politics 
and the propensity to participate - is explored in later chapters. 
87 
Email-enabled smartphones were first popularised in the early 2000s, with the 
release of the 'Blackberry' devices. However, the release of the Apple iPhone in 2007 
saw a shift in smartphone technology from email device to pocket-sized personal 
computer capable of running internet-connected applications, and with it a 
corresponding shift in how consumers conceive of and access the internet 
(Charlesworth, 2009). As with fixed internet access, the diffusion of smartphone 
devices was limited at first to early adopters, characterised by their high socioeconomic 
status (Smith, 2011; Zheng, 2011). The mark of difference between fixed and mobile 
internet adoption is in speed: in 2007, 19 per cent of residents in developed countries 
had mobile broadband access, increasing steadily to 57 per cent in 2011(see Figure 
3.2). In developing countries, access increased from one per cent in 2007 to nine per 
cent in 2012. In 2011, mobile broadband penetration was highest in Europe (54 per 
cent of residents) , followed by the Americas (31 per cent), with Africa lagging at four 
per cent. 
Take-up rates in the different geographic regions mirrored those for internet 
access more broadly, as shown in Figure 3.2 (International Telecommunications Union, 
2011); it seems that, once accustomed to 'being online', the addition of a new platform 
to a consumer's suite of internet technologies occurs more readily than the initial 
adoption (Aron and Burnstein, 2003). It might be expected that the diffusion of mobile 
broadband in developing countries will lag behind the diffusion of fixed internet access 
but, once established among a critical mass, will proliferate at a faster rate (Lee et al. 
2011. The importance of mobile internet access lies in its capacity to make users 
constantly connected - not only to the WWW, but to their family, friends, colleagues, 
and broader social networks (McAllister & Pietsch, 2011; Park et al., 2009; Penard and 
Poussing, 2010). Further, it has the capacity to increase the amount of information to 
which a smartphone user is exposed. However, it also has the potential to widen the 
'knowledge gap' between the already engaged and the disengaged, by allowing existing 
participants to learn more, engage more widely and deeply, and to participate more 
(Anduiza et al., 2009b; Bonfadelli, 2002; McAllister and Gibson, 2011). 
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Source: International Telecommunications Union 2011 
The implications of these changes in internet use for political participation in 
Australia are far-reaching. First, increasing numbers of internet users spending 
increasing amounts of time online have unprecedented opportunities to participate 
onltne and greater exposure to information about offline participation, but perhaps less 
time available to participate offline. Second, access to mobile internet connections via a 
smartphone or other portable device allows a citizen to learn about politics in any 
situation, at qny time. He can likewise sign an e-petition or email a member of 
parliament while on public transport. On the other hand, increased opportunities to 
access the internet may reinforce the engagement of those who are already interested 
and participate, as they will likely make the most use of the internet for political 
purposed. The following section explores who uses the internet in Australia, who does 
not, and consequently who is more inclined to participate as a result. 
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3.3 Australian internet users and the 'dig ital divide' 
The speed of internet diffusion in Australia suggests that the social divide 
between internet users and non-users, usually most evident among early adopters, 
should diminish more quickly than in similar countries. However, data from the 2008 
American National Election Study (2010), 2010 Australian Election Study (McAllister et 
al., 2010a) and 2011 Eurobarometer study (European Commission, 2011) show that 
internet use, while almost ubiquitous across the respective populations, is still 
concentrated among the highest educated and highest income earners; internet use in 
Australia is apparently no more egalitarian than in the United States or across Europe 
generally. Willis and Tranter (2006), conversely, argue that the social divide -
measured by the conventional socioeconomic indicators of educational attainment and 
income - are not adequate measures in describing the patterns of internet diffusion in 
Australia. They point to age as particularly salient in determining internet use in 
Australia: 
"In advanced industrial societies, certain types of knowledge are no longer 
gained through an accumulative process associated with ageing. Instead, 
knowledge of new technologies, such as the Internet, is strongly associated with 
youth" (Willis and Tranter, 2006, p. 55). 
What Willis and Tranter do not mention explicitly is that knowledge is not only 
traditionally associated with age, but with education and occupational status. Based on 
diffusion theory and Willis and Tranter's empirical study, then, it is expected that 
internet use in Australia is decreasingly influenced by educational attainment and 
household income, but that age - which is usually positively correlated with both of the 
socioeconomic factors mentioned - should have either negligible or negative effects. 
Analysis of AES data from 2001 to 2010 supports Willis and Tranter's (2006) 
observations, as Table 3.1 demonstrates. Over that period, the number of internet 
users in the Australian population has increased from 52 per cent in 2001 to 7 4 per 
cent in 2010, with steep growth between the 2001 and 2007 elections. At this stage of 
the diffusion process, there are increasing differences between the educational, 
geographic, age, occupational and income profiles of users and non-users. They are not 
necessarily systemic, however, but generational. The remaining internet 'hold outs' are 
getting older, and retiring and earning less. In the diffusion process, it appears that 
elderly city dwellers have yielded and now use the internet, while the truly resistant 
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of internet users and non-users in Australia, 2001 to 2010 
Transitional period Social internet period 
2001 2004 2007 2010 
Users in population (%) 52 67 73 83 
Mean age of users 42 44 47 52 
Mean age of non-users 52 67 73 74 
Users living in major ci t ies(%) 61 60 58 62 
Non-users living in major cities (%) 39 48 46 44 
Users with university degrees(%) 32 33 32 31 
Non-users with university degrees(%) 5 5 4 4 
Users in top income quartile(%) 45 37 27 31 
Non-users in top income quartile (%) 13 7 4 5 
Users with managerial responsib ility(%) 47 46 46 46 
Non-users with managerial respons ibility(%) 31 32 33 28 
Source: 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 Australian Election Studies (Bean, Gow & McAllister 2001; Bean 
et al. 2004, 2007; McAllister et al. 2010) . See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
overwhelmingly live in regional and rural areas. Those who do use the internet are 
increasing in age, as the bright young early adopters become outnumbered by the late-
adopting majority. The percentage with university degrees has remained steady after 
starting high, while the number of all Australians with a degree has increased slowly 
over the same period. In total, the profile of internet users is becoming closer to the 
profile of the Australian population at large. 
More detail on the relationships between these characteristics and internet access is 
gleaned from binary logistic regression analysis, presented in Table 3.2. The model 
predicts whether individuals have access to the internet. Age has a consistently 
negative effect, in as much as the proclivity to use the internet declines with age, but 
that effect is greatly outweighed by those of income, educational attainment and the 
respondent's position in his or her organisation, measured by supervisory and 
managerial responsibility. The influence of income appears to diminish over time, from 
a regression coefficient of .189 in 2001 to .102 in 2010. On the contrary, the effects of 
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Table 3.2: Predictors of internet access among Australian citizens, 2001 to 2010 
Transitional period Social internet period 
2001 2004 2007 
B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) B 
Age 
-.047** .005 0.954 -.052** .005 .949 -.082** .008 0.921 -.083** 
Gross annual household income 
.189** .018 1.209 .127* * .018 1.135 .151 ** .023 1.163 .084** 
Educational attainment 
.268** .038 1.307 .303** .042 1.354 .296** .057 1.345 .364** 
Seniority of position in workplace .147** .050 1.158 .164** .051 1.178 .176** .064 1.193 .211 ** 
Residential location (by population) .148** .048 1.160 .009 .050 1.009 .147* .061 1.159 .011 
Constant 
-.860** .335 1.338** .370 2.947** .552 5.330* * x2 457 .708 398.5 20 462.802 524.615 
-2 log likelihood 1246.093 1198.800 808.199 921.018 
Nagelkerke r2 
.421 
.364 
.474 
.458 
Binary logistic regression analysis. ** = p<.01 *=p<.05 (two-tailed). n=1267 (2001), 1402 (2004), 1369 (2007), 1729 (2010) . Source: 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 Australian Election Studies (Bean, Gow & McAllister 2001; Bean et al. 2004, 2007; McAllister et al. 2010) . See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
2010 
SE Exp(B) 
.007 .920 
.019 1.088 
.053 1.439 
.062 1.190 
.063 1.011 
.479 
managerial responsibility and educational attainment increase over the same period. 
There is therefore still a socioeconomic element to the internet access divide, but it is 
not strictly a wealth divide. 
Whether a person lives in a remote location or a major city has little effect on 
whether he uses the internet. In fact, data suggests that the effect of location is not 
significant in 2004 or 2010, and only marginally in 2007. This is perhaps an artefact of 
Australian federal government initiatives to expand internet access in rural and remote 
areas via satellite delivery. 22 Certainly, all other things being equal, distance from a 
major town or city does not appear to impede access to internet services (although 
Table 3.1 shows that non-users disproportionally live outside of major towns). In sum, 
Willis and Tranter's (2006) predictions get mixed results. The effect of age is not as 
important when controlling for other factors, particularly socioeconomic ones. 
Likewise income is not as important as education and seniority of position in the 
workplace, while any rural / urban effects are close to non-existent. To read Willis and 
Tranter (2006) in another way, it could be said that there is a persistent digital divide 
in Australia, but the factors that explained it in 2006 do not hold the same weight in 
2012. 
In a similar analysis of internet users in the United States, Talµkdar and Gauri 
(2011) find that the positive effects of income, education, gender, race, age or 
residential location in predicting internet access persisted between 2002 and 2008. In 
fact, gaps in the mean incomes, educational attainments and proximity to a major city 
became larger in that period. Data from Europe suggest similar effects there: the 
strongest predictors of internet access are education and income, while the factors 
preventing internet access are overwhelmingly income, the presence of children in a 
household and unemployment (Montagnier and Wirthmann, 2011). Montagnier and 
Whirtmann (2011) also find that Europeans' reasons for not having internet access are 
strongly influenced by income: those in the lowest income quartile are the most likely 
to respond that they do not need, do not want or do not have adequate skills or money. 
Households with dependent children, on the other hand, are more likely to report that 
22 The Higher Bandwidth Incentive Scheme subsidised fixed broadband (where avai lable) and 
satellite internet connections to residents of rural areas in Australia, with the intent of 
lowering the previously prohibitive cost of satellite internet connections to the average 
broadband connection rates charged in cities and regional centres. The program ran from 
2004 to 2005, before being replaced by similarly rural-focussed programs. 
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they cannot afford an internet connection, rather than that they do not need or want it 
(Montagnier & Wirthmann 2011). The social digital divide therefore seems to have 
persisted both in Australia and internationally, although there are strong signs of its 
abatement in Australia. 
3.4 Internet use, the civic voluntarism model and political 
participation 
The previous chapter outlined what is known about political participation, 
focusing on the major studies in the field and culminating with Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady's (1995) civic voluntarism model of participation. Not only is that model 
arguably the most comprehensive aggregation of all the research conducted prior to 
1995, it is also the first to argue the positive effects of an individual's resources and 
. skills, and not simply his or her socioeconomic status. With the advent of the internet 
as a communications medium, citizens of advanced democracies have acquired new 
skills which are likely to aid them in participating in politics. Moreover, the medium 
itself allows for new and emerging acts of participation that can be conducted entirely 
over the internet, reducing the need for a citizen to possess large amounts of time, 
money or civic skills. The civic voluntarism model can therefore not only assist in 
understanding vyho participates in Australia and why, but also how internet use among 
Australian citizens is changing their proclivity to participate. 
The relatively rapid diffusion of a medium so unlike television, radio or 
newspapers, coupled with the development of Web 2.0 applications allowing internet 
users to share information quickly and easily, is likely to have had some effect on 
citizens' exposure to political information and opportunities to participate. The 
literature on internet effects focuses largely on two key questions: does internet use 
mobilise apathetic citizens to participate in politics, or does it reinforce the habits of 
those who already participation; and do online forms of participation - or 'e-
participation' - attract citizens who would normally participate offline, or new 
participants? The civjc voluntarism model of participation, which was developed in 
1995 (before the internet became a mainstream communications medium) contends a 
citizen with civic skills, money, free time, and exposure to mobilisation to participate is 
more likely to participate than other citizens (Verba et al., 1995). By drawing on that 
model, the different strands of the internet and participation literature can be brought 
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together and explained through citizens' access to the resources necessary to 
participate. 
The question of whether the internet can mobilise citizens into participation or 
whether it reinforces the participatory habits of the already engaged is widely referred 
to as the 'normalisation/mobilisation' thesis (Hirzalla et al., 2010; Norris, 2000; Van 
Laer, 2007). 'Normalisation' refers to the hypothesis that the internet (or any medium) 
merely reinforces existing divides between the engaged and disengaged, by giving the 
engaged more opportunities for engagement and participation; it deepens their existing 
activities. This hypothesis is similar to the 'knowledge gap' thesis of media 
communications, which posits that rather mass media do not diminish the knowledge 
gap between people who are interested and uninterested in public affairs, but expands 
it by allowing the knowledgeable to learn even more (for example Genova & Greenberg 
1979). In other words, the relationship between news consumption and political . 
engagement is non-recursive: 
"The most politically knowledgeable, trusting, and participatory are most likely 
to tune into public-affairs coverage. And those most attentive to coverage of 
/ 
public affairs become more engaged in civic life" (Norris 2000, p. 317). 
Further, Norris shows evidence that the internet produces similar normalising effects: 
"the people most likely to be motivated to seek out election information on party Web 
pages, or to communicate and organize via the Net, are those who would be most 
engaged in traditional forms of political activism in parties, discussion groups, and 
lobbying activities" (2000, p. 277). Similar findings dominate the literature on internet 
effects on political engagement (for example Krueger 2002; Norris 2003; Best & 
Krueger 2005; Anduiza et al. 2009; Hirzalla et al. 2010). 
Conversely, the 'mobilisation' hypothesis asks whether citizens who previously 
h_ave little or no engagement with politics can be mobilised by using the internet. The 
theory underpinning this hypothesis argues that exposure to information and 
discussion on the internet can persuade someone to participate where, in the 
rnunterfactual scenario with_no internet, he would not normally participate. Early 
proponents of the mobilization hypothesis predicted that the internet would be used to 
facilitate direct democracy functions, expanding the public sphere to include those who 
are unable or unaccustomed to participating traditionally (Ferdinand, 2000; Norris, 
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2002, 2000). For the most part, empirical studies have not supported theories of 
internet mobilisation. Where they have, the effects are marginal: concentrated 
amongst the young (Hirzalla et al., 2010) and specific forms of participation (Van Laer, 
2010). 
After the normalisation/mobilisation debate, the second major focus of the 
internet effects literature is e-participation: who participates online, whether they 
have previously participated offline, and whether the act of participating online 
mobilises citizens to then participate in an offline capacity. Researchers, including 
Oser, Hooghe and Marien (2013), Vissers, Hooghe, Stolle and Maheo (2012) and 
Cantijoch and Gibson (2011) have found only small, if any, differences between online 
and offline participants. Oser et al. (2013) observe that there is a particular type of 
activist who prefers to participate online, but who has also participated offline 
previously. Moreover, online activists demonstrate similar socioeconomic biases as 
· offline activists. Schlozman, Verba and Brady (2010) likewise note that online activists 
have ample socioeconomic resources but are younger than traditional protestors. 
Research from Spain suggests that experience using the internet increases the 
likelihood that users will use the medium for participation (Anduiza et al., 2010). 
Cantijoch and Gibson (2011) take a bottom-up approach, examining e-participation and 
finding that distinct forms of online activism exist, different from each other as well as 
from offline participation. 
Despite asking different questions, these two broad focuses of the literature on 
internet use and participation share an interest in what citizens require in order to 
participate. They are also agree in so much as the internet, including the ability to 
participate online, has not been so far shown to have sb·ong mobilising effects (Anduiza 
et al., 2009a; Vissers et al., 2012). Fundamentally, they ask whether the internet 
provides citizens with a vital resource, outlet or medium to take the step into 
participation. To bring these two questions together in a systematic and researchable 
way, this study applies the civic voluntarism framework to whether internet use is 
mobilising Australians into participation or normalising the behaviour of existing 
participants. The questions are re framed to ask whether the internet can replace any of 
the traditional predictors of participation, thereby mobilising previously disengaged 
citizens into participation. Alternatively, the internet may only supplements traditional 
predictors, reinforcing and normalising the profile of existing participants. This section 
examines each of the predictors in the civic voluntarism model in turn, discussing what 
is known about their relationship with internet use and hypothesising that relationship 
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in the context of Australia. It also introduces data from Australia and internationally to 
provide some initial evidence for those hypotheses. 
Civic skills 
The civic voluntarism model argues that civic skills enable citizens to 
participate by making them more confident and better able to express their views 
(Verba et al., 1995). This is an intuitive explanation for the dominant role of 
socioeconomic status (SES) in predicting participation, as the same characteristics that 
measure SES - wealth, education and employment status - are also associated with 
imparting civic skills. This study asks whether civic skills retain their importance to the 
process of participation in the internet era. The reason for the question can be 
demonstrated with an example cited by Schlozman et al. (2010): in 2003, a group of 
online activists (predominantly computer scientists) sought stronger government 
regulation of electronic voting systems in the United States. The authors note that 
" ... there is nothing unexpected about the political success of what began as an 
Internet-based movement among computer professionals. While computer 
nerds are hardly the most visible group in American politics, they have 
characteristics - in particular, high levels of education - that predispose them 
to take part in politics should the occasion arise" (2010, p. 487). 
However, would those 'nerds' have become sufficiently concerned about the issue, 
organised a campaign, and taken it through to its completion - in this case, lobbying 27 
states to legislate in their favour - if the internet did not exist? Without the internet, 
the activists would not have been able to transmit their message to a diffuse audience 
so quickly and cheaply. That they could organise so efficiently is likely due to their 
(particularly) high computer and internet literacy. 
As internet use becomes more popular, the traditional civic skill predictors of 
participation, according to Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995)'s model, are expected 
to _become less important. Technological and social changes, such as the increased use 
of email over postal mail, should affect what skills a citizen requires to be able to 
participate. Advanced internet skills will comprise, as in the case of the electoral 
activists, the ability to create a website and communicate effectively on a medium that 
is qualitatively different to traditional mass media. At the other end of the range of 
internet skills is sending an email, more common among the population but less 
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effective in expressing views to a large audience. This study is expected to find that 
internet resources are at least as effective in predicting online participation as 
traditional civic skills. They are also expected to be significant in predicting offline 
participation, as per Schlozman et al.'s (2010) observation that online participation is a 
likely precursor to offline participation. 
Data from Australia show that the vast majority of Australians possess at least 
some internet skills. The Australian Election Study has only measured internet skills in 
2010, butthe resulting cross-sectional data provide a snapshot of the types of skills 
possessed by Australias. First, 86 per cent of internet users have sent an email with an 
attachment - a skill one step above the most basic online activities. Further, 63 per 
cent reported downloading software to their computers, a number which has likely 
increased with the proliferation of software applications - or 'apps' - designed to 
enhance the experience of online social networks and smartphones. Similarly, a high 
· number of users - 46 per cent - have uploaded photos, pictures or videos to a website. 
This is likely associated with the advent of online social networking services (SNS) such 
as Face book, which claimed 901 million users internationally in March 2012 
(Face book Inc, 2012). The Face book website and an increasing range of SNS such as 
Twitter and Tumblr are designed to make sharing photos and videos particularly easy. 
Finally, the 2010 AES found that 14 per cent of Australian internet users have designed 
a personal website or we blog. These users must possess the confidence and skills to 
create their own website as well as the motivation to produce their own content for 
public consumption. 
The different measures of internet proficiency are distributed in various ways 
among the population, but the defining characteristic of internet users is their youth. 
The average age of someone who has designed a website (38 years) is 20 years younger 
than someone who has not (58 years). Only 12 per cent of users report having done 
each of the four activities measured by the AES; their mean age (3 8 years) is 2 3 years 
less than those who use the internet but have not done any of the four activities (61 
years). Indeed, age is negatively correlated with internet proficiency, per the AES 
measures (r=-.388, p=.000). Internet proficiency is positively correlated with years of 
internet use (r=.395, p=.000), income (r=.234, p=.000) and education (r=.246, p=.000). 
Unsurprisingly, the most proficient internet users are also those who are online the 
most, and those who are online several times a day are likely to have experience with at 
least three of the four measured skills. Overall, it appears that Australian internet users 
for the most part feel comfortable performing simple internet activities, but that the 
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most proficient users are younger and better educated than are relatively novice users 
(McAllister et al., 2010a). 
Internet proficiency is also related to traditional civic skills, as per the civic 
voluntarism model (Best and Krueger, 2005; Krueger, 2002). Measuring proficiency as 
a scale of experience in the four different skill acts, ranging from zero (having 
experience in none of the acts) to four (having experience in all four acts), relationships 
between proficiency and civic skills become clear. Internet skills and job skills, a scale 
of experience in job-related acts such as organising meetings and writing letters, are 
correlated at r=.357 (p=.000). Likewise internet skills are moderately correlated with 
educational attainment (r=.387, p=.000), and another measure of civic skills, 
memberships in non-political organisations (p=.216, p=.000). Individuals who possess 
civic skills are therefore expected to possess at least some internet skills, while it has 
already been shown that both are related to high incomes and high educational 
attainment. While that creates the possibility of multicollinearity within the 
multivariate model (for example Best and Krueger, 2005; Krueger, 2002), the 
relationships between the two variables are not strong enough to invalidate the model. 
Money 
Not only were traditional civic skills not necessary to the success of the 
American computer scientists-turned-electoral activists, they did not require any 
substantial amounts of money (Schlozman et al., 2010). Wealth on its own is not a 
particularly robust predictor of participation, rather it enables an otherwise well 
resourced, skilled and interested citizen to participate (Verba et al., 1995). It is a 
necessary but sufficient condition of participatory acts. While the advent of e-
participation nullifies the high costs of some forms of participation - such as political 
party membership, attendance at party functions, travel to protest events, or the 
donation of money to a candidate or party - online forms of participation are not 
always transferable with offline forms (Bimber, 1999; Cantijoch and Gibson, 2011). For 
in~tance, a citizen who lacks the money to attend a protest in another city may not be 
interested in participating in an online equivalent. He may choose not to sign an e-
petition due to its perceived lack of efficacy, or not want to join an online group of 
. 
. 
'hacktivists' due to the illegality of what they-do. E-participation should therefore not 
be considered a panacea to the wealth bias among political participants. 
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Moreover, this chapter has already shown that, while decreasing, a 
socioeconomic digital divide persists in Australia. The income profile of internet users 
is increasingly reflective of the general population; most citizens, irrespective of 
income, have some form of internet access. This is demonstrated in the binary 
regression analysis of Australian internet users between 2001 and 2010 in Table 3.2. 
To the extent that a digital divide persists in Australia, it is Income should still matter 
for any acts of donation, as a citizen must have some degree of disposable wealth to 
indeed dispose of it It likewise should still matter for any acts of participation offline 
that require travel or some form of expense. It will likely still predict online 
participation, but only as an artefact of pre-internet participation; wealthy citizens who 
participate offline, both before the internet and now, are likely to participate online as 
well. At this stage of the internet diffusion process, there are surely those citizens who 
participated offline before they even thought of having internet access. It should be 
less important among younger citizens, who are at the beginning of their political life 
and less coloured by the traditional participant biases. 
Free time 
Schlozman et al.'s (2010) 'computer nerds' began their campaign online. Given 
their occupations, they may easily have operated during work hours. Another 
possibility is that a person employed as a computer programmer or technician would 
spend at least some of his 'free time' on the internet anyway, and so operating an on line 
campaign would dovetail with an existing hobby. The impact of a citizen's free time in 
predicting participation would be diminished in both scenarios; ifa citizen possesses a 
high level of internet skills, he should require less free time to participate online than 
any citizen - skilled or unskilled - should require to participate offline. 
This gives rise to a vital question: are internet use and 'free time' different 
things? If a survey respondent reports having no free time, but spending a lot of time 
using the internet, has he simply filled his free time with internet usage? Indeed, 2010 
AES data show that frequency of internet use is negatively correlated with the number 
of hours a person has to himself (r = -.199, p = .000). Further, free time is more closely 
related to annual income (r = -.291, p = .000) than to occupational status, as measured 
by position in an organisation (r = -.037, not statistically significant). Free time is also 
concentrated more heavily among men (r= .117, p = .000), appears to increase with age 
(p = .259, p = .000), and, unsurprisingly, those without full time employment (p = .269, 
p = .000) . AES respondents were not asked about their free time prior to 2010, so there 
100 
is no precise way of knowing whether these data are part of a trend, although they do 
reflect Verba et al.'s (1995) findings from the US. In the almost 20 years since that 
study, it does not appear that the distribution of free time among citizens has changed 
substantially, even with the proliferation of internet use. 
There are only so many hours in any citizen's day, and internet use invariably 
takes up some of those. Nie (2001) makes two points to this end: time spent using the 
internet has invariably replaced time that citizens used to spend on other activities; and 
that the nature of the internet is such that it requires a user's complete attention, unlike 
television, which often provides the 'white noise' to a family's time together. Further, 
" ... many of us are familiar with that unique Internet characteristic of surfing 
that leads Internet junkies to sit down to do a single task and end up, hours 
later, with a loss of sense of time, place, and original purpose" (Nie, 2001, p. 
431). 
Ni e's instinct on internet use is a compelling one: he was not only an early adopter of 
the internet, but a distinguished political scientist with a vast knowledge of who 
participates in politics and why. Indeed it is supported by the 2010 AES which shows a 
strong negative correlation between respondents' reported free time and the frequency 
of their internet use (r=-.262, p=.000). It is possible that survey respondents are 
including the time they spend online ( outside of work hours) as 'free time'. If so, it is 
expected that 'free internet time' would be to online participation as 'free time' is to 
offline participation. That is, they are not reflective of the types of citizens who become 
engaged and active in politics, rather they are a necessary resource if a citizen wishes to 
participate. Furthermore, if free time is increasingly spent online, less free time should 
in theory be available for offline participation; free time would instead lend itself to 
online participation, if any. If the data show that to be true - that free time better 
predicts online participation than offline participation - then the idea of free time as 
sbmething other than time spent online may require rethinking. 
More Australians using the internet each year, and they are online with 
increasing frequency (see Figure 3.3). Internet use in 2001 appears to have been more 
ad hoc than in 2010: one in two users went online each day, compared with three in 
four users in 2010. The largest growth has been among those who use the internet 
several times a day. The percentage of users who log on once a day has remained 
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consistent at around one quarter of all users, while the most sporadic internet users -
those who do not go online every day - appear in long term decline. There are several 
possible explanations for the increased intensity of internet use in Australia. First is 
the diffusion of internet access in workplaces, and the incorporation of internet 
technologies into daily occupational tasks, for example organising meetings, 
communicating with colleagues, ordering supplies and banking. Second is the 
development of broadband internet access, which research suggests has stronger 
effects on participation than earlier types of internet connection (Kwak et al., 2004; 
Ward and Vedel, 2006). Earlier technology - referred to as dial-up internet access -
used telephone lines to connect to an internet service provider, and as a consequence 
could only be used when the telephone landline was not in use.23 Use of a dial-up 
connection was a more structured activity than using a broadband connection: not 
only did the telephone landline need to be free, but the process of getting online was 
often slow, connections were less robust and would regularly 'drop out', and 
connection charged atthe cost of a phone call ( on top of fi xed access charges). 
Broadband access provides constant connectivity to the World Wide Web, allowing for 
quick, short bursts of internet use. 
A third explanation for the increased frequency of internet use is the diffusion 
of mobile broadband access, in this 'social internet' period. Since the release of the 
Apple iPhone in 2007 - at which time smartphones became a mass consumer product -
Australian mobile broadband subscriptions have risen to 5.5 million in December 2011, 
comprising almost halfof the 11.6 million broadband subscriptions (both fixed and 
mobile) across the country(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). In March 2007 
mobile broadband subscriptions made up less than five per cent of all intern et 
connections in Australia. The consequent shift in internet access from a strictly 
desktop environment to the portability of internet access in a person's pocket is 
staggering: the act of using the internet has been transformed from a very deliberate, 
structured exercise to something that can be done at any time, and in almost any place. 
It is therefore not surprising that Australians are increasingly describing themselves as 
very frequent internet users. 
23 At December 2011, only four per cent of all Australian internet connections used dial-up 
technology (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). 
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Figure 3.3: Frequency of internet use in Australia between 2001 and 2010, excluding non-users 
Source: 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 Australian Election Studies (Bean , Gow & McAll ister 2001; Bean 
et al. 2004, 2007; McAllister et al. 2010) . 
Mobilisation 
Beyond possessing adequate resources, citizens generally need to be asked to 
participate (Verba et al. 1995). Schlozman et al.'s (2010) computer programmers-
tui::ned-activists were mobilised to participate by what they viewed as a policy failure; 
their campaign gained momentum as they contacted other citizens, who in turn 
contacted further citizens, with an appeal to support their cause. Had the originators of 
the campaign never contacted them, the campaign's supporters are less likely to have 
expressed their views publicly (Krueger, 2006a; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Van 
Laer, 2007; Verba et al., 1995). The internet has certainly made the kind of narrowcast 
or directed communications used by political actors to mobilise citizens cheaper, faster 
and more diffuse. Previously, campaigners had limited options: direct, addressed mail 
to_ a known contact; unaddressed household mail; television advertising or unpaid 
coverage; or radio advertising or unpaid coverage. Local campaigns Gould mobilise by 
going door-to-door or to community meetings or events to persuade citizens to support 
their cause. Now, campaigners - whether partisan, grassroots or organised lobbyists -
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can contact possible supporters with unprecedented directness, and with reduced cost 
(Bimber, 1998; Carty, 2010a; Fisher and Boekkooi, 2010). Once they've reached their 
contacts, those recipients can then forward the original message on to their extended 
contacts; as a result, more citizens are able to be contacted now than ever before, 
whether in person, or by phone, mail or email (Bond et al., 2012a; Gonzalez-Bail6n et 
al., 2011). 
There are several effects of this enhanced contacting, some of them positive. 
More contact in total from a greater number of original sources should increase the 
information that a citizen receives on any election or policy issue. Moreover, the nature 
of online networks means that potential participants might receive an appeal from 
support from someone known to them, and not just from an unknown sender at a 
political party's head office (although the message might still have originated from that 
head office). Data from the US suggest that citizens are more likely to respond to 
· requests to participate received from personal contacts than from strangers (Verba et 
al. 1995, p. 157). However, the majority of requests to participate go unheeded (Verba 
etal.1995). 
Another effect of internet communications on mobilisation is that political 
actors have the capacity to disseminate appeals for support quickly, allowing them to 
capitalise on public interest in an issue or event. It is difficult to predict the extent, if 
any, of these effects on Australian political participation. However it is reasonably safe 
to expect that the overall number of Australians being contacted by political parties, 
candidates and other groups increases with internet use. Contact via email is also more 
likely to lead to online participation, due to the capacity to very quickly and easily go 
from reading an email to signing an e-petition or emailing an official (for example 
Vissers et al. 2012). It must be noted, however, that the direction of the relationship 
between internet use and recruitment is not always clear. Email contacts are not 
publicly available in Australia, while phone numbers and addresses; for many citizens 
to be contactable by a party or candidate online, they must have had previous contact, 
either by signing up for an email newsletter, emailing a representative or party official, 
or making their emai]•address available in some other way. In other words, the citizen 
needs to already be active before they have the potential to be mobilised online. 
Large scale campaigns in the United States have made more systematic use of 
email address databases, compiled from various sources. Research shows that, despite 
their often diffuse nature, subsequent online mobilisation campaigns have been 
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comparatively effective. Hooghe et al. (2010) find that email-based mobilisation 
campaigns are as effective as face-to-face mobilisation in the medium term. Krueger 
(2006b) finds similarly, but notes that in practice political parties only possess the 
email addresses of citizens known to them in some way, and presumably therefore 
already politically engaged. This may change as email becomes a more common means 
of communication and parties collect (or purchase) constituents' email address data. 
On the contrary, Nickerson (2007) finds no evidence that email mobilisation increases 
voter turnout, arguing that despite its relative inexpensiveness, email mobilisation 
remains an inefficient option for political parties and candidates. Certainly, evidence 
from Australia suggests that parties have used email only sparingly to persuade voters 
or mobilise activists, likely to the lack of available email contacts: only 1.5 per cent of 
Australians reported being contacted by a party or candidate via email or other online 
means during the 2010 election (McAllister et al., 2010a). 
Engagement 
Rather than mobilising political engagement, the internet may facilitate an 
enclave of highly engaged citizens, broadening the gap between the interested and 
uninterested. Norris (2000) observes that the relationship between media 
consumption, including on the internet, and engagement is non-recursive; the effects 
run from consumption to engagement as well as from engagement to consumption. 
Data from the US and Europe show that "news media ... serve primarily to further 
activate activism" (Norris, 2000, p. 277). Bimber (2001) likewise finds no effects on 
engagement, noting that any effects may be difficult to detect at the individual level, but 
more apparent at the society or community level. McAllister and Gibson (2011) have 
found that the internet has reinfor.cing effects on the political knowledge of Australians. 
On the contrary, Jennings and Zeitner (2003), Shah, Cho, Eveland and Kwak (2005) and 
Kenski and Stroud (2006) each find that internet use has a small, positive effect on 
mobilising civic engagement, as does Boulianne's (2009)bou. What binds these studies 
together is their focus on what citizens do online. Specifically, exposure to political 
information or discussion is expected to foster political engagement, if only among the 
already engaged. This section examines how Australians use the internet, with an 
emphasis on exposure to political content. Chapter 4 looks more closely at the effects 
of internet use on various measures of their political engagement. 
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The most popular online activity among Australian internet users is emailing, 
followed closely by general browsing, including news and other research (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2011) . Social networking constitutes the third most popular 
activity, however unlike emailing and browsing which are equally popular among age 
groups, it tapers off as age increases. Neither general browsing nor social networking 
appears greatly affected by socioeconomic status, employment status, educational 
attainment, or rural/urban location. Beyond those three broad activities, Australians 
are most likely to use the internet to study, listen to music or watch videos, shop or 
create their own content to share. In fact, more Australians create their own content 
online than download videos, movies or music, providing further evidence of the 'user 
as producer' phenomenon associated with Web 2.0. 
The vast majority of internet use in Australia can therefore be categorised as 
emailing, browsing and social networking. Having assumed that internet use is having 
some effect on political participation, it stands to reason that there should also be a 
difference between emailing political content, browsing websites for election news, and 
adding a politician to a social network and, for example, emailing your mother, 
browsing websites for sports news, and adding a high school friend to a social network. 
In short, if the internet is having any effect on political participation, it is likely to be 
most obvious in cases where the internet is being used as a source of political 
information (see for example Jennings & Zeitner 2003; Kenski & Stroud 2006). AES 
data complement the ABS data with greater detail on any political aspects of each of the 
three broad on line activities. The data also assist in making clear distinctions between 
political internet use and online political participation. 
While using the internet for political purposes - or political internet use - has 
some crossover with online political participation, there is one key point of distinction 
between them. Political internet use involves informing oneself about politics, either 
for a specified purpose or as a part of general internet browsing. It does not seek to 
have any political outcome, such as persuading a friend how to vote, contacting an 
official to express an opinion, or adding a name to an online petition. E-participation, 
like offline forms of participation, comprises "acts that aim at influencing the 
government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the 
choices made by government personnel" (Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 2). Political 
discussion inhabits a grey area: there is no distinction in the available data between 
discussing politics with a friend for the sake of informing oneself, and discussing 
politics wi th a view to changing that friend's mind, which constitutes a political effect 
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(Gil de Zuniga et al., 2010). Following Verba and Nie (1972, p. 29) this study defines 
political discussion as a determinant of participation, not an act of participation. The 
first need for this distinction arises in the case of email activity. 
Emailing is by definition an interpersonal activity, involving a sender, a 
receiver, and content usually targeted at the receiver ( or receivers). There are two 
main forms of political emailing: sharing political content or discussion with peers via 
email, or contacting an official via email. The first is not a participatory act, while the 
second is participatory, and will be discussed in chapter seven as a form of political 
participation. In 2001 and 2010 the AES has asked respondents whether they have 
discussed politics with others online during the preceding election period.24 The 
numbers of online political discussants are stunningly low: four per cent of internet 
users in 2001 and seven per cent in 2010. Even with the diffusion of internet access 
and the soaring popularity of social networking in 2010, fewer than one in ten internet 
users used the medium to discuss politics with their peers. Those seven per cent are 
slightly above the average age of all internet users (r=.185, p=.000), with no significant 
relationships between online political discussion and education or income. 
Where emailing can constitute either a non-participatory or participatory act, 
general browsing - the second most popular online activity among Australian internet 
users - is for the most part not participatory.25 Browsing is redolent of the Web 1.0 
internet, which consisted largely of static, information heavy websites that had more in 
common with newspapers than the interactive features of Web 2.0. Since 2001 the 
AES has asked respondents which kinds of political websites they have visited, most of 
which can be described as informative, for instance mainstream news and official 
government websites. There is one grey area between informative browsing and 
participation, namely the use of we biogs, which by design invite readers to engage in 
discussion by leaving a comment. The distinction between reading a we blog and 
commenting on it has only been made since the 2010 AES; data on we blog readership 
before that are treated as non-participatory. 
24 As 2001 preceded the rise of social networking as a popular online activity, this measure is 
categorised as an email activity. 
25 The description of web browsing as non-participatory is changing with the increasing 
number of online news articles allowing readers to comment on the page, recommend the 
article to friends via social networking websites, or simply to vote whether they 'like' or 
'dislike' the article. However, these participatory tools are still emerging, and 
comprehensive data on readers' use of them does not exist at this time. 
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The most common form of political internet browsing among Australians is 
following election news online (AES data are shown in Figure 3.4 ). Alongside the use of 
mainstream news websites, which has increased at a similar rate, they comprise the 
vast majority of political browsing by Australian internet users. More specific 
browsing, such as visiting the website of a political party, federal parliament or the 
Australian Electoral Commission, constitute only a small proportion of all browsing 
activity. Emerging forms of online political content, such as weblogs and satirical or 
humorous websites, have attracted similarly small numb ers during the election 
campaign period: five per cent of respondents reported visiting 'fun or humorous' 
political websites in 2004 and five per cent watched unofficial campaign videos 
online(including on YouTube) in 2010. 
Overall, political browsing activity appears to be concentrated among a 
minority of internet users: three measures in the 2010 AES - following election news 
on the internet, using the internet to get news on the 2010 election, and visits to 
mainstream news media websites - are all strongly correlated at .654 (p=.000) or 
higher. Further, the number of political websites visited, as measured by the AES, is 
negatively correlated wi th age (r = -.234, p=.00 0) . Among all internet users, 65 per cent 
did not use the internet for any of the political purposes measured, including the use of 
mainstream news media (for any purpose). While political browsing is increasing in 
popularity among Austra lian internet users, its influence is hampered by the fact that it 
is concentrated amongst a small number of relatively young users, and that 65 per cent 
of all users appear not to use the internet for political browsing at all. 
The third most popular online activity among Australian internet users is social 
networking. Online social networking services (SNSs) are defined as 
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" ... web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi -
public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with 
whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of 
connections and those made by others within the system" (Boyd and Ellison, 
2007, p. 211) . 
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SNS users create their own webpage ( or profile), based on a template provided and 
hosted by the SNS. The user nominates other users who can view his profile and whose 
profile he can view in return. Alternately, the user can choose to allow anyone -
including internet users without a profile of their own - to view his profile. The user 
can accordingly use his profile either to share information with nominated friends, 
family and others, or he can use his profile as a personal broadcast platform. Users 
can interact with any content published on a profile, whether by commenting 
elsewhere on the page ( usually underneath the original content), by replying directly to 
the content producer, and in some cases by sharing the original content on their own 
profiles. An increasing number of Australian political parties and candidates are using 
SNSs to disseminate information quickly, cheaply and widely (Chen and Smith, 2010; 
Gibson and Ward, 2008). Increasing the supply of campaign-related information on 
SNSs will likely increase the demand among citizens; Australians cannot visit the social 
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media profiles of their representatives and candidates if they do not exist. Chapter 4 
elaborates on the parties and candidates' online campaign techniques. 
Data from the 2010 AES reveal that, despite the vast numbers of SNS users in 
Australia, very few of them read or share political content on social networking 
services.26 Among internet users generally, only two per cent signed up to receive 
information from a party or candidate, or registered in any way as an online 'friend', 
follower or supporter of a party or candidate. Fewer still used online tools to promote 
or help a party or candidate, or used an SNS to repost unofficial campaign content. 
More encouragingly, five per cent of users posted comments on a we blog, Twitter feed 
or to a SNS profile during the campaign period (however it is not clear that those 
activities were necessarily political in nature) . In sum, it is clear that Australian 
internet users do not generally view social networking as a forum for political 
discussion or proselytising. Fewer than 10 per cent of internet users have used SNSs to 
share or discuss' any political information. Those who report using an SNS for political 
discussion or campaigning are younger than internet users on average, although this 
likely reflects the youth bias among SNS users generally (for example Hampton et al. 
20 11). 
3.5 Conclusion 
Compared to other, similar countries, the diffusion of internet access in 
Australia happened early and rapidly. Currently, more than 85 per cent of Australians 
have access in some form, and lack of access is increasingly concentrated among the 
very elderly (McAllister et al., 20 10b). In short, anyone who wants to use the internet 
in Australia, does. Despite the late stage of diffusion of internet access, there is still a 
strong socioeconomic bias among users: they are richer, better educated and younger 
than non-users. Most Australian internet users possess at least a basic level of 
proficiency with the t echnology, but only a very small number use it to share or discuss 
political information. Many of the biases associated with internet access generally are 
either maintained or amplified by specific activities: internet users are genera lly 
younger than non-users, and those users who engage in political social networking are 
generally younger than those users who do not. Australians who engage in political 
26 Various sources point to more than 10 mi llion Facebook users in Australia (see for example 
Google Ad Planner data; Dobbie 2012), while other data suggest that one in every six website 
visits in Australia is to Facebook (Lee, 2012). 
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discussion or browsing online are slightly older than internet users in general, in 
contrast to the younger age profile of those who engage in e-participation elsewhere 
(Gennaro and Dutton, 2006; Hirzalla et al., 2010; Oser et al., 2013; Schlozman et al., 
2010). Having been through the 'early adoption' and 'transitional' phases of internet 
adoption, Australia is now witnessing a period of 'social internet' usage. 
Data from the Australian Election Studies show that while the numbers are 
increasing, very few Australians use the internet to become informed about politics. 
However, the internet is still likely to positively affect both online and offline 
participation in Australia. While not expected to be a place of egalitarian political 
opportunity, internet use may decrease the influence of socioeconomic factors on 
participation. More likely is that the inclusion of internet resources in the civic 
voluntarism model will reduce the positive effects of age on participation (Anduiza et 
al., 2009a; Hirzalla et al., 2010; Schlozman et al., 2010). Further, internet skills are 
expected to replace or at least complement the role of civic skills (Krueger 2002; Best & 
Krueger 2005; Kruikemeier et al. 2013). Chapter four commences the analysis of 
participation in Australia over time, and how the internet is changing who participates, 
why they participate and how they participate. 
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Chapter 4 - internet use and electoral 
participation 
4.1 Introduction 
The first form of participation studied here, electoral participation comprises 
electoral enrolment and voter turnout. Voting is the "most widespread and regularized 
political activity, and in terms of the overall impact of the citizenry on governmental 
performance it may be the single most important act" (Verba et al., 1995, p. 46). Voting 
is a highly structured act: elections are held on predetermined dates, and citizens are 
mobilised via media campaigns, political parties and electoral authorities. Voting is 
also easily accessible as a political act, the cost of participating is low relative to other 
participatory behaviours. As a consequence of its low barriers to entry, voting 
"embodies the most fundamental democratic principle of equality" (Putnam, 1995a, p. 
3 5) . Moreover, voting generally does not require a high level of political knowledge or 
understanding of democratic processes, even in countries where voting is made 
difficult by complicated electoral registration procedures, such as in the United States. 
For the most part, voting is the easiest act of political expression, and as a consequence 
is the most common act. This chapter examines the effects of internet use on both 
electoral turnout and enrolment, which is a necessary condition of voting. 
The various reasons why citizens do or do not vote in elections are well 
studied.27 The literature on voter turnout largely centres on rational choice theories, 
but increasingly at psychological explanations for individual behaviour. This chapter 
looks at electoral participation in Australia through the framework of Verba, Schlozman 
and Brady's (1995) civic voluntarism framework of participation. Specifically, it looks 
at how individuals' time, money, civic skills, political engagement and exposure to 
recruitment influence their propensity to vote, and how internet use mediates that 
influence. However, any effects.at the individual level are shaped and constrained by 
political institutions. This chapter therefore also explores the likely effects of 
Australia's political institutions on its citizens' individual-level behaviour. Foremost 
27 For example Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), Jackman (1987), Aldrich, (1993), Jackman 
and Miller (1995), Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), Franklin (1999, 2004), Blais (2000, 2006), 
and Aldrich et al. (2011) . 
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among those is compulsory voting, which substantially affects the costs and benefits of 
participating in Australian elections. Other institutional-level effects on voter turnout 
include the electoral system, electoral administration and the conduct of elections and 
the governance structure (namely federal government split between a national-level 
and eight state-level governments). The range of individual- and institutional-level 
factors is discussed in Section 4.2. 
When considering the effects of internet use on individual behaviour, it is 
necessary to understand the particular opportunities that the internet affords citizens. 
Those opportunities are not limited to increased exposure to information or faster 
means of communicating, but include the ability to complete electoral enrolment 
processes online and potential to vote online in the future. Section 4.3 discusses how 
political parties and electoral management bodies are using the internet to increase 
voter enrolment and turnout in Australia, from parties' embrace of candidate websites 
· to electoral management bodies' (EMB) social media campaigns to remind young 
Australians to enrol. Considering the range of individual-level factors, institutional-
level factors and the supply of information and opportunities to participate on the 
internet, Section 4.4 analyses the internet's influence on electoral enrolment in 
Australia. Individual-level data are not available, as the major, publically available 
survey datasets (such as the Australian Election Study, World Values Study and 
Australian Survey of Social Attitudes) do not measure enrolment and turnout 
behaviour. Data instead come from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and Australian 
Electoral Commission, but are not available at the individual level. The analysis 
therefore predicts enrolment and turnout behaviour at the federal electoral division 
level. Methodological details are discussed in Section 4.4 Section 4.5 examines the 
effects of internet use on voter turnout ( again, aggregated atthe federal electoral 
division level). 
4.2 Theorising the effects of internet use on civic voluntarism 
and electoral participation 
Research on voter turnout has clustered around two main factors: institutions, 
and individual-level factors. Institutional-level influences include electoral systems 
(including compulsion but also the type of ballot and counting method used), the 
closeness of an electoral competition, the ease with which a citizen can vote, the 
integrity of the political system and the age ofa democracy (Anderson, 2007; Birch, 
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2009; Blais, 2007; Franklin, 2004; Norris, 2004). These influences are generally 
theorised - perhaps wrongly - as being homogenous across a population and unable to 
be altered by individual citizens (Anderson, 2007). Certainly, they do influence voter 
turnout both directly, as well as indirectly through individual-level factors. These have 
been introduced through discussion in earlier chapters, and include such measures as 
age, gender, income, educational attainment, political engagement and recruitment into 
the political process. This section discusses the institutional and individual-level 
factors that affect voter turnout in Australia and internationally. It also considers how 
those factors may work together to affect turnout. 
Australia's political institutions, perhaps even more than either advanced 
democracies, are designed to facilitate voter turnout (Hill, 2001; Sawer, 2001). 
Foremost among them is the electoral system, which compels citizens to vote or pay a 
fine to the government. Compulsory voting laws shift the responsibility of mobilising 
voter turnout from parties to citizens themselves; the choice for enrolled citizens is 
whether to vote or to abstain, and risk incurring a fine . The less costly option for most 
Australian citizens is to vote, which is inverse to the equation in most voluntary 
systems (Blais, 2000). Comparative research has found that compulsion only has 
significant effects on turnout when the law is enforceable, as it is in Australia (Norris, 
2004). As Birch (2009) observes, Australia is generally considered a 'strict' enforcer of 
compulsory voting, although in practice the fines payable for not voting are quite small 
and in many cases waived entirely on appeal. Nonetheless the existence of a sanction 
appears to be enough to maintain comparatively high levels of turnout (Birch, 2009, p. 
94). As shown in Chapter 3, even with increasing numbers of Australian citizens 
choosing not to enrol (and consequently not having to vote but avoiding any sanctions), 
turnout as a percentage of the voting aged population remains high. 
A second way in which the Australian electoral system mobilises voter turnout 
is in how votes are cast and counted. Systems of preferential voting similar to that in 
Australia (which has an alternative voting system in the lower house and single 
trnnsferable voting system in the upper house) have long been held to encourage 
turnout (Blais, 2007; Franklin, 2004; Norris, 2004; Powell, 1986). This effect has two 
-particular explanations. First, preferential electoral systems tend to draw higher 
numbers of candidates than other systems; providing voters with more choice when 
casting their ballot (for example Karvonen 2004). Second, in preferential systems 
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designed to achieve high electoral proportionality the number of 'wasted votes' - votes 
that are not needed to achieve a winning result- is minimised, and as a consequence 
the benefits of voting are increased (Aldrich, 1993; Blais, 2000). In a plurality electoral 
system, where the candidate with the largest number offirst-preference votes is the 
winner, votes cast for a losing candidate may not even be counted. In a preferential 
system, votes cast for losing candidates are transferred to the voters' next most 
preferred candidate, until only two candidates remain. Taking these two features of 
Australia's electoral system together, the institutional effects on turnout are positive, in 
total.28 
One further institutional feature of the Australian enrolment system likely to 
increase electoral participation in the future is direct enrolment. Legislation was 
passed through the federal parliament in July 2012 allowing the AEC to enrol citizens 
who are known to them, rather than citizens needing to take the initiative to enrol for 
. the first time or update their enrolment. The process "use[s] administrative data from 
other agencies to enrol an individual or update the details of an already enrolled elector 
without the intervention of that individual" (Australian Electoral Commission, 2012b). 
For instance, when an 18 year old applies for her drivers' licence, her details could be 
made known to the AEC, which then enters her on the electoral roll. She will then 
receive election information from the AEC and be expected to attend a polling booth on 
election day. Each time she advises her state licensing authority of a change in address 
that change will automatically update her electoral roll details. This minor reform to 
the electoral system is expected to help reverse the decline in the size of the electoral 
roll, which has been caused at least in part by citizens failing to update their address 
details with the AEC and subsequently being removed from the roll (Brent and 
Jackman, 2007; Brent, 2008). It will also ensure that upon reaching voting age, 
Australia citizens will be compelled to vote, rather than avoiding enrolment and any 
subsequent fines for abstention on election day. The efficacy of this reform will be 
known in time. 
The extent to which individual-level factors affect voter turnout often depends 
upon constraints at the institutional level. For example, voting in the United States 
takes place on a Tuesday and often requires waiting in line for extended periods of time 
(Highton, 2006; Levitt, 2010; Spencer and Markovits, 2010). The costs of attending a 
polling booth might therefore include the foregone income of a self-employed 
28 This is not an exhaustive list of institutional-level factors affecting turnout. Other factors 
include district magnitude, voting age and ease of voting (Blais, 2006). 
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tradesman, the price of childcare for small children or just the general cost in time 
spent lining up and voting that cannot be spent doing other things. However for some 
citizens, including retirees or those with flexible employment conditions, the costs are 
less burdensome. The same differences in burden exist across countries. In Australia, 
voting is conducted on a Saturday, most local primary schools are used as polling 
booths and waiting times are minimal. Voters are not required to present identification 
when they vote, and the process is, for many voters, 
" ... asocial occasion. Pamphleteers and party volunteers jostle at the entrances 
to polling booths, exchanging competitive by good-natured banter as incoming 
voters pause to join the conversational festivities on their way to the booths" 
(Hill, 2001, p. 136). 
Of course, Australians who work, study or have family commitments on Saturdays do 
experience the time costs of voting, but they are minimised by how elections are 
conducted. Moreover, pre-poll and postal voting options are available. The 
institutional level effects on the costs of voting are therefore different in Australia and 
the United States, as one example. 
Having the time to vote is not the only individual level factor affecting voter 
turnout. As discussed previously, the civic voluntarism model sets-out time, money, 
civic skills, engagement and recruitment as the most important individual-level 
determinants of participation (Verba et al., 199 5). Their effects on voter turnout are 
mediated by institutional-level factors - such as the conduct of elections - but it is also 
expected that they are mediated by citizens' internet use. For instance, the time costs 
of voting are not restricted to the act of attending a polling booth, as described above. 
They also include the time spent learning about the election, the candidates and their 
various policies in order to cast an informed vote. Some citizens will vote for 
candidates from the same party at every election, reducing the time spent collating 
information. However, these lifelong voters are declining in number (Dalton, 2012, 
~ 984; McAllister, 2011 ). As the demands for political information have increased with 
the ongoing partisan dealignment of voters, the supply of information online has 
increased accordingly. This section examines how the internet has affected voter 
turnout through the framework of citizens' time, money, civic skills, engagement and 
recruitment. 
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It is possible that the internet has lowered the transaction costs of learning 
about politics. Gathering information on candidates or issues online - as opposed to 
offline - is potentially less expensive, takes less time and is easily searched and 
organised (Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2010). An internet user is therefore expected to 
be less burdened by the time and financial costs of voting, as well has possessing 
greater civic skills to allow them to participate with confidence. However, data from 
Australia (McAllister and Gibson, 2011) and the United States (Prior, 2005) have shown 
that the positive effects of online political information are concentrated among the 
already engaged, widening the gap between the engaged and uninterested. Further, 
Dalton (2008a) notes that increases in political resources in the United States have 
been associated with increases in non-electoral forms of participation such as 
contacting political representatives and protesting, but not voting. The internet and its 
ever-growing repository of political information has instead provided citizens with new 
avenues of participation, focusing on expression and individuality, according to Dalton. 
Of course, voting is not entirely a function of a citizen's resources. Blais (2000) 
observes that rational choice theory does not explain why many voters seemingly act 
irrationally, spending time and money to vote despite the very small benefits the act 
bestows. Rather, Blais contends that many citizens demonstrate a sense of civic duty, 
and that the costs associated with voting are outweighed by the satisfaction of having 
done the 'right' thing. Although Dalton (2008a) argues that civic duty holds 
diminishing weight among each generational of American citizens, Blais'(2000) 
analysis finds that as many as 50 per cent of Canadian citizens view voting as a moral 
obligation. It is not clear that the internet affects this facet of voting. Alternatively, it 
may well be affecting it negatively, by opening up new participatory opportunities that 
allow citizens to express themselves and fulfil their citizenship obligations (Dalton, 
2008a). 
Although the weight of evidence on voter turnout suggests that the internet will 
likely have only a small - if any- positive impact on voting in Australia, it is an 
important relationship to study. Given what is known about the reasons why citizens 
do or do not vote, the traditional constraints on voting are likely to be shifted for 
internet users . Those changes should be overwhelmingly positive, but may be 
concentrated among the already engaged. lf so, the internet might be contributing to 
the divide in engagement among citizens, rather than healing it. To put it in other 
terms, the internet may be normalising the engagement of existing voters, rather than 
mobilising non-voters (Norris, 2000) . Of course, the extent of internet effects on 
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Figure 4.1 Candidates' attitudes towards and use of internet on line campaigning, 2001 to 2010 
Australian federal elections 
n=477 (2001), 535 (2004), 470 (2007), 247 (2010). 
Source: 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 Australian Candidate Studies (Gibson et al. 2001; Gibson, Bean & 
McAllister 2004; McAllister, Bean & Gibson 2007; McAllister et al. 2010a) 
Australia's tardiness in adopting internet campaigning techniques is likely 
attributable to the compulsory voting system, which releases parties and candidates 
from having to mobilise voters to turnout, instead only needing to persuade them how 
to vote. However, Chen (2013) observes that Australian campaigners borrow online 
strategies from overseas, adjusting them to suit the local environment. The contagion 
of techniques can be seen in the presentation and targeting of party and candidate 
websites. For the most part, online campaigning has been re latively conservative, 
mirroring and complementing 'offline' and traditional media campaigns. Early 
candidate websites in first-order American elections were pitched primarily at existing 
supporters, rather than at undecided voters: 
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"The presentation of material, particularly on the front page, is designed to 
signal to voters (weak or strong) that the decision to vote for the candidate is a 
wise one and to solicit those supporters for assistance in the form of 
contributions of money, volunteer time, contacting others, and, finally, turnout 
on election day" (Bimber and Davis, 2003, p. 100). 
Increasingly, American campaigns use Web 2.0 functions (such as biogs, online 
'grassroots' communities and social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) to 
target specific demographics and to participate in a quasi-dialogue with undecided 
voters (for example Gulati & Williams 2013; Baumgartner 2013; Davis et al. 2010). 
Australian parties and candidates' online activities more closely resemble those of 
American online campaigns a decade earlier. 
The second aspect to the supply of election-related information online concerns 
technical and logistical information and services. While the promise of internet voting 
systems shadows any discussion of internet effects on electoral participation, few 
jurisdictions have taken the step of putting it into practice.31 There is apparent support 
for internet voting among Australians, with 45 per cent reporting that internet voting 
would be "much easier" than the current process of polling booth attendance 
(McAllister et al., 2010b ). However, any move towards internet voting seems distant 
(Electoral Council of Australia and New Zealand, 2013). Currently online elector 
registration or enrolment is much more common than internet voting. By introducing 
an online enrolment system in June 2013, Australia joined Canada, the UK, New Zealand 
and several states in the US in allowing citizens to enrol to vote entirely over the 
internet. 
4.4 Electoral enrolment 
Electoral enrolment, like voting, is compulsory in Australia. 32 Once enrolled, 
citizens are required to vote, and easily traced and fined if they do not vote ( and do not 
have a valid reason for not voting). However those who do not enrol are for practically 
unpunishable. This is because they only become known to the electoral commission if 
31 Only Estonia has adopted an internet voting system. Several jurisdictions - Finland, India 
and Switzerland - have hosted trials but made no commitment to ongoing use, while the 
United States hosted the Arizona Democratic Party primary election trial in 2001. 
32 In fact, enrolment was made compulsory in 1912, six years before compulsory voting was 
enacted. 
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electoral participabon depends at least in part upon what online resources are 
available to cibzens. If the internet does not consbtute a polibcal resource, it is unlikely 
to mobilise participabon. In the case of electoral participabon, the internet can help to 
mobilise voters by providing informabon about parties and candidates, salient issues, 
technical and logisbcal informabon about the vobng process, as well as opportunibes 
to enrol to vote. The following secbon details the supply-side of this equabon: the kind 
of informabon available online, and how it is likely to mobilise cibzens to the polling 
booth. 
4.3 The 'supply' side: parties and candidates online 
The previous discussion of individual-level effects of internet use on electoral 
participation assumes that cibzens can - and do - access polibcal resources online. 
Australian Election Study data in Chapter 3 shows that 35 per cent of Australians used 
the internet to access political news and other elecbon-related information during the 
2010 federal election campaign. This section examines the kinds of political 
information available online, drawing on research on online campaigning and other 
'supply-side' uses of the internet in Australia (with international benchmarks) . 
Australian political parties were quick to adopt the internet for COJ:!lmunicabng with 
the electorate. Gibson and McAllister (2008) note that the Australian Labor Party was 
among the first parties in the world to have a website, in 1994. However, in the almost 
20 years since then, the rate of online progress among Australian political institubons 
has slowed (Gibson and McAllister, 2008). Indeed, research on the intervening period 
in Australian politics almost invariably comments upon the small numbers of voters 
accessing parties' and candidates' online campaigns, and the simplicity of those 
campaigns compared with those in the United States and elsewhere (Gibson & 
McAllister 2009; Chen & Smith 2010; Chen 2013). The purpose of online political 
resources in the context of electoral participabon is two-fold: that potenbal voters can 
learn about parties, candidates and issues, and that they can find out technical and 
logistical information about the voting process. 
To learn about parties, candidates and issues, potential voters need to be able 
to access relevant information on line. This ·is most likely to come from media outlets, 
online news services such as polibcal biogs, and the official websites of parties and 
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candidates. Each of the major parties has an established web presence, with official 
websites including pages dedicated to individual candidates (Gibson and Ward, 2002). 
By 2010 the major parties each had established online presences (Chen, 2012). During 
the 2010 election campaign, eight per cent of Australians reported visiting parties' or 
candidates' websites (McAllister et al., 2010a) . That number has increased only 
minimally from six per cent at the 2004 election. Data from the Australian Candidate 
Study (ACS),29 conducted alongside the Australian Election Study (AES), show that in 
the same period, the number of candidates with personal websites has increased 
disproportionately (Figure 4.1). Aside from a small decrease at the 2004 election, the 
use of personal candidate websites in campaigns has increased steadily, 
from 37 per cent of candidates in 2001 to 55 per cent in 2010. Positive attitudes 
towards the importance of using the internet in campaigns have expanded from 14 per 
cent of candidates in 2001 to 64 per cent in 2010.30 The respective increases far 
outweigh the slow growth in Australian citizens visiting these sites (per Chapter 3). In 
other words, supply has grown faster than demand. 
The ACS data reflect findings from elsewhere in the literature. Australian 
research shows that the Australian parties and candidates made increasing use of 
online media such as YouTube, Twitter and Facebook between the 2007 and 2010 
elections, but that the audiences remained relatively small (Chen and Smith, 2010; 
Chen, 2012). Gibson and McAllister (2011b) observe similar trends in Web 2.0 
campaigning in Australia. Looking internationally, Australia appears to lag behind the 
internet campaigning developments seen in the United Kingdom, Canada and United 
States, but have adopted personal candidate websites earlier than New Zealand parties 
and candidates (Chen and Smith, 2010; Davis et al., 2010; Gibson and Cantijoch, 2011). 
Gibson and Cantijoch (2011) declare that the 20 10 Australian election was not an 
'internet election', despite expectations that the internet could affect the outcome. 
Indeed, new online techniques had no effect on the vote (Gibson and McAllister, 
2011b). 
29 The ACS surveys all federal election candidates from th e majo r parties following the election. 
Since 2001, the ACS has includ ed qu estions on can did ates' use of online campaign 
techniques. 
30 The 2010 measure includes an additional response category of 'extremely'; the 64 per cent 
figure consequently includes responses of'very important' and 'extremely important'. 
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they apply to enrol, in which case they are exempted from punishment by federal law. 33 
The easiest way to abstain from voting in Australia is therefore not to enrol, but the 
relative anonymity of unenrolled Australians also makes them difficult to study. 
Reflective of downward trends in voter turnout across advanced democracies, the 
percentage of voting aged Australians who are enrolled to vote has fallen in the post-
war period (Figure 4.2). This section looks at the factors affecting electoral enrolment. 
To do so, it analyses data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics' (ABS) 2006 Census of 
Population and Housing, an Australia-wide census conducted every five years. Survey 
samples drawn from the electoral roll, including the Australian Election Study and the 
World Values Study, exclude the unenrolled, while a targeted study would require more 
resources than are available to this project. As the ABS data are confidential at the 
individual level, the data have been aggregated here to the level of federal electoral 
divisions. 
The Australian Electoral Commission (2013) reports that 85 per cent of 
enrolments in the final week before the electoral roll was closed in preparation for 
2013 federal election were submitted online. The remarkably high proportion of 
online enrolments suggests that at least some of those citizens would not have enrolled 
offline, or that they would have attempted to enrol by post but missed the roll closure 
deadline. Beyond allowing online enrolment, EMBs at the state and federal levels in 
Australia have used the internet (including social networking services) to encourage 
citizens to enrol (Macnamara et al., 2012). Research into EMBs in Australian and New 
Zealand has found "a high level of interest and willingness within the government 
bodies studied and a commitment to ongoing trials and further learning", but that 
"there is still some way to go before social media significantly increase citizens' voice 
and democratic participation" (Macnamara, et al. 2012, p. 636). 
One such internet-based campaign was conducted in the Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) in 2012. With an election imminent, the relevant EMB - Elections ACT 
- launched a social media campaign in August 2012 to improve voter enrolment rates: 
"Less than half of the ACT's 18 and 19 year olds are enroll ed to vote for 
October's Legislative Assembly election ... The ACT Electoral Commission is 
hoping to lift this participation rate .by using social media to engage with young 
33 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012). 
123 
people about enrolment and voting in the lead up to the election, with the 
launch today of the Elections ACT facebook page" (Elections ACT, 2012a). 
Between the launch of the campaign and a subsequent announcement on 18 September 
2012, enrolment rates had increased from 48 to 60 per cent of eligible 18 year olds, 42 
to "under SO" per cent of 19 year olds, and 78 to "around 80" per cent of 20 to 24 year 
olds (Elections ACT, 2012b ). While any increase in the size of an electoral franchise 
should be viewed as positive, the role of the internet in any increase is uncertain. 
However, the campaign - and others like it - appears to assume that the internet can 
help to overcome at least some of the obstacles to electoral registration. To assess 
whether this is possible first requires consideration of those obstacles. 
This study hypothesises that a range of factors, based broadly on Verba et al.'s 
(1995) civic voluntarism model, can predict electoral enrolment in Australia. The first 
factor is educational attainment. This is measured by the percentage of people 
currently attending a tertiary education and who already possess a bachelor degree or 
higher within an electoral division. The second factor is socioeconomic status. To the 
extent that it is not measured by educational attainment, SES is measured here by the 
percentages of low-income earning households (i.e. between $7800 and $18148 
annually) and high-income earning households (ie $52000 annually and higher). The 
income metrics applied here follow the ABS' model of Socioeconomic Indexes for Areas 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006a). 
The third of those factors in this model is age. Age is measured in the model by 
the percentages ofresidents below 30 and 50 or older in an electorate. Internationally, 
young people are least likely to vote (see for example Wattenberg 2008). Whether this 
is the effect of patterns in participation over the lifecycle ( e.g. where participatory 
behaviour peaks around an individual's middle age, when they have the most 
resources) or whether it is a generational effect (in which young people in this 
generation are less likely to vote, and are also not likely to vote as they age) is debated. 
Most studies have found that lifecycle and generational effects co-exist to varying 
degrees to cause an observable decline in electoral participation; that young people 
today are less likely to vote than in previous generations, although young people have 
traditionally been the least likely to vote (for example Blais et al. 2002; Blais et al. 2004; 
Rubenson et al. 2004; Blais 2007; Gallego 2009; Bhatti & Hansen 2012; Bhatti et al. 
2012; Persson et al. 2013). 
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The respective causal mechanisms of each effect are not established, but two 
broad schools of thought have emerged. First, that young people possess less political 
knowledge than their elders, and are less likely to be politically engaged and active as a 
result (Rubenson et al., 2004). This lifecycle effect has turned into a generational effect, 
as values have changed over time and general levels of political interest have declined 
in many countries; while the young and disengaged once grew to become engaged, 
cultural changes have seen them stay disengaged, and their children likewise (Blais, 
2007; Inglehart, 1977, 2008). The second school of thought is related, but focuses on 
that habit of voting rather than engagement. Franklin (2004) finds a confluence of 
circumstances that helps to explain turnout declines through the second half of the 20 th 
century. First, the character of individual elections did little to mobilise voters, but 
particularly new voters, to turn out to vote. Second, electoral reforms lowering the 
voting age in many countries meant those new voters were younger than ever, and 
more prone to become either habitual voters or non-voters. Finally, by not turning out 
for the first two or three elections once they achieved voting age, were far more likely 
to continue not to vote as they aged. Once young citizens learn not to vote, they 
become stuck in their ways (Aldrich et al., 2011; Franklin, 2004; Gerber et al., 2003). 
Whether either - or both - of these causes exists in the Australian context is uncertain, 
and beyond the scope of this particular study. In the meantime, age is measured and 
controlled for, to isolate the effects of internet access. 
The fourth factor is ethnicity, measured here by the percentage of Australian-
born residents and those who have little proficiency in the English language, which 
influences several aspects of the voting process. First, electoral enrolment in Australia 
is restricted to citizens, thus excluding permanent residents (who are extended the 
franchise in New Zealand, for example). Immigrants to Australia are required to be 
granted citizenship before they can enrol to vote. Second, language proficiency is a 
civic skill, which Verba et al. (1995) argue is a key predictor of participation. 
Proficiency in English is useful to completing the relevant enrolment processes, as well 
as being a skill which gives its owner the confidence to participate in a political act such 
as voting. 
The fifth factor predicting enrolment is residential mobility. The enrolment 
process in Australia requires any citizen aged 18 or over to submit a hardcopy form to 
the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). Once enrolled, he is required to keep his 
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address details updated in order to be eligible to vote. The AEC periodically 'cleans' the 
electoral roll, deleting those whom they have reason to believe no longer live at their 
enrolled address (Brent and Jackman, 2007). The effect of residential mobility on 
enrolment and turnout is not contained to the AEC's processes, however. Studies from 
the United States have found that one third of American citizens move every two years, 
and requirements that they update their electoral registration following each change of 
address 'impede' their turnout (Brians and Grofman, 2001; Highton, 2000; Squire et al., 
1987; Timpone, 1998) Turnout rates among citizens who have moved in the previous 
two years is as low as "young people or the uneducated" (Squire et al., 1987, p. 46). 
Mobility is therefore a hypothesised predictor of enrolment: individuals who have 
recently moved house are more likely to be deleted from the roll, or be incorrectly 
enrolled, than those with a stable residence (pending the introduction of direct 
enrolment procedures). 
The internet has the potential to positively affect electoral enrolment, perhaps 
primarily by overcoming the problem of residential mobility. As shown in Elections 
ACT's (2012a, 2012b) use ofa social media campaign to enrol voters before the 2012 
ACT election, the internet can negate tl1e need for a current, fixed address or home 
phone line in order to contact citizens. Prior to the parallel diffusions of internet access 
and mobile phones, staying in contact with residentially mobile citizens - such as 
university students and tenants - was logistically more difficult. Internet access is 
measured as the percentage of households in an electorate with either no internet 
access, broadband access, dial-up access or otl1er, unspecified forms of access. 
The distribution of internet access reveals a strong rural influence: the more 
rural an electorate is, the fewer residents will have any internet access, and those who 
do are more likely to have dial-up than broadband access (Figure 4.2). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, tl1e relationship between location and type of internet access is likely the 
result of lower availability of broadband technology outside of metropolitan areas, 
although income could also be a factor. Figure 4.2 shows the relationships between the 
type of connection and the demographic ranking of electorates, where 'inner 
metropolitan' is coded as 1 and 'rura l' as 4 on a scale.34 The concentration of 
broadband access in metropolitan areas is clear. It is expected that, because of its 
potential to negate tl1e negative effects of mobility on electoral enrolment, the levels of 
34 Demographic rankings are taken from the Australian Parliamentary Library, which used 2006 ABS Census of Population and Housing data to construct demographic profiles of each federal electoral division (Bennett and Barber, 2008). 
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of households wirth no internet access, dial-up internet access and 
broadband inter'ft et access by demographic ranking of e lecto rate 
Source : 2006 Census of Population and Housing (Austral ian Bureau of Statistics, 2006b); 
Parliamentary Library, Parl iament of Australia (Bennett & Barber 2008). n=lS0. 
■ No internet 
■ Dial-up 
Broadband 
both broadband and dial-up internet access should positively affect enrolment in 
ustr·alia. 
The impact of these five broad predictors on electoral enrolment - plus internet 
access - in Australia is presented in Table 4.1. Looking first at the effects of internet 
access, broadband access appears to have a negative effect on the level of em·olment in 
an election. This finding holds even though rurality is controlled for v.rith the 
demographic ranking measure, suggesting that the negative effects of broadband access 
and no internet access are not proxy effects for rurality. The dial-up access coefficient, 
while insignificant, is nonetheless positive. The different measures of internet access 
therefore move accordingly ,l\rith their place on the urban-rural scale, but appear to 
have an impact over and abo e the demographic ranking. 
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Table 4.1: Predictors of enrolment in Australia, 2006: data aggregated by federal electoral 
division 
B SE b 
Broadband connections 
-.243 .082 -.415 
Dial-up connections 
.114 .124 .064 
Population aged 17-29 
-.718 .105 -.532 
Lived elsewhere in Au stralia 1 year ago 
-.398 .112 -.218 
High incom es (>$52000 pa) 
.sos .097 .577 
Attending tertiary institution 
.780 .275 .339 
Has bachelo r degree or higher 
-.362 .124 -.319 
Do not speak English well 
-.415 .153 -.189 
Demographic ranking 
.185 .357 .038 
Electoral status 
.257 .274 .038 
Constant 100.294 4.367 
2 
.801 2.607 r 
Adjusted r 2 
.787 
Ordinary least squ ares regression analysis. n=lS0 (electoral divisions) . p=two-tailed. 
Source: 2006 Census of Population and Housing (Australian Burea u of Statistics, 2006b); Certified 
List Elector Count (Australian El ectoral Commission, 2007). Dependent variable: Percentage of 
residents enrolled by fed era l electoral division (elector count/census count). 
p 
.004 
.363 
.000 
.001 
.000 
.005 
.004 
.007 
.604 
.350 
.000 
A rural electorate which has a relatively stable and older population is 
therefore already more likely to have a higher rate of enrolment than an inner 
metropolitan electorate with a more mobile, younger population, for instance a city-
based electorate. However it appears that, even in inner metropolitan electorates 
where electo ral enrolment is already relatively low, the diffusion of broadband access 
can predict even lower rates of enrolment. It is likely that this effect says more about 
the characteristics of electorates with high broadband diffusion than it does about the 
actual effects of internet use. For example, the measurement of broadband access may 
actually reflect some other fea tures of inner metropolitan electorates, for example 
youth, tertiary education, pro fessional employment and high residential mobility. This 
is an inherent proble_m of aggregate regression analysis, and is encapsulated by the 
notably high coefficient of determination (or r-squared figure) (see for example Kelley 
& McAllister 1983). 
Electoral enro lment in Australia is negatively affected by rates of broadband 
internet access in an electorate. Figure 4.2 shows that rural electorates are far less 
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likely than inner metropolitan electorates to have high rates of broadband access, 
however the effects of broadband access on enrolment rates persists even after 
controlling for rurality. The result is surprising, but it may be, for instance, that the 
demographic ranking sourced from the Australian Parliamentary Library (Bennett and 
Barber, 2008) is not sufficiently detailed to fully account for the differences between 
urban and rural electorates. 
It is also possible that the cross-sectional data presented here capture a specific 
point in the diffusion of internet technology in which geographic regions were 
delineated by their type of internet access. This has likely changed with the diffusion of 
broadband technology since 2006, and will continue to change as mobile broadband 
and soon fibre-to-the-home connections proliferate in Australia. Nonetheless, the 
result is of great interest and worthy of further exploration. The other factors 
predicting an electorate's rate of electoral enrolment are largely as expected: the 
proportions of youth, non-English speakers and recent arrivals to an electorate have 
negative effects on the enrolment rate ( although the negative effect of educational 
attainment is more surprising), while the proportion of high income earners and the 
closeness of the electoral contest have positive effects. The next section looks at voting 
behaviour, and particularly those Australians who, having registered to vote, fail to do 
so. 
4.5 Voter turnout 
As with Elections ACT's (2012a; 2012b) 'remember to enrol' campaign on social 
media, EMBs in Australia are increasingly using the internet as a platform for 
'remember to vote' campaigns (Macnamara et al., 2012). Access to the internet can 
increase a potential voter's exposure to political information, including news about 
current affairs and information about how and where to vote. Even if they do not seek 
out such information, it is likely that they will inadvertently come across it while 
browsing. For example, Facebook users are exposed to political advertisements 
targeted to their geographic location. Some will also be exposed to direct appeals from 
EMBs to turn out to vote. Exposure to information should, as when predicting 
enrolment rates, have a positive impact. But'whether any effects are sufficiently strong 
to show up in a multivariate analysis is unknown. There should be no significant 
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difference between the effects of broadband and dial-up internet access after 
controlling for electorate demographics (i.e. inner metropolitan, outer metropolitan, 
provincial and rural). 
The multivariate analysis of voter turnout (by enrolled population) in Australia 
reveals that neither the rate of broadband or dial-up internet access in an electorate 
has a significant effect on how many of its residents vote (see Table 4.2). Those factors 
that are significant are mostly as would be expected: the higher the proportion of 
young people, recent arrivals to the electorate and non-English speakers, the lower the 
turnout. These effects exist in addition to the effects that they have on enrolment, 
shown in Table 4.1; non-English speakers are less likely than English speakers to enrol, 
but even those who are enrolled appear less likely to turn out to vote. Less obvious was 
the significant negative effect of bachelor degree attainment on turnout, particularly 
when compared with the strong positive effect of the rate of students currently 
attending a tertiary institution. Turnout among tertiary students is probably a factor of 
exposure to voting information on campus and encouragement from fellow students. 
The characteristics of tertiary attendance in this way reflect the characteristics of 
internet use. These results show, however, that by themselves the characteristics of 
internet access do not directly affect voter turnout. 
Rather than abstaining by not attending a polling booth, and incurring a fine as 
a result, an Australian who does not wish to cast a vote can instead cast an informal 
vote and avoid being fined (Hill and Young, 2007; Pringle, 2012). There are no obvious 
reasons why internet access would be expected to affect overall levels of informal 
voting besides the additional exposure to information about voting, including access to 
candidate information and sample ballot papers prior to election day. This is not to say 
that any meaningful number of voters seek out this information, rather that it is more 
accessible online than offline. Again, it is not expected that either broadband or dial-up 
access should have a significant effect, but if there is any sign of a relationship, it should 
be positive. The results presented in Table 4.3 support this expectation: neither 
measure of internet use in an electorate has a significant effect on the rate of informal 
votes. Moreover, tl1e significant factors affecting informal voting are largely as 
expected, namely the strong positive effects of the proportion of people not proficient 
in English and the number of candidates standing for election (see for example Hill & 
Young 2007). The proportion of high income earners in an electorate makes informal 
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Table 4.2: Predictors of turnout (by enrolled population) in Australia, 2006: data aggregated by 
federal electoral division 
B SE b p 
Broadband connections 
.033 .040 .181 .405 
Dial-up connections 
.081 .060 .145 .180 
Population aged 17-29 
-.225 .051 -.531 .000 
Lived elsewhere in Australia 1 year ago 
-.265 .054 -.463 .000 
High incomes (>$52000 pa) 
-.001 .047 -.005 .976 
Attending tertiary institution 
.533 .133 .739 .000 
Has bachelor degree or higher 
-.216 .060 -.607 .000 
Do not speak English well 
-.259 .074 -.375 .001 
Demographic ranking 
-.232 .173 -.152 .183 
Electoral status 
-.005 .133 -.002 .969 
Constant 101.636 2.121 .000 
2 
.524 1.259 r 
Adjusted r 2 .486 
Ordinary least squares regression analysis. n=l50. p=two-tailed. 
Source: 2006 Census of Population and Housing(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006b); Certified 
List Elector Count (Australian Electoral Commission, 2007). 
Dependent variable: Turnout among enro lled popu lation. 
votes slightly less likely, while the proportion of tertiary students and the tightness of 
the contest ( measured by the difference between the final two candidates at the 
previous election) make informal votes substantially less likely. In sum, the results -
including the lack of any effects of internet use - are unsurprising. 
Breaking the rate of informal votes down into intentional (i.e. protest) and 
unintentional votes yields similar results. Table 4.4 shows the result of multivariate 
regression analysis predicting informal protest voting by electorate, and the factors 
listed have very little predictive power. Only the rates ofresidents holding a bachelor 
degree (negative) and who are not proficient in English (positive), as well as the 
rurality of the electorate (negative) have significant effects on how many protest votes 
were cast in 2007. Given the small numbers of voters who cast a protest ballot (from 
between 0.13 and 1.1 per cent of voters in an electorate), these results are again as 
expected. There is not likely to be any characteristics or relationships that can 
describe such a small group in any significant way. So few Australians use their vote as 
an opportunity to express any sort of protest against their political institutions 
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Table 4.3: Predictors of informal voting in Australia, 2006: data aggregated by federal electoral 
division 
B SE b p 
Broadband connections 
.043 .02S .318 .097 
Dial-up connections 
.011 .038 .027 .769 
Population aged 17-29 
.082 .032 .267 .012 
Lived elsewhere in Australia 1 year ago -.072 .035 -.171 .041 
Attending tertiary institution 
-.277 .084 -.527 .001 
Do not speak English well 
.286 .047 .569 .000 
High incomes (>$52000 pa) 
-.060 .030 -.299 .047 
Has bachelor degree or higher 
-.045 .038 -.174 .237 
Demographic ranking 
-.015 .109 -.013 .893 
Electoral status 
-.146 .084 -.094 .086 
Number of candidates 
.272 .045 .331 .000 
Constant 2.916 1.352 
.033 
r2 
.646 .798 
Adjusted r 2 
.618 
Ordinary least squares regression analysis . n=150. p=two-tailed . 
Source: 2006 Census of Population and Housing(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006b); Certified 
List Elector Count (Australian Electoral Commission, 2007). 
Dependent variable: Percentage of informal votes cast by electorate (Australian Electoral 
Commission). 
- be it the electoral system, the candidates, parties or the parliament - that any 
empirical connection between them is unlikely to be found. They are, most likely, 
uncorrelated. 
Compulsory voting has many effects on the Australian political system, not least 
in maintaining consistently high voter turnout. Once a citizen is enrolled, he retains 
two options for abstaining: not attending a polling booth (and risk being fined), or 
voting informally. Neither of these appears to be affected by rates of internet access at 
the aggregate level, however no effects were theorised. When breaking informal voting 
down to include only protest voting (namely blank and 'scribbled' votes), none of the 
expected determinants has a significant effect. The analysis suggests that protest 
voting in Australia is not a factor of any of the usual determinants of abstention, and 
perhaps not a factor of anything in particular. The analysis moreover confirms that 
most Australians enrol to vote, attend a polling booth, and cast a valid ballot. However, 
individual-level data would shed much greater light on which enrolled voters abstain in 
Australia, and how they choose to abstain. 
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Table 4.4: Predictors of informal protest voting in Australia, 2006: data aggregated by federal 
electoral division 
B SE b p 
Broadband connect ions -.002 .005 -.093 .714 
Dial-up connections -.001 .007 -.015 .905 
Popu lation aged 17-29 -.001 .006 -.034 .809 
Lived elsewhere in Australia 1 year ago -.001 .007 -.014 .901 
Attending tertiary institution -.000 .016 .000 1.000 
Do not speak English we ll .031 .009 .424 .001 
High incomes (>$52000 pa) -.004 .006 -.130 .513 
Has bachelor degree or higher -.016 .007 -.437 .026 
Demographic ranking -.050 .021 -.316 .017 
Electoral status -.022 .016 -.098 .177 
Number of candidates .014 .009 .122 .095 
Constant .961 .259 .000 
2 
.372 .153 r 
Adjusted r2 .322 
Ordinary least squares regression analysis. n=150. p=two-tailed. 
Source: 2006 Census of Population and Housing(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006b); Certified 
List Elector Count (Australian Electoral Commission, 2007). 
Dependent variable: Percentage of combined 'blank' and 'scribble/slogan' votes cast by electorate 
(Australian Electoral Commission). 
4. 6 Conclusion 
Using census data, the chapter has explored the role of internet access in 
electoral participation in Australia. Aggregated at the level of federal electoral 
divisions, the data showed that rates of broadband access are highly correlated with 
urban electorates and dial-up access with rural electorates, reflecting a cross-sectional 
picture of technology use in Australia in 1996. The rate of broadband connections in an 
electorate negatively predicted electoral enrolment (calculated as the number of 
residents enrolled as a proportion of the voting aged population of the electorate 
according to the census), even when controlling for the urban-rural character of the 
electorate. This does not dismiss the possibility of internet effects, however. While not 
significant, rates of dial-up connections had a positive effect on electoral enrolment. 
The difference between the two types of internet access indicates thi3.t the measures in 
the census data may be accounting for other effects, possibly rurality, which is captured 
here in a relatively blunt, four-measure scale. Neither form of internet access had any 
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significant effects on voter turnout, rates of informal voting or rates of protest voting at 
the electorate level. However, individual level survey data would allow for more 
minute examination of the effects of internet use on electoral participation in Australia. 
Voting in Australia is not merely a civic duty, but a compulsion backed up by 
federal legislation. By voting, an Australian citizen is not necessarily expressing her 
support for her country's democratic institutions; she is just as likely seeking to avoid 
being fined for not attending a polling booth. Accordingly, multivariate analysis in this 
chapter suggests that Australian voting behaviour is more instrumental than 
expressive. The key examples here are the effects of mobility and English language 
proficiency. Federal electorates with a more transient population, characteristic of 
university students and those without children or families to support, have lower voter 
enrolment and turnout. Likewise, electorates with high proportions of non-English 
speakers have low participation rates. 
This does not assume that those populations are less interested in politics or a 
less developed sense of civic duty (although, according to Dalton (2008a), civic duty is 
less prevalent among the young), but that they have chosen to opt out of the voting 
process. Perhaps the costs of voting are prohibitive, either in terms of time, money or 
civic skills (Verba et al., 1995). Perhaps, on the other hand, they do not fully 
understand the consequences of abstention under Australian law. Individual level data 
would help to map the process of informal voting, teasing out the degree of intention 
behind a blank or spoil ballot, but without such data the analysis here provides some 
headway into understanding electoral participation in Australia. Next, this study 
explores the effects of internet use on partisanship and campaign participation in 
Australia, the other major example of formal political participation. 
134 
Chapter 5 - political parties, the internet 
and campaign participation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the effects of internet use on party identification, 
membership of political parties and contributions of time and money to parties and 
candidates among Australian citizens. Each of these activities comprises engagement 
with conventional political institutions: the electoral system and political parties. 
Through these actions, individuals help to maintain the political structures that are a 
feature of a functioning democracy.35 Political party membership and contributions to 
parties and candidates - described here collectively as 'campaign participation' - works 
to maintain the dominance of formal political parties in the democratic processes of 
seeking election and governing. By supporting political parties, individuals are 
reinforcing political norms and preventing the introduction of new political 
competitors. The internet has arguably made it easier for citizens in advanced 
democracies to support political parties, including during campaigns: new 
opportunities to belong to online networks of supporters (Dalton eJ: al., 2011; Scarrow, 
2013, forthcoming), donate money online (Levenshus, 2010; Schlozman et al., 2010) 
and declare support for a preferred party or candidate online (Bekafigo and McBride, 
2013; Bond et al., 2012b) 
The number of Australians belonging to political parties has never been large, 
although rates of party identification are consistently high (McAllister, 2011 ). Due 
largely to compulsory voting laws, Australian political culture has not engendered 
party membership in the same way as in countries such as Austria, where parties 
provide high rates of patronage to their members (Muller, 1994). The rate of party 
membership in Australia has stayed consistent at around two per cent of the 
population in the postwar period (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010; Bean, 1997). 
The largest dataset of political behaviour in Australia, the Australian Election Study, 
35 Political protest, on the contrary, can and often does seek to reform or dismantle those 
political structures. 
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does not measure party membership ( with the exception of the 1996 survey). Why, 
then, is it worth studying at all? 
Party membership serves five vital functions beyond just being an outlet for 
individuals' political expression (Dalton et al., 2011). First, party members perform the 
important intra-party role of selecting candidates for nomination at general elections. 
Membership is also necessary for individuals wishing to represent any of the Australian 
parties as a candidate at a general election. Members moreover help to organise 
elections, including scrutineering ballot counts at Australian elections. Second, in 
voluntary voting systems, party organisations provide vital mobilising services, 
encouraging and assisting citizens to vote. In Australian elections, this function is 
instead provided by the Australian Electoral Commission, and the enforcement of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. Third, party members help to shape their parties' 
ideological positions on governance and policy, providing voters with clear choices 
when they go to vote. In the final two linkage functions identified by Dalton et al. 
(2011), parties - via their candidates - are elected to represent constituencies in a 
legislature, forming stable governments and oppositions, before implementing the 
policies communicated before the election. 
With so few Australians wielding a large degree of power in Australia's process 
of nominating and selecting candidates for public office, it is valuable to understand 
who joins political parties, and why. This study examines whether the advent of the 
internet has changed the profile of Australian political party members. Theory 
suggests there are two main ways in which the internet could play a role. First, internet 
technologies have reduced the cost and time required for parties to contact both 
existing and potential members and donors (Schlozman et al., 2012). For example, 
members of Australian parties can renew their party subscriptions online and new 
members can sign up online without having to attend a party meeting or meet with 
party officials (Australian Labor Party, n.d.; Liberal Party of Australia, n.d.). Supporters 
can donate to parties or specific candidates from their desktop. Further, parties 
elsewhere in the world are developing online-only levels of membership, in which 
members need never .leave the comfort of their home to still be an active member 
(Dalton et al., 2011; Scarrow, 2013). Second, but as importantly, the internet is 
expected to have indirect effects on party membership, by enhancing exposure to 
political information and recruitment by political actors and peers (Bimber, 2003; 
Rommele, 2003). 
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This chapter extends the analysis of party membership to include those who 
align themselves with a party, but do not necessarily join the organisation, as well as 
those who volunteer their time to parties and candidates (for example by handing out 
flyers during an election campaign) and donate money to parties and candidates. The 
internet is expected to affect these contributions through the framework of civic 
voluntarism (Verba et al. 1995), particularly the types of resources required to 
participate in political activity. Contributions of time are expected to be more easily 
made online: an individual with little free time should be more likely to distribute 
political content to his peer network than to volunteer to hand out flyers for two hours 
on a Saturday. Likewise, the types of civic skills required to speak to potential 
supporters and persuade voters are probably as useful in predicting the distribution or 
creation of online political material. People with little free time should likewise be 
more likely to donate money online than offline. 
This chapter begins by revisiting the role of the internet in the civic voluntarism 
framework of participation (Verba et al. 1995). It tests the hypothesis that online 
resources will either substitute for the traditional resources of time, money and civic 
skills, or they will complement them in predicting campaign participation (Section 5.2). 
Section 5.3 explores the linkage between Australian parties and citizens, and the role of 
party websites and online communications. Section 5.4 examines levels of party 
identification in Australia: the extent to which Australians align with any particular 
party, and the expected role of the internet in strengthening or weakening that 
alignment. Section 5.5 analyses the effects of internet use on party membership in 
Australia in 2010. Section 5.6 explores contributions of time and money to Australian 
parties over time, before analysing the effects of internet use in 2010. Finally, this 
chapter discusses the implications of the findings on Australian democracy. 
5.2 Internet resources, civic voluntarism, engagement with 
parties and campaign. participation 
Verba et al.'s (1995) civic voluntarism model argues the positive effects of an 
individual's resources, political engagement and recruitment by political actors on the 
likelihood that he participates in political ac-tivity. The resources described by Verba et 
al. (1995) are free time, money and civic skills. This chapter compares the effects of 
online and offline resources on individuals' campaign participation. Engagement with 
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parties is measured here by strength of party identification, party membership, 
financial contributions to parties or candidates and voluntary work for a party or 
candidate. Resources are categorised as either offline or online: free time offline, free 
time online, traditional civic skills, and internet skills. 
Where an act can only be performed offline - for example joining a political 
party in Australia - it is expected that while civic skills should be the stronger 
predictor, internet skills will retain a small positive effect. The implications for the civic 
voluntarism model of political participation are substantial, but most important is the 
question of whether internet resources - online time and online skills - can substitute 
for the traditional resources of free time and civic skills, or whether they merely 
complementthose traditional skills. In other words, does an individual with ample 
online resources, but few traditional resources, have the same likelihood of 
participating in politics as someone with ample traditional resources, and no internet 
access, or at least few online resources? Do those possessing offline resources 
participate offline, and those with online resources participate online? 
Existing research suggests that the internet partially mitigates the need for an 
individual to have ample free time in order to participate in politics (see for example 
Bimber 2003; Best & Krueger 2005). Time has a cost, and traditional acts of political 
participation have required a relatively high investment of time. An individual 
interested in joining a political party requires free time, first to find out the 
requirements for party membership, then to complete those requirements, and finally 
to actively participate in the party. If the individual decides to take an official position 
within the party, be it as an officer of the local branch of the party, or as an officer at the 
electorate, state or federal level, an even greater investment of time is required. The 
same applies to voluntary contributions of time or money to a party, but particularly, 
obviously, with regards to time. Contributing to a political campaign by handing out 
'how to vote cards' to voters on election day requires the donation of usually several 
hours, generally ruling out those who have responsibility for young, elderly or infirm 
family members or who are engaged in paid employment on weekends. 
Free time is operationalised in this analysis in two different ways: as the hours 
an individual has to himself each day, allowing him to participate in offline activities; 
and the frequency of an individual's internet use, allowing him to participate in online 
activities. These measurements reflect the nature of time as a resource that an 
individual must possess in order to participate. To act offline, an individual needs time 
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free from work, family or study commitments. To act online, an individual needs to 
spend at least some time online. The more time an individual has - either offline or 
online - to spend, the less costly an act of participation becomes. The 2010 Australian 
Election Study (AES) is the first in the series to ask respondents about both the time 
they have to themselves on an average day and the time they spend online in an 
average week. 
Both offline and online free time should positively affect party membership, 
particularly as parties increase their online presence. While much of the literature on 
party organisations' use of internet technologies is rapidly overtaken by events, the key 
assumptions about the effects of having an online presence should hold. Access to 
information online makes it easier for potential members to learn about and contact 
parties, while membership subscriptions can often now be paid and registered online 
(see for example Rommele 2003). Likewise, the increasing use of the internet to 
transfer money has seen the increase of convenient 'e-donations' in favour of cheque or 
cash donations, particularly among those making small financial contributions to 
parties. Margetts (2006) describes such developments as symptomatic of an 
organisational shift away from mass parties and toward 'cyber parties'. In a cyber 
party, 
--
" .. . members [are] afforded more flexible channels for participation and 
opportunities to form and join looser issue- and policy-based networks ... Such 
easy exit and entry barriers [are] also seen to create the possibility for a 
massive and floating support base less able to hold leaders accountable, and the 
emergence of a narrower digital elite that displaces the more traditional activist 
base" (Gibson et al. 2012, p. 32).36 
Similarly, Scarrow (forthcoming) observes that political parties are already 
beginning to offer varying levels of affiliation. Among the less formal modes of 
membership is 'cyber member', "formally registered party supporters who are 
generally recruited through a party's web page" and who "are encouraged to campaign 
on the party's behalf, and to help spread the party message to others" (Scarrow, 
forthcoming). In Scandinavia, some parties have trialled 'online-only' forms of party 
36 Parallels between Margetts' (2006) theory of 'cyber parties' and the mainstream parties 
literature, characterised by Katz and Mair's (1995) theory of cartelisation are discussed in 
Section 5.3 . 
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membership in response to declining numbers of traditional (i.e. 'offline') members 
(Dalton et al., 2011 ). Atthe extreme ends of this observed spectrum of party affiliations 
lie b"aditional party membership and one-way news audiences. The internet has the 
potential to expand that news audience via social media such as Face book and Twitter, 
as well as through subscription to email newsletter services (Gibson and McAllister, 
2009a). 
Internet use is also expected to affect the predictive role of money, the second 
determinant of participation in Verba et al.'s (1995) model, by lowering the financial 
costs of some forms of participation. Money is measured in the AES by gross annual 
household income; there is no equivalent online measurement of money. However, 
Chapter 3 shows that money is a barrier to having internet access - the persistent 
social 'digital divide' - and so there is an antecedent positive effect of wealth in any 
online act of participation. In regard to monetary contributions, an individual's wealth 
is more likely to affect his propensity to donate money than to join or volunteer for a 
political party (see for example Verba et al., 1995, p. 190). Monetary contributions, or 
'chequebook participation', are often made in conjunction with other forms of 
participation in campaign activity, 37 however that relationship seems to have 
diminished over time (Claggett and Pollock, 2006). 
Much has been made of the success of Howard Dean's 2004 and Barack 
Obama's 2008 US presidential campaigns in attracting new, previously disengaged 
donors, who used the internetto contribute relatively small amounts of money 
(Hindman, 2005; Wilcox, 2008). While Claggett and Pollock's (2006) factor analysis of 
modes of participation spans 1980 to 2004, it is likely that the connection between 
contributions and other campaign acts has continued to erode as the low costs of email 
communication allows parties to solicit enormous numbers of people for small 
amounts of money. This approach to fundraising is typified by the Dean and Obama 
presidential primary campaigns, and contrasts with early American presidential 
campaigns which relied on a small number of carefully selected and prolific donors 
(Hindman, 2005; Wilcox, 2008). However other research notes that while the amount 
of money donated increases, the distribution of small versus big donors has largely 
remained stable (Smith, 2013). Donation trends are examined further in section 5.5. 
37 The bivariate correlation between attendance at political meetings or rallies and donation of 
money to a party or candidate during the 2010 Australian federal election was strong, for 
example (r=.590, p=.001) (McAllister et al., 2010). 
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Internet use is not expected to affect the civic skills described by the civic 
voluntarism model so much as internet proficiency should be considered a civic skill in 
its own right. Verba et al. (199 5) measure civic skills as language proficiency, verbal 
ability, educational attainment, experience with organisational skill acts either at work, 
in non-political associations or at church. Krueger argues that internet skills should be 
added to the civic voluntarism model: "online skills help an individual overcome the 
technical hurdles associated with navigating the internet, just as civic skills help 
individuals act in a complex social and political world" (2002, p. 485) . Further, internet 
skills and 'offline' civic skills are likely to be concentrated among different groups in a 
society, as discussed in Chapter 3. Krueger (2002) finds that internet skills are strong 
predictors of online political participation, while civic skills have no predictive power; 
on the other hand, civic skills are strong predictors of offline participation, but internet 
skills have no predictive power there. Accordingly, this study includes an independent 
variable measuring internet skills using the 'internet proficiency' scale discussed in 
Chapter 3 (section 3.5). 
While time, money and civic skills are strong predictors of political 
participation, they do not explain it. Political engagement and recruitment by peers or 
political actors explains why individuals with the necessary resources choose to expend 
them on political activity. Engagement is not included in multivariate analyses 
throughout this study, as the aim is to instead analyse the effects of resources and 
recruitment on participation, both of which get obscured by the inclusion of measures 
of engagement. One measure of engagement in Verba et al.'s (1995) model is party 
identification, which is presented here as a dependent variable. The reasons for this 
are twofold. First, party identification can predict engagement with political parties, 
but it is not necessarily endogenous to party-related participation. Instead, party 
ider1tification can be conceived as the antecedent attitude towards a political party 
which may or may not lead to participation. This analysis casts light on that larger 
group of identifiers, including participants and non-participants. Second, party 
identification is expected to be strengthened by internet use, through increasing 
opportunities for individuals to 'self-select' the media to which they expose themselves 
(for example Kenski & Stroud 2006; Stroud 2008; Iyengar & Hahn 2009). 
Finally, the civic voluntarism model highlights the role of recruitment in the 
process of becoming active in politics. Recruitmenttakes two forms: informal 
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approaches from peers, and formal approaches from parties or candidates. Individuals 
who spend time online, particularly using social networking services such as Face book 
or Twitter, are likely to have a larger network of informal contacts than those who do 
not (see for example Dalton & Kittilson 2012; Kittilson & Dalton 2011; Hampton et al. 
2011) . It is therefore expected that general internet use - measured by frequency of 
time spent online - should have a positive, but small, impact on donations of time and 
money. Internet use should increase the opportunities to be formally recruited by a 
political party or candidate. Australian and American politic91 parties' use of 
sophisticated databases containing information on enrolled voters enables highly 
targeted, personalised and inexpensive communications with potential party activists. 
In 2010, only a small number of Australians were contacted by parties or candidates 
online: only 33 AES respondents (n=2214), or 1.5 per cent, reported receiving emails 
persuading them to vote for a particular candidate (McAllister et al., 2010a). 
Compulsory voting in Australia reli eves parties from the burden of mobilising party 
activists, and hence innovating mobilisation techniques like those used in campaigns 
internationally (Karp et al., 2008). 
5.3 Parties, citizen linkage and campaign participation: 
the use of internet communications 
One of the central functions of political parties in civic li fe is the linkage they 
provide between a government and its citizens (Dalton et al., 2011). Even as parties 
have become cartelised, solidifying the relationship between parties and the state while 
reducing the need for grassroots organisation, contact between parties and citizens is 
still a central function of parties (Dalton et al., 2011; Katz and Mair, 1995) . While party 
membership numbers continue to decline across advanced democracies, many parti es 
have adapted by embracing new technologies to enable more targeted methods of 
voter mobilisation and make more efficient use of their grassroots volunteers (Dalton 
et al., 2011; Gibson et al., 2012; Scarrow, 2013). This section examines how the 
Australian parties are using the internet to connect with citizens, but particularly with 
their supporters and prospective volunteers.38 
38 This section does not discuss the Australian parties' use of electroni c databases of 
constituents, which have been studied in depth elsewhere (for example Onselen & Errington 2004; van Onselen & van Onselen 2008). The primary function of those databases is to 
target undecided voters on salient issues or policies, rather than to mobilise campaign 
volunteers. 
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With the exception of the LPA, the Australian parties appear to have resisted 
the trend of falling party membership as a proportion of the population of advanced 
democracies (see Chapter 2). This likely comes from the same source as many other 
aspects of Australia's political exceptionalism: compulsory voting. Not having to 
mobilise voluntary voters to turn out on election day, the Australian political parties 
also take a relatively indifferent approach to recruiting party members. Parties in other 
advanced democracies have moved away from mass party organisational models 
towards cartel party models, with greater public funding for party activities and 
greater reliance on large donors rather than members' subscription fees for campaign 
funding (Johns, 2006; Katz and Mair, 1995; Ward, 2006), Australian parties have not 
required the great amounts of money required to mobilise potential voters. Any 
financial or human capital at an Australian party's disposal has traditionally been 
reserved for the official election campaign; for purposes of persuasion rather than 
mobilisation (Johns, 2006). Parties in the US, for example, campaign to both mobilise 
and persuade different sections of the population, and a much larger population at that 
(Green and Gerber, 2010; Karp et al., 2008). Accordingly, Australian campaigns have 
always been relatively inexpensive operations. The Australian parties have slipped 
easily into Katz and Mair's (1995) cartelised organisational model, having never relied 
on large numbers of members to mobilise voters or fund campaigns (Marsh, 2006, 
1995; Ward, 2006). 
Each of the major Australian parties offers only one form of official 
membership. However, in 2013 the ALP implemented organisational reforms including 
a range of ways in which supporters and other interested parties can become involved 
in the party. Those interested in ALP politics and with access to the internet can join 
the party's 'Labor Connect' network or contribute to the online 'ThinkTank' forum, 
neither of which require any payment or ongoing commitment. However, involvement 
in these forums does not provide the individual with any say in intra-party politics, 
such as a vote in preselecting candidates or at any level of the party organisation. The 
ALP also publishes a page on its website directing supporters to call talkback radio or 
write letters to newspaper editors in support of ALP policies. In terms of actual 
membership options, the four major parties have for the most part embraced internet 
technology. The Nationals allow prospective members to submit expressions of 
interest online, to be contacted by the party organisation later. The AG provide full 
online membership services in each of their state divisions. The ALP and LPA offer 
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state-based memberships, with only some states allowing online registration: five state 
or territory divisions of the LPA, and three state divisions of the ALP. Where online 
registration is not available, prospective members can submit the required forms by 
post, fax or email. 
Other obstacles to party membership, beside the administrative requirements 
ofregistration, include the cost of membership subscriptions and the time required to 
be an active, rather than passive, member. The ALP and AG offer progressive rates of 
membership subscription based on income. The LP and Nationals offer concessional 
rates to pensioners and students, as well as to members of the their respective youth 
divisions. As mentioned, the ALP and AG also facilitate online political networks via 
their websites, in which network members can communicate with other supporters 
and with party officials. In both parties, this avenue for participation is separate from 
official party membership. Drawing on what is known about the internet- particularly 
Web 2.0 applications - and online participation, the advantages of online political 
networks are that they do not require a financial contribution (beyond possessing 
internet access) or attendance at meetings at a particular date or time, or even place. 
The social democratic parties, then, ostensibly encourage mass participation, with the 
traditional barriers to political party membership lowered. The conservative parties -
the LPA and Nationals - still require pre-internet levels of time and money to become 
engaged with and/or participate in their party organisations. 
5.4 Party identification 
Party identification describes whether a person identifies as closer to one 
particularly political party, and if so, how strongly they identify with that party. As a 
measure of closeness to a party, it is generally viewed as a determinant of other 
political behaviours and characteristics: "once an individual becomes psychologically 
attached to a party, he or she tends to see politics from a partisan perspective" (Dalton, 
2002). Moreover, party identification is often used as a frame through which the world 
is presented to citizens via the media and political actors (see for example the 'political 
framing' literature; Dalton 2002). Fiorina (1981) argues that party identification 
represents a rational decision on the part of a voter, based on parties' previous 
performances and expected future performances, that allows the voter to make 
inexpensive, low-information decisions on political issues. Where once party 
identification - in terms of strength and direction - was highly socialised, passed from 
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Taole 5.1: Mean characteristics of Australian citizens by strength of party identification, 2010 
Not very strong Fairly strong 
(n=510) (n=913) 
Money 
Hou se hold income + 11.47 (5 .43) 11.50 (5.90) 
Time 
Time to self (hours/day) 6.39 (5 .82) 6.69 (7 .45) 
Time spent on internet+ 5.37 (2.21) 5.20 (2 .28) 
Employment status 5.01 (2.33) 4.70 (2 .36) 
· Civic skills 
Educational attainment+ 3.41 (2.15) 3.47 (2.15) 
Born in Australia (l=yes) 0.77 (0.42) 0.78 (0.41) 
Membership of non-politica l organi sations 0.47 (0.77) 0.49 (0.76) 
Job ski ll s 1.42 (1.49) 1.51 (1.50) 
Internet skills 1.92 (1.34) 1.90 (1.41) 
Recruitment 
Contact by parties/canc:lidates 0.99 (0 .29 ) 1.05 (0.32) 
Engagement 
Interest in politics + 3.18 (0 .77) 3.20 (0.79) 
Political knowledge 2.12 (1 .66) 2.57 (1.76) 
Controls 
Sex (fema le) 0.51 (0.50) 0.51 (0 .50) 
Age 47.38 (17.36) 49 .67 (17.32) 
One-way ANOVA. Standard deviations in parentheses. Between-group differences: ** p<.01 *p<.05 (two-tailed). 
Source: 2010 Austra lian Election Study (McAllister et al. 2010). See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
Very strong 
(n=334) 
10.18 (5.74)** 
6.77 (6 .90) 
4.99 (2.40)* 
4.71 (2 .36)* 
3.10 (2.18) ** 
0.78 (0.42) 
0.54 (0 .82) 
1.40 (1.47) 
1.69 (1.38)* 
1.05 (.36) ** 
3.21 (0.77) 
2.65 (1.74)** 
0.51 (0.50) 
50.82 (18.15)* 
generation to generation on the basis of socioeconomic status and racial or religious 
identification, those nexuses are dismantling (with corresponding generational 
increases in educational attainment and postmaterialist attitudes) (Dalton, 2002; 
Inglehart, 1990; Kemp, 1978). 
The profile of party identifiers in Australia accords with international literature 
(Converse, 1969; Dalton, 2002).39 The mean characteristics of'notvery strong', 'fairly 
strong' and 'very strong' party supporters in Table 5.1 suggest that party identification 
increases with age, and decreases with income, educational attainment and 
employment status. Very strong party identifiers are likewise the least likely to use the 
internet. This is not to suggest causal relationships between any of these factors. 
Rather, party identifiers are concentrated among the elderly in Australia; this is either a 
lifecycle or generational phenomenon, although drawing on the literature there are 
likely elements of both at work (Converse, 1969; Dalton, 2002; McAllister, 2011; 
Milbrath, 1965; Pub1am, 2001). The other characteristics which appear to decline as 
partisanship increases - income, employment status, educational attainment and 
internet use - are artefacts of age, rather than expected negative determinants of party 
identification. 
Those with very strong party identification display greater factual political 
knowledge and report having been contacted by parties and candidates in the previous 
election campaign at greater rates than those with weaker identification. This supports 
the thesis that contacting citizens comprises a core linkage function of political parties 
(Dalton et al., 2011). More interestingly, very strong party identifiers display no more 
political interest than weaker identifiers, suggesting that party identification in 
Australia serves as an ideological cue enabling low-cost political decision making, and 
also that political interest and party support are decoupling in Australia, as elsewhere 
(Dalton, 2012, 2002; Fiorina, 1981; Milbrath, 1965). 
Looking more closely at the predictors of party identification among Australian 
citizens, multivariate regression results in Table 5.2 show the overwhelming influence 
of contacting. When controlling for other factors the effect of age becomes negligible, 
as do the related effects of household income, employment status, educational 
attai nment, and interest use. Instead, only being contacted by parties or candidates 
39 This section examines the strength of party identification among Australians, and not the direction of party identification. While interesting, particularly in terms of the breakdown of 
class and other effects on direction of party support, the direction of identification does not 
matter in this instance. 
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Table 5.2: Predictor,s of strength of party identification in Australia, 2010 
Online resource model All resource model 
b SE B b SE B 
Money 
Household income -.005 .003 -.041 -.004 .004 -.031 
Free time 
Frequency of internet use -.017 .012 -.055 
Hours to self .001 .003 .009 .001 .009 .009 
Civic skills 
Internet skills .009 .020 .019 
Ed ucational attainment -.011 .009 -.035 -.009 -.028 -.028 
Born in English-speaking country .026 .042 .016 .026 .016 .016 
Organisational memberships .033. .024 .037 .035 .024 .040 
Job skil ls .004 .013 .009 .005 .013 .011 
Recruitment 
Contact by party/candidate .147* * .055 .067 .150** .055 .069 
Controls 
Age · .002* .001 .053 .002 .001 .040 
Sex (female) .008 .034 .006 .007 .035 .005 
I 
Constant 1.670 .120 1.743 .134 
2 
.013 .682 .010 .682 r 
Adjusted r2 .008 .008 
Ordinary least squares regression analysi s. ** = p<.01, *= p<.05 (two-tailed) . n=1609. 
Source: 2010 Austra lian Election Study (McAllister et al. 2010). See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
during the previous campaign holds any predictive power. The model therefore says 
little about the distribution of party identification among Australians or the effects of 
specific factors, but it does point to the importance of Australian parties in keeping 
citizens psychologically attached to their preferred party. It also suggests that any 
lifecycle or generational declines in party identification can be overcome by the parties 
themselves. 
The two measures of internet use in this model - time spent online and internet 
skills - have no significant effect on the strength of individuals' party identification 
(although time spent online has a small negative effect, with a relatively small standard 
error). Despite the comparatively low rates of internet use among the strongest party 
identifiers (Table 5.1), there is reason to hypothesise that the internet will have 
positive effects on party identification in the future. A range of studies on the effects of 
cable television news have found that as media outlets have proliferated and begun to 
target specific audience demographics based on ideological dispositions, the news 
audience - and in turn the electorate at large - has become more polarised ideologically 
(Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Morris, 2007, 2005; Stroud, 2010, 2008). The same 
hypothesis applies to online news consumption; in fact, polarisation is arguably more 
likely to follow online news consumption, as the internet enables acute self-selection of 
news consumption (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011; Nie et al., 2010). In Australia, for 
now at least, it appears that the internet has little effect on party identification. 
Moreover, in 2010 only 10 per cent of the population reported using the internet 'a 
good deal' to follow election news, compared with 20 per cent who used newspapers, 
36 per cent tel evision and 17 per cent radio (although online election news 
consumption has grown steadily since 1998) (McAllister et al., 2010a). 
In Australia, there is no direct relationship between strength of party 
identification and political interest (r=.004, p=.869).40 This can likely be attributed to 
Australia's system of compulsory voting, where citizens are required to vote in spite of 
any lack of interest or attachment to a party. Mackerras and McAllister (1999) observe 
that although party identification has been declining in Australia, both in the number of 
Australians who identify with a party and the average strength of the voter-party 
relationship, it remains strong against international benchmarks. Further, "unlike the 
mass publics in many other societies, ordinary voters provide little questioning of their 
40 When added as a predictor to the ordinary least squares regression analysis models 
presented in Table 5.1, political interest has small positive, non-significant effects (b=.014 
and .015, p>.10 respectively) . 
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role" as political institutions (McAllister 2011, p.37). The explanation for high party 
support in Australia, Mackerras and McAllister argue, is that "compulsory voting 
ensures that voters cast a ballot and the act of voting means that they are forced to 
think, however superficially, about the major parties" (1999, p. 229). If this holds, it 
can also explain the (lack of a) relationship between party identification and political 
interest in Australia: by using partisanship as a cue when voting, an apathetic voter 
requires very little interest in politics at all ( c.f. Fiorina 1981 ). By contrast, the 
numbers of Australians going on to actually join the party with which they identify 
remains low. 
5.5 Predicting party membership: the role of internet resources 
Schattschneider observes that "the party is divided into two entities: (1) an 
organized group of insiders who have effective control of the party, and (2) a mass of 
passive 'members' who seem to have very little to say about it" (1942, p.58). This 
chapter has already discussed how the era of the mass party is in decline, with fewer 
citizens looking to join political parties. Despite the declining numbers of party 
members and the passive nature of most memberships, party membership remains an 
important measure of campaign participation. There are two persistently important 
reasons to study party membership, per Schattschneider (1942): to understand who is 
controlling political parties and the various powers assigned to those parties, such as 
preselecting candidates, and to understand who the passive members are, and why 
they choose to join a political party instead of spending their resources on other tasks 
or activities. 
Most studies of political party membership have focused on why parties either 
seek or are ambivalent towards mass membership and the associated problem of 
democratic linkage between parties and citizens. The focus here is why people decide 
to join political parties. Eldersveld (1964, p. 529) argues that "citizens join the party ... 
to,fulfil basic motivational drives and needs": primarily instrumental motivations such 
as career or economic advancement, but also for social interaction and friendship. 
Similarly, Whiteley et al. (1994) note three motivations for party activism: ambitions to 
hold public office, interest in influencing policy outcomes, and as an expression of 
partisanship. More recently, Bruter and Harrison (2009) find that the majority of 
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young party members across Europe join political parties for moral purposes, including 
feeling like a good citizen, helping others and "influencing others"; a smaller number 
join to make social connections, and a small minority have professional motivations, 
namely organisational positions and honours, money, or careers in politics. It is 
possible that opening up new avenues for party affiliation - such as online supporters' 
networks - will, by reducing both the costs potentially the benefits of joining, induce 
new types of members, including 'fans', those who will disseminate information online, 
and others who seek no occupational or social gain from membership (Scarrow, 2013, 
forthcoming). 
Depending on the intent of the member or prospective member, membership of 
Australian parties can take on different forms. Membership can be an expressive act of 
participation, providing the member with a membership number and card, and 
allocating them to a local branch of the party organisation. That branch then usually 
encourages the new member to participate in their activities, including meetings, social 
events and fundraising. Even if the member does not become active, he has at least 
paid a subscription fee and can claim full membership. In cases where membership 
does not require a subscription fee, as with the 'LaborConnect' supporters' network, 
the act is presumably entirely expressive (Australian Labor Party, n.d.; Scarrow, 2013). 
Where membership requires the payment of a subscription fee it also has an 
instrumental component, in that the fee paid is usually higher than the cost to the party 
of administering that membership. Paid memberships comprise both an instrumental 
component (donation) and an expressive component (the act of joining). 
The other instrumental aspect of party membership may also be the most 
important: the right to vote in the preselection of a party's general election candidates 
(Dalton et al., 2011; Gauja, 2010; Jaensch, 2006). Parties in Australia afford their 
members varying levels of influence in candidate preselection, ranging from allowing 
each member to vote individually to members voting for branch delegates who 
subsequently vote in the preselection ballot on behalf of the branch (Gauja, 2012). The 
parties, and within them the different state organisations, also have different 
provisions for members in the most senior organisational positions to veto or override 
preselection decisions made at the electorate level on an ad hoc basis. Branch 
members can therefore exert total or no influence on candidate selection, depending on 
the party, state division and individual circumstance of the preselection. Party 
members typically have higher socioeconomic status, are older, and more commonly 
male than non-members (Cross and Young, 2008; Scarrow, 2007; Verba and Nie, 1972; 
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Whiteley, 2009). With party members participating in the selection of election 
candidates, the effects of socioeconomic bias among those members has the potential to 
skew who stands for and wins election to public office. Again, by reducing the costs of 
party membership, both directly and indirectly, the internet has the potential to reduce 
both socioeconomic and age biases among members (see, for example, Scarrow, 2013). 
Bivariate analysis of World Values Survey data shows that Australian party 
have on average lower socioeconomic status than non-members (Table 5.3).41 Both 
average wages and educational attainment are lower among party members than non-
members, defying the theory based on American data. The difference in average 
incomes is both large and statistically significant. Likewise, party members are less 
likely to be in full-time employment, however when viewed as a proxy for free time, 
this supports the civic voluntarism thesis. Adding to the profile of a typical party 
member is the mean age of 54, compared with the mean age of non-members at 46. 
Party members are older, more likely to be retired or work part-time, have lower 
incomes but higher educational attainment. There is no meaningful gender bias among 
party members, nor are they more likely to speak English at home. 
Given their mean age, it follows that party members display a preference for 
traditional media consumption. Table 5.3 shows that, among a range of different 
options measured by the WVS, online sources of political information are particularly 
unpopular among party members. Party members are instead more likely to get their 
information from television, newspapers and interpersonal discussion. Non-members 
use computers more frequently than party members, however this is again 
unsurprising in light of the different age profiles. Among party members, 15 per cent 
'never' use a computer, compared with 10 per cent of non-members and the population 
respectively (World Values Survey Association, 2013). It appears therefore that the 
internet, and computer use generally, has made few inroads into party membership in 
Australia. According fo data from the 1981-84 wave of the WVS, the mean age of 
Australian party members has increased from 45 years to 54 years in 2010 (World 
Values Survey Association 2009; 2013). The digital era, and with it the introduction of 
more accessible (including online) forms of party membership, seems not to have 
attracted younger members in significant numbers. 
41 World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6 data are used in this section in the place of the 2010 
Australian Election Study. The Australian subset in the WVS dataset comprises 14 77 cases. 
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Table 5.3: Mean characteristics of Australian party members and non-members, 2010 
Non-members 
(n=l330) 
Money 
Household income (deciles) 4.93 (2 .04) 
Time 
Employment status 4.65 {2 .61) 
Frequency of PC use 2.64 {0 .65) 
Civic skills 
Educational attainment 4.81 {2 .96) 
Language spoken at home 0.93 (0.26) 
Information source: daily newspaper 2.71 {1 .33) 
Information source: printed magazines 1.41 (1 .06) 
Information source: TV 3.53 {0.89) 
Information source: radio 3.26 {1 .24) 
Information source: mobile phone 2.02 {1.77) 
Information source: email 2.32 {l.70) 
Information source: internet 2.87 {1 .52) 
Information source: talk with friends or colleagues 3.36 {0.92) 
Engagement 
Interest in politics 2.77 (0.70) 
Controls 
Sex 0.49 (0 .50) 
Age 45 .59 {17.48) 
Independent samples t-test . Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Between-group differen ces: ** p<.01 * p<.05 
Party members 
(n=147) 
4.66 (2.02)* 
4.20 {2 .58)* 
2.48 {0.75)* 
5.13 (2 .90) 
0.92 {0.28 ) 
2.93 {1.23)* 
1.39 {1.06) 
3. 70 {0.71)* 
3.23 {1.29) 
2.00 {1.76) 
2.32 {1.77) 
2.55 {1 .66) * 
3.42 (0 .83) 
3.27 (0.69) 
0.48 (0.50) 
53.69 (18.40)** 
Source: World Values Survey (Australi an subset), Wave 6 (Wave World Values Survey Association 
2013). See Appendix 2 for variab le coding. 
Multivariate regression analysis reveals no socioeconomic bias among party 
members (see Table 5.4). Applying the same model used previously in this study, and 
drawing on the civic voluntarism model of participation (Verba et al., 1995), party 
membership has been modelled as a factor of money (household income), time 
( employment status, reflecting the free, non-work time available to an individual) and 
civic skills ( educational attainment, language spoken at hom e and use of newspapers 
and television as sources of political information, vis a vis the internet), controlling for 
age and sex. The use of the internet as a political information source ( another measure 
of civic skills) and frequency of general personal co mputer (PC) use (a measure of how 
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Table 5.4: Predictors of party membership in Australia, 2010 
Money 
Household income (deciles) 
Time 
Employment status 
Frequency of PC use 
Civic skills 
Educational attainment 
Speak English at home 
Information source : dai ly newspaper 
lnformati9n source : TV 
Information source: internet 
Controls 
Age 
Sex (fema le) 
Constant 
x2 
-2 log likelihood 
Nagelkerke r2 
B 
-.059 
.023 
.085** 
.100 
.019 
.120 
.029 * * 
-.007 
33.410 
837.840 
.051 
Offline reso urce model 
SE 
.050 
.042 
.034 
.380 
.077 
.135 
.007 
.190 
Binary logistic regression analysis. **p<.01 *p<.05 (two-tailed) . n= ... 
Exp(B) 
0.942 
1.023 
1.089 
1.105 
1.019 
1.113 
1.029 
0.994 
B 
-.045 
.029 
-.183 
.095** 
.125 
.020 
.127 
-.010 
.026** 
.001 
35 .056 
836.193 
.054 
All resource model 
SE 
.051 
.043 
.182 
.036 
.381 
.077 
.135 
.081 
.007 
.190 
Source: World Va lues Survey (Au stralian subset), Wave 6 (Wave World Values Survey Association 2013). See Appendix 2 for variable coding. 
Dependent variable : a068 Belong to political parties ('active ' or 'inactive'=l) . 
Exp(B) 
0.956 
1.029 
0.833 
1.100 
1.133 
1.020 
1.120 
0.990 
1.027 
1.001 
much time an individual spends using a computer, from each day to less frequently) 
are included in the second, 'all resource' model. There are no sufficient measures of 
recruitment by political actors in the dataset. 
Both the offline resource and full resource models predict party membership 
quite poorly. Table 5.4 shows the very small degree of difference in model fit after the 
internet measures are added. As in the t-test results in Table 5.3, party members on 
average earn less than non-members but educational attainment has a positive effect 
Age has the only other significant effect on party membership: the picture that emerged 
in Table 5.2 of party members as well-educated retirees is reinforced here. Elsewhere 
in the model, the predictors have no significant effects on membership. Even the use of 
offline and online sources for political information, which could be expected to pick up 
some measure of political interest, have no positive effect In fact the use of internet as 
an information source has a very small (insignificant) effect. What seems to matter for 
party membership in Australia is therefore education and age and not - so far -
internet use. 
The lack of significant results in Table 5.4 is not surprising, as the model only 
predicts offline party membership. Neither the WVS nor any similar study (yet) asks 
respondents about their membership of online party networks. The measures of 
computer and internet use would be expected to have significant positive effects on 
online party membership . Like online party networks, study of them is only beginning, 
and existing data difficult to source. Australia has also been relatively slow to act in 
regard to online memberships; only the ALP has more than a skeleton online presence 
in 2013. The lag between other countries adopting a trend and Australia following suit 
is, as with so many other facets of political behaviour, likely due to compulsory voting 
in Australia. As discussed, there is less incentive for Australian parties to actively 
promote party membership with innovations such as online-exclusive memberships or 
supporter networks, as the parties do not need the sorts of formal recruitment 
networks required by parties in voluntary voting systems. 
As internet use becomes more diffuse, and online communications become the 
norm in intra party organisation, it should be expected that internet resources will 
become as important as, if not superseding, traditional resources as a requisite for 
political party membership. With greater diffusion will also come more data on 
individuals' membership of online party networks, and greater opportunities for 
testing the effects of internet use. For the moment, however, political party 
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membership in Australia is not the domain of the well-resourced - the rich, well-
educated or Australian-born. Rather, party members are likely to have lower incomes 
than the rest of the population, they are more likely to get political information from 
traditional media than the internet, and there are indications that they are less likely to 
speak English at home than non-members. The profile of party members is likewise 
vastly different to the profile of internet users drawn in Chapter 3, where it was shown 
that a socioeconomic digital divide persists, even with internet diffusion at around 85 
per cent of the population. 
5.6 Parties, time and money: new opportunities to campaign 
The two other elements of campaign participation explored here -
contributions of time and money- are more closely related to the civic voluntarism 
model of participation (Verba et al. 199 5) than belonging to a political party. In order 
to donate time (through voluntary work) or money requires an individual to possess 
that resource. Further, an individual will likely have ample quantities of that resource, 
enabling them to donate it to a political party. The relationships unearthed in the 
following analysis should be straightforward: the more money an individual has, 
measured by annual household income, the more likely he should he to donate money 
to a party or candidate. That relationship should hold for donations made both online 
and offline, as there is no online substitute for financial resources. The more free time 
an individual has, the more likely he should be to volunteer his time to a party or 
candidate. Contributing online assistance to a political party generally requires less 
time than offline assistance, but does require that an individual spends at least some 
time online. Therefore, the more time he spends online, the more likely he should be to 
contribute time online . 
There are several significant differences in the mean characteristics of people 
who donate time to a party or candidate, and those who don't (Table 5.5).42 Further, 
there are differences between those who contribute time online and offline. As 
expected, those who report receiving, discussing or distributing political information 
42 2010 Australian Election Study data are analysed throughout the rest of this chapter. 
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Table 5.5: Mean characteristics of types of voluntary campaign workers in Australia, 2010 
No campaign work 
Mon ey 
Household income 
Time 
Time to self 
Time spent on internet 
Employment status 
Civic skills 
Education al attainment 
Born in English-speaking coun try 
Job ski ll s 
Membership of non-political organisations 
Inte rnet skills 
Recruitment 
Contact by parties/candid ates 
Engagem ent 
Interest in politics 
Political knowledge 
Contro ls 
Sex (female) 
Age 
One-way ANOVA. Standard deviations in parenth eses. 
Between-group differences: * * p<.01 * p<.05 . 
(n=1764) 
10.42 (5 .93 ) 
7.19 (7 .00) 
4.53 (2 .53) 
4.14 (2 .52) 
3. 11 (2.13) 
.75 (.44) 
1.32 (1 .50) 
.43 (.71) 
1.37 (1.35) 
1.01 (.29) 
3.16 (.80) 
2.42 (1.78) 
1.54 (.SO) 
57.50 (15 .62) 
Source: 2010 Au strali an Election Study, n=1876 (McAlli st er et al. 2010) 
Worked 'offline' on ly 
(n=295) 
9.27 (5 .68) 
7.85 (7.96) 
4.76 (2.43) 
4.14 (2.52) 
3.16 (2 .05) 
.68 (.47) 
1.51 (1.52) 
.60 (.81) 
1.60 (1 .34) 
1.06 (.40) 
3.27 (.73) 
2.72 (1 .82) 
1.45 (.SO) 
56.87 (17 .69) 
Worked 'online' only Worked 'offline' & 'online' 
(n=95) (n=60) 
12.36 (6.00) 9.69 (6.08) ** 
6.57 (6.89) 6.07 (5 .92)* 
6.35 {1.41) 6.50 (1.72) ** 
4.77 (2.44) 5.17 (2.16)** 
4.13 (2 .27) 4.14 (2.35) ** 
.82 (.39) 
.80 (.40) ** 
1.81 (1.56) 1.78 (1.46) ** 
.55 (.81) .67 (1.13) * 
2.78 (1.15) 2.53 (1 .28)** 
1.13 (.42) 1.03 (.32)** 
03 .16 (.75) 3.30 (.81) 
3.02 {1.75) 3.25 {1.76)** 
1.56 (.SO) 1.55 (.SO) * 
46.09 (19.43) 44.30 (19.59) ** 
online spend much more time online than those who participated either offline or not 
at all. They likewise report possessing greater internet skills: an average of 2. 78 from a 
range offive skills, compared with 1.60 reported by offline participants. Differences 
are also evident in income, educational attainment, employment status, free time, job 
skills, membership of non-political organisations, as well as age and sex. Those who 
assisted a party or candidate online have much higher average annual household 
incomes (between $70,000 and $80,000) than those who volunteered offline assistance 
(between $45,000 and $50,000). Those who did not volunteer at all also have higher 
incomes than offline volunteers. 
Respondents who assisted online were far more commonly born in an English-
speaking country, have higher educational attainment, greater political knowledge, 
more job skills, and less free time than offline volunteers. They are also younger than 
their offline counterparts, and more commonly female. The inverse relationship 
between free time and time spent online stands (r=-.199, p=.000) is observable in this 
table. Online volunteers spend a lot of time online, but do not report having much time 
to spend on non-work and non-family related activities. They are also more likely to 
have jobs in which they organise meetings. Offline volunteers, on the other hand, are 
older, with more free time on their hands and less time spent online. They are, 
accordingly, more likely to also be retired. Those who volunteered both online and 
offline work have the least amount of time to themselves, and have the most time-
consuming employment. They are also the most likely to belong to non-political 
organisations, drawing a profile of particularly active, engaged citizens. Interestingly, 
they also have lower household incomes than online-only volunteers. 
When controlling for all these characteristics, do the related factors of time 
spent online and internet skills still matter? The hypothesis is that they should have a 
positive impact on both online and offline contributions of time to a party or candidate, 
but particularly for online contributions. The results of a binary logistic regression 
analysis in Table 5.6 confirm this hypothesis. Frequency of time spent online and the 
number of accumulated internet skills each increases the odds of participating in online 
½_'Ork by 40 per cent. Moreover, both measures retain their predictor power when the 
traditional resources of free time and civic skills are added to the model. Overall, the 
addition of traditional resources adds very lfttle to the model fit or the partial effects of 
the predictors. Of the traditional civic skills, only education is a positive predictor of 
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Table 5.6: Predictors of contributions of online campaign work in Australia, 2010 
Online resource model All resource model 
B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp(B) Money 
Househo ld income 
-.054 ** 
.015 0.947 
-.079** .016 0.924 Free time 
Frequency of internet use 
.380** .096 1.463 
.355** .097 1.426 Hours to se lf 
-.005 .011 0.995 Civic skills 
Internet skill s 
.327** 
.093 1.387 
.276* * .095 1.318 Educational attainment 
.099* .040 1.104 Born in English-speaking country 
.013 .223 1.013 Organisationa l membersh ips 
.022 .105 1.023 Recruitment 
Contact by party/ca nd idate 
.544* .219 1.723 
.505* .222 1.657 Job ski ll s 
.128* .062 1.137 Controls 
Age 
-.023** 
.006 0.978 
-.027** .006 0.973 Sex (fema le) 
.228 
.160 1.256 
.161 .164 1.175 
Constant 
-4.649 
.745 
-4.327 .800 
x 2 
177.446 191.785 
-2 log like lihood 1091.690 1077.351 
Nagelkerke r 2 
.183 
.197 
Binary logistic regression ana lysis . **p<. 01 * p<.05 (two-tailed). 
Source: 2010 Australian Election Study, n=1876 (McAllister et al. 2010). See Append ix 1 for var iab le coding. 
online work The analysis suggests, then, a profile of online party activists as young, 
well-educated but only starting out their careers ( and earning relatively low incomes), 
regularly online and well versed in the ways of the internet. None of these results are 
particularly surprising, but they do confirm that the internet provides a pathway to 
participation for younger citizens, those who do not possess traditional civic skills and, 
perhaps most importantly, those without a great deal of free time. 
Modelling the effects of offline resources on contributions of offline party work 
reveals the importance of organisational membership and job skills (see Table 5.7). It 
also confirms what was hinted at in Table 5.5: the strong negative effects of coming 
from an English-speaking country. This phenomenon first emerged in Bean's (2012) 
analysis of 2007 AES data, and appears to be explained by what Zappala (1998) 
describes as a clientelist political culture among many ethnic communities in Australia. 
The regression results also reaffirm previous results showing the negative effect of 
annual household income, even after controlling for age and educational attainment. 
Free time has no influence on whether an individual contributes time to a party or 
candidate, which is surprising; surely it is the one resource particularly required to 
participate in this way. The offline resources model fits the data relatively poorly. With 
online resources added to the model, the number of non-political organisational 
memberships retains predictive power, but job skills lose importance and internet 
skills have a significant and positive influence. The addition of offline resources to the 
model adds little to the overall model fit. However, the important result here is that 
internet proficiency is more important than traditional job-related proficiencies in 
predicting contributions of traditional, offline campaign work 
This result represents the study's first substantial piece of evidence that online 
resources can substitute for the traditional resources in the civic voluntarism model of 
participation. The factors predicting offline campaign workers paint a vastly different 
profile to that found by Verba et al. (1995) in the US: an Australian campaign volunteer 
is less likely to come from an English-speaking background, he has below average 
inrnme, and while he does belong to non-political organisations, he is more likely to 
possess internet skills than job-related skills. Although internet skills are currently 
concentrated among the young and well educated, they are more easily attained than 
job skills, which come from having responsibilities in the workplace. Even the 
unemployed, let alone those employed in non-professional occupations or who 
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Table 5.7: Predictors of contributions of offline campaign work in Australia, 2010 
Offline resource model All resource model 
B SE Exp{B) B SE Exp{B) Money 
House hold income 
-.096 ** .013 0.908 
-.099** .013 0.906 Time 
Hours to self 
.014* 
.008 1.014 
.014* .008 1.014 Frequency of internet use 
.014 
.047 1.014 Civic skills 
Educational attainment 
.047 
.033 1.048 
.036 
.033 1.037 Born in Engli sh-s peaking country 
-.678** .149 0.508 
-.680 ** .149 0.506 Organisational memberships 
.291 ** .087 1.338 
.289** .087 1.335 Job ski ll s 
.058 
.049 1.060 
.042 
.050 1.043 Internet skill s 
.084 .074 1.088 Recruitment 
Contact by party/candidate 
.601 ** 
.183 1.824 
.577** .183 1.780 Controls 
Age 
-.025 ** .004 0.975 
-.021 ** .005 0.979 Sex 
-.073 
.128 0.566 
-.064 
.128 0.938 
Constant 
.109 
.412 
-.233 
.476 x 2 
121.733 124.459 
-2 log likeli hood 1625.797 1623.060 Nage lkerke r2 
.103 
.106 
Bin ary logisti c regression analysis. **p<.01 * p<.05 (two-tai led) . 
Source: Austra lian El ection Study 2010, n=1878 (McAllister et al., 2010a) . See Appendix 1 for var iable cod ing. 
elsewhere do not have responsibility for organising meetings or speaking in public, et 
cetera, can become internet proficient. 
Combined, the analyses of contributions of time online and offline to Australian 
parties and candidates in 2010 show the relative importance of online resources over 
traditional offline resources. Among the traditional resources, only educational 
attainment positively predicts online work, while income has a negative effect on the 
propensity to contribute online work Online workers are slightly younger than the 
mean, use the internet much more frequently and possess many more internet 
skillsthan those who worked offline and those who do not contribute any campaign 
work. The profile of offline workers is starkly different. They are less likely to be born 
in Ausb·alia or any other English-speaking country than the population mean, they are 
likely to belong to non-political organisations, are more likely to have been contacted 
by a party or candidate, and - importantly - it seems they are more likely to possess 
internet skills than traditional civic skills. Continuing the profile of online workers, 
offline workers are younger and earn less household income than the population mean. 
It is hypothesised that donors to Australian parties or candidates will have 
above average household incomes, allowing them greater latitude to donate to a 
partisan cause. Of course, the flipside to income is expenditure: a young person with a 
low household income likely also has fewer expenses than, for instance, a mother of 
three teenage children. There will likely be some distribution of donors between the 
wealthy, as measured by income, and the young, with their relatively ample disposable 
incomes.43 The comparison of the mean characteristics between non-donors, offline 
donors and online donors in Table 5.8 begins to draw a profile of distinct types of 
financial donors to political parties or candidates. First, it must be noted that only 
seven respondents to the 2010 AES reported donating online only. Most people who 
donated via the internet also donated in person or by mail. The overall number of 
people who donated via the internet - those who donated online only and those who 
donated both online and offline - are more likely to be in full-time employment than 
both offline donors and non-donors. Offline donors and non-donors display similar 
employment profiles. Donors, both offline and online, are less likely to be born in an 
English-speaking country than non-donors (68 per cent of offline donors and 69 per 
43 The AES data contain no comprehensive measure of personal or household expenditure. The 
measure of fr ee time however does offer a proxy measure of personal commitments, 
including parenting and other factors which positively affect household expenditure. 
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cent of online donors compared with 74 per cent of non-donors). Offline donors (61 
years) are on average older than non-donors (57 years), and much older than the 
average online donor (41 years). 
With regard to resources, offline donors display the most political knowledge, 
but the lowest educational attainment, fewest job skills, internet skills, hours of free 
time and hours spent on the internet. Online donors possess the lowest household 
incomes of the three groups (reflecting their relative youth), but have the highest 
educational attainment, which as has been discussed is characteristic of internet users 
generally. They likewise possess the most internet skills and job skills, spend the most 
time online and have the most amount of free time. Again, these are all characteristics 
associated with youth and internet use. Those who do not donate to any party or 
candidate have the highest household income, relatively low educational attainment, 
and the lowest rate of membership of non-political organisations. They are the least 
attached to political life and civil society. In terms of other resources - job skills, 
internet skills, free time and time spent online - non-donors sit in a middle ground 
between offline donors (with less) and online donors (with more). Donors are 
collectively more likely to be male: 56 per cent of offline donors and 60 per cent of 
online donors. The majority of non-donors are female (53 per cent). 
The multivariate analysis of factors predicting online donations to parties and 
candidates in 2010 replicates the analysis of online campaign work in Table 5.8. The 
results, however, show that online resources, namely frequency of internet use and 
internet skills, have little predictive value on online donations (see Table 5.9) . Only the 
time an individual spends online has a significant and positive effect. Internet skills 
have a strong significant negative effect on on line donations. Moreover this is 
reinforced when offline resources - education, language skills, organisational 
membership, job skills and free time - are added to the model. The frequency of 
internet use is no longer significant, but still positive, while internet skills retain a 
negative (but not significant) effect. The important factors in predicting online 
donation are youth, educational attainment, and, with negative effects, household 
income and being born in an English-speaking country. 
The types of individuals who donated to a party or candidate on line in the lead 
up to the 2010 election therefore confound the civic voluntarism model of political 
participation in several ways (Verba et al., 1995). They are young, with below average 
incomes, above average educational attainment, and commonly born in a non-English 
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Table 5.8: ~ean characteristics of types of campaign donors in Australia, 2010 
Did not Donated 'offline' Donated 'online' Donated 'offline' 
donate only only and 'online' 
(n=1954) (n=42) (n=7) (n=58) 
Money 
Household income 10.39 (5.90) 9.59 (6 .33) 15.00 (7 .98) 7.70 (5 .88) ** 
Time 
Time spent on internet 4.68 (2.50) 4.42 (2.65) 6.67 (0.82) 5.67 (2 .12)* 
Time to se lf 7.22 (7 .12) 7.08 (6 .14) 4.17 (2 .93) 8.00 (7.15) * 
Employment status 4.17 (2.52) 4.15 (2.44) 5. 67 (1.51) 5.67 {1.91) * 
Civic skills 
Educational attainm ent 3.17 (2.14) 3.10 (2.20) 6.33 (0 .82) 3.72 (2 .35) ** 
Born in Engli sh-speaking country 0.74 (0.44) 0.68 (0.47) 0.50 (0 .55) 0.72 (0.45) * * 
. M embership of non-political organisations 0.45 (0.74) 0.65 (0.82) 0.83 (0 .75) 0.66 (1.15) 
Job skill s 1.38 (1.51) 1.27 (1 .30) 2.50 (1 .64) 1.26 (1.43)* 
Intern et skill s 1.49 (1.38) 1.29 (1.30) 3.00 (1.55) 1.92 (1.53)* 
Recruitment 
Contact by parti es/candidates 1.03 (0 .31) 1.07 (0.44) 1.00 (0 .50) 0.99 (0 .30) 
Engagement 
Interest in politics 3. 17 (0 .79) 3. 27 (.70) 3.83 (.41) 3.18 (0.80) 
Political knowledge 2.50 (1.80) 3.16 (1.79) 4.50 (1 .38) 2.11 (1.52) ** 
Controls 
Age 56.75 (16.29) 60.71 (6 .32) 49.50 (17.24) 39.77 (19.37) ** 
Sex (female) 0.53 (0 .50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.33 (0.52) 0.42 (0 .50) 
One-way ANOVA. Standard deviations in parentheses. Betwee n-group differences: **p<.01 * p<.05 (two-tailed) . 
Source : Au stralian Election Study 2010 (McAllist er et al., 2010a). See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
Table 5.9: Predictors of on line donations to parties or candidates in Australia , 2010 
Online resource model All resource model B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp( B) Money 
Household income 
-.107** 
.025 0.899 
-.122** .028 .886 Time 
Hours to self 
.030* .012 1.031 Frequency of internet use 
.171 * 
.105 1.186 
.112 .110 1.119 Civic skills 
Educational attainment 
.100 .073 1.106 Born in English-speaking country 
-1.350* * .317 .259 Organisational memberships 
.142 .176 1.153 Job skills 
.198* .113 1.220 Internet ski ll s 
-.399** .144 0.671 
-.384 * · .151 .681 
· Recruitment 
Contact by party/candidate 
-.435 
.540 0.647 
-.140 .459 .870 Controls 
Age 
-.072** 
.012 0.930 
-.088** .013 .915 Sex 
-.076 
.268 0.927 
-.120 .280 .887 
Constant 1.482 
.888 1.900 1.051 X2 98.641 105.810 
-2 log likelihood 445.987 439.447 
Nagelkerke r2 
.203 
.216 
Binary logistic regression ana lysis . **p<. 01 *p<.05 (two-tailed) . 
Source: Australian Election Study 2010, n=1987 (McAllister et al., 2010a). See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
speaking country. Table 5.7 shows that individuals born in a non-English speaking 
country were more likely to contribute campaign work offline than online; this analysis 
suggests that they are, net of all other factors, also inclined to contribute money online. 
However, more important to the overarching research question in this study is that 
while online donors possess more internet skills and spend more time online than 
offline donors and non-donors, when controlling for other factors these online skills 
and activities do not have positive effects on online donation. While internet skills and 
time are important, they do not alter the existing profile of the types of people who 
engage with politics. The more salient question here moves from the effects of internet 
resources to the larger one of whether, without the internet, the types of people who 
donate online would donate at all. The first step in answering that question is to 
analyse the predictors of offline donation in 2010. 
The model does a poor job of explaining offline donations in Australia, 
suggesting that resources generally do not affect who donates (Table 5.10). Within the 
offline resource-only model, only membership of non-political organisations (positive) 
and being born in an English-speaking country (negative) have significant effects on 
offline donation. None of the other resources - education, job skills or free time - has a 
significant effect; for those three resources, the standard error of the coefficient is 
higher than the regression coefficient itself. The results do suggest the ( non-
significant) negative effects of both education and job skills, however. With online 
resources added to the model, non-political organisational memberships and being 
born in an English speaking country retain their significant effects, in line with Bean's 
(2012) findings from the 2007 AES. 
The internet has varied effects on the contributions of time (as work) and 
moi:iey to Australian political parties and candidates. There is evidence that internet 
skills can substitute for traditional civic skills in predicting offline campaign work. If 
this initial evidence holds, it suggests that the internet does have the potential to break 
down the conventional barriers to entry into ( offline) political participation. It would 
likewise suggest that the conventional frameworks used to explain political 
participation (e.g. Verba et al. 1995; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Verba & Nie 1972) 
should be rethought in light of advances in communications technology. Similarly, the 
profiles of online and offline participants are· markedly different, particularly in terms 
of socioeconomic status and resources. It is tempting, but incautious, to infer that the 
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Table 5.10: Predictors of offline donations to parties or candidates in Australia, 2010 
Offline resource model All resource model 
B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) Money 
Household income 
-.047 
.034 0.954 
-.041 
.034 0.960 Time 
Hours to se lf 
-. 032 
.030 0.969 
-.034 
.031 0.967 Frequency of internet use 
-.103 
.112 0.902 Civic skills 
Educational attainment 
-.020 
.087 0.981 
-.008 .089 0.992 Born in English-speaking country 
-.751 * 
.344 0.472 
-.759* 
.345 0.468 Organisational memberships 
.374* 
.210 1.453 
.400* .213 1.492 Job skills 
-.187 
.137 0.829 
-. 188 
.140 0.829 Internet skills 
.093 
.200 1.097 Recruitment 
Contact by party/candidate 
.561 
.436 1.7 53 
.571 
.438 1.770 Controls 
Age 
.012 
.010 1.012 
.010 .011 1.010 Sex 
-. 179 
.331 0.836 
-.197 
.332 0.821 
Constant 
-3.458 1.070 
-3.086 1.191 xi 
18.860 19.757 
-2 log likelihood 366.256 365.359 
Nagelkerke r2 
.054 
.056 
Binary logistic regression analysis . * *p<.01 *p<.05 (two-tailed). 
Source: Au stralian Election Study 2010, n=1876 (McAllister et al. , 2010a}. See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
internet is providing a pathway to participation for individuals who would otherwise 
not bother to become active. This is particularly acute with regard to online donations, 
as only seven respondents reported donating online, but not offline. However, given 
the high educational profile of online workers and donors, however, it is perhaps more 
reasonable to suggest that they are not necessarily the types of people who would 
never get involved in politics, but that the internet is hastening that involvement. 
Further analysis in following chapters will advance this argument. 
5. 7 Conclusion 
Theory suggests that internet use should be expanding political party 
membership in Australia, as the internet makes it increasingly cheap and fast for 
parties to contact large numbers of existing and prospective members. Online 
organisation of party administration, including joining and renewing subscription fees 
online, should make party membership an easier and therefore more popular form of 
political expression than previously, particularly among the young and well-educated, 
who comprise the most frequent and skilled internet users. Similarly, being able to 
donate money to parties or candidates via the internet, or to distribute campaign 
material online rather than have to volunteer to physically hand ou!_flyers, should 
make it easier for people not typically active in political life to become so. 
Multivariate analyses testing these hypotheses reveal that participants are 
younger, less wealthy, and less likely to be born in an English-speaking country than 
previously expected. Moreover, the importance of traditional resources, particularly 
the kinds of skills attained in the workplace, is mitigated by the attainment of 
equivalent internet skills, such as familiarity with downloading software or sending 
files by email. Internet use shows little effect on political party membership in 
Australian in 2010, but internet skills can substitute for traditional civic skills in 
opening up pathways to volunteering for a political party or candidate, both online and 
offline. 
One notable feature of the Australian analysis is the large proportion of 
individuals from non-English speaking countries who have donated time or money to a 
party or candidate. This was first noted by Bean (2012), although earlier research has 
described a political culture among ethnic communities in Australia wherein members 
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of parliament and ethnic constituents exchange representation for financial and other 
forms of support (Zappala, 1999, 1998). Alternatively, this effect may be a result of 
strong social networks and social capital - and consequently potential for recruitment -
among Australians from a non-English-speaking background (Barreto and Munoz, 
2003; Bevelander and Pendakur, 2009; Fennema and Tillie, 1999, 2001). Members of 
an ethnic diaspora may face policy or political threats which spur them to mobilise 
(Cho et al. 2006). Further, mobilisation levels vary between both between ethnic 
groups and according to how long an immigrant is established in his chosen country 
(Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). The literature generally agrees that, within 
close social networks, 'structured mobilisation' by political actors is easier and more 
effective. Close networks among ethnic diasporas in Australia may be facilitating their 
participation in campaign activity, and particularly in joining and contributing time to 
parties. 
Analysis of Australian donors of time and money to parties and candidates 
reveals dramatic differences to donors in other countries. Verba et al.'s (Verba et al., 
199 5) analysis of American political donors finds thatthe highest income earners 
contributed ten times as much money to political campaigns as the lowest income 
earners ( as a percentage of their family income). Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) find 
that income and education positively affected political donations from 1956 to 1988. 
They also note that "the wealthy are much more likely than the poor to share the social 
circles of the candidates, the fundraisers, and the organized supporters" (Rosenstone 
and Hansen, 1993, p. 134). Verba, Nie and Kim's (1978) comparative study finds that 
campaign participants in each of Austria, India, Japan, the Netherlands and United 
States - all of the countries measured - had a positive socioeconomic bias. Australian 
evidence suggests the opposite: campaign participants do have high educational 
attainment, but below average income. They also tend to be younger than in other 
advanced democracies. The implications so far for Australian democracy are positive: 
citizens beginning to participate earli er in life eases fears of a generational decline in 
participation. 
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Chapter 6 - The internet, social capital and 
the costs and benefits of participation 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the effects of internet use on two informal modes of 
political participation: contacting a government official and working with others to 
solve a problem. The defining characteristic of communal, or cooperative, 
participation is that "when a citizen cooperates with others - either in informal groups 
or informal organisations - it reduces the likelihood that the political activity will be 
aimed at some benefit particularized to him alone" (Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 53). 
Moreover, communal participation, including contacting and working with like others, 
is considered non-conflictual and not directly related to electoral politics (Verba and 
Nie, 1972). However, communal participation incurs a collective action problem, 
reducing the potential benefits of taking part. Collective action describes an activity 
seeking an outcome that will benefit a group of people, not just those people who 
participate in the activity.44 It is therefore predicted that communal participants in 
Australia possess greater amounts of time, money and civic skills th~ n the rest of the 
population. However, one solution to the collective action problem, in which citizens 
are able to 'free ride' on the activity of others, is social capital: the networks and levels 
of social trust present in both individuals and communities. High levels of social trust 
can counter the disparity between those with the resources to participate and those 
without, as low-resourced participants can trust that their participation will be 
reciprocated in some way and at some time. Accordingly, this chapter examines the 
effects of internet use on communal participation, within both civic voluntarism and 
social capital frameworks . 
Based on similar studies in Australia and the United States, it is hypothesised 
th?t Australian citizens are producing social capital through online social interactions 
(Dalton and Kittilson, 2012; Gibson and McAllister, 2009; Kittilson and Dalton, 2011). 
In turn, that social capital should increase the likelihood that they participate in 
44 For instance, community action protesting the closure of a local school might benefit all local 
parents of school-aged children, but only those with the time and other resources to do so 
will actually protest 
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communal activities. Similarly, it is expected that, through the framework of the civic 
voluntarism model of political participation (Verba et al., 1995), the internet has 
lowered the barriers to entry for both contacting and communal work Given the time 
required to write a letter to or meet with a representative, or to work with other people 
to achieve a political goal, it is expected that participation will be restricted to 
individuals with ample free time.45 By reducing the time required to complete tasks 
such as composing and sending a letter or learning about an issue, the internet is 
hypothesised to positively affect the propensity that somebody will contact an official 
to express his views. It is less likely to affect communal participation - either positively 
or negatively - although indirect effects may exist through the accumulation of political 
information and recruitment via online networks. 
This chapter first discusses the civic voluntarism model with respect to 
communal participation, expanding on the expected effects of online and offline 
resources (section 6.2). Section 6.3 looks at the current state of communal 
participation in Australia, with trend data from within Australia and cross sectional 
comparison to a range of other countries. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 examine who engages in 
communal participation in Australia, looking first at political contacting and then 
communal work Descriptive analysis of participants and non-participants is followed 
by multivariate analysis exploring the effects of time spent online and internet 
proficiency. Section 6.6 considers the implications of the findings for Australian 
democracy, while 6. 7 summaries the analysis. 
6.2 Resources, collective action and communal participation 
As with the acts of partisan participation described in Chapter 5, it is expected 
that internet use is changing the profile of individuals who engage in communal acts of 
participation. The context of communal participation is different in some important 
ways, and the effects of internet use and the effectiveness of the civic voluntarism 
model should differ accordingly. The intended outcomes of communal participation 
are usually collective in nature, benefiting more people than just those who participate. 
Further, communal participation may not benefit those who participate at all, but a 
different group entirely. In these cases - where there is little or no direct benefit to the 
individual participant - participants are likely to have ample amounts of time and 
45 This assumption is based on American evidence (namely Verba et al. 1995; Krueger 2002; Best & Krueger 2005) and has not previously been tested in th e Australian context 
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money; the costs are similar as in other acts of participation, but the material rewards 
are lower. Civic skills are expected to be important in predicting contact with a 
government official in person or in writing, and working with like others to express 
views. Emailing a government official should require fewer interpersonal skills and 
less free time, and should be more popular among those with fewer resources. This 
section outlines the predicted effects of internet use on communal participation in 
Australia through the framework of Verba et al.'s (1995) civic voluntarism model. First, 
however, it considers the collective action problem of communal participation. 
Most acts of political participation have a 'collective action' problem, which is 
akin to the problem of'public goods' in economics (Ostrom, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000; 
Tarrow, 2011). Public goods have two characteristics that mean they will generally not 
be efficiently provided in the market First, they are 'non-excludable', meaning that 
once they have been produced, it is not feasible to stop someone from receiving the 
benefits of them. Second, they are 'non-rivalrous', meaning that the consumption by 
one individual does not reduce the amount available for others. Because anyone can 
benefit from the goods once produced, and the same amount of benefit is available to 
all, individuals have an incentive to 'free ride' (Blais, 2000). Instead of working to 
produce a good themselves, they wait for others to do so and reap the rewards without 
cost In the context of petitions or demonstrations, the 'public gooct_is not a physical 
product, but the benefit that would accrue to the group of individuals who desire a 
particular change in legislation or policy. 
For example, a citizen who voted in the division of Fraser, in the Australian 
Capital Territory, at the 2010 Australian federal election had only a one-in-111,541 
chance of determining the outcome of that division's election. The costs of voting -
informing oneself about the candidates, relevant issues, legal requirements, and then 
finally turning out to vote - rarely outweigh the benefits of voting, which are spread 
among many voters. Likewise, the costs of participating in order to achieve benefits to 
be shared among a group of people will not always outweigh the benefits. Blais (2000) 
observes that, upon weighing the relative costs and benefits of joining an 
environmental action group, a rational citizen will invariably abstain from 
joining. Rather, she leaves the work to others: 
"She free rides. She hopes to reap the benefits of the group getting formed and 
contributing to the reduction of po!Jution without paying the cost" (pp.115-6). 
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Given the basic calculation of the costs and benefits of writing to a government official, 
or joining a community group, the resources of money and free time should have a high 
impact on the propensity to participate. Where the costs in terms of time and money 
are lower -when an official can be emailed, rather than having to write and post a letter 
or visiting a member of parliament in her office - the amount of time and money a 
person has should have less influence on whether he participates. 
The flipside to this problem of collective action is when a participant expresses 
views or seeks change to benefit only them. Such appeals to government officials are 
common: letters seeking expedition of immigration processing, assistance dealing with 
bureaucratic agencies, and other individual requests broadly defined as 'casework'. 
While there is evidence that the casework component of a political representative's 
workload is increasing in other countries (Ward and Lusoli, 2005), there is little 
available evidence on how much casework Australian representatives undertake. 
Heitshusen, Young and Wood (2005) suggest that Australian representatives perform 
less casework than their Canadian, British and New Zealand counterparts. Bean 
(1989b) likewise observes that most approaches to representatives concern 
community rather than personal problems: 
"It may be that some societies (Australia among them) see the community 
based grievance as a more legitimate cause for political action than problems of 
a personal nature while others take the opposite view. On the other hand in 
affluent societies people may encounter fewer situations which cause them 
personal difficulties" (1989b, p. 461). 
The AES data used here do not specify whether respondents contacted a government 
official to express their views on a collective problem or an individual ( casework) 
problem. For the purposes of the analysis, the measure of contacting will be treated as 
an act of communal participation (with collective benefit), but the two possible intents 
of contacting will be considered in the discussion. 
It is hypothesised that internet use mediates the effects of time, money and civic 
ski lls on communal participation (Verba et al., 1995).46 Working with like others is the 
most time intensive act considered, and based on previous studies from the United 
46 The fourth factor in the civic voluntarism model, recruitment, is excluded as the only 
available data on recruitment covers the election campaign (i.e. 30 to 40 days) preceding the 
survey only, w hil e the measures of communal participation in the same dataset cover the five years prior to th e survey; the tim e order makes the recruitment measure incapable of 
affecting the participation measu res and its inclusion would invalidate the model. 
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States (see for example Oliver 1984; Verba et al. 1995; Krueger 2002), a lack of free 
time should be a barrier to parbcipation. The closest thing here to an 'online' measure 
of time - frequency of internet use, which reports how often an individual is online - is 
not expected to affect whether an individual works with like others offline. 
The importance of free time on contacting an official should depend on the 
mode of contact: free time should positively affect whether someone writes to or meets 
with a representative in person, as both are relatively time intensive acts, while the 
amount of time spent online should positively affect whether someone emails a 
representative. The more time an individual spends online, the less costly it is for him 
to quickly send off an email to his local member of parliament or to a Minister, for 
example. Ifhe spends little time online, the relative cost of the time it takes to send an 
email is higher. The effects of free time on emailing an official, and of 'online' time on 
writing to or meeting with an official, should be negligible. 
The second predictive factor in the civic voluntarism model is money: a citizen 
must be able to afford the financial costs ofparbcipating, including the income foregone 
by not working, the costs of travelling to a demonstration or the financial contributions 
which often come with voluntary work On the other hand, 'deprivation theory' argues 
that participation can result from an absence of resources; where there is inequality 
between a class who have resources and a class who do not, those ~ thout may be 
impelled to engage in non-electoral forms of political action (Dalton and van Sickle, 
2005). Existing evidence however contends that wealth is generally a positive 
predictor of participation, including non-electoral modes such as communal work (for 
example Dalton & van Sickle 2005; Krueger 2002; Verba et al. 1995). Money, as 
measured by gross annual household income, is expected to positively affect all three 
forms of participation here: expressing views to an official in writing or person, 
emailing an official and working with like others. 
Civic skills, the third predictive factor in the model, should have the largest 
effect on communal participation, particularly for working with like others. An 
individual who forms or joins an activist group likely has some existing political 
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knowledge, confidence speaking in public and experience in attending and possibly 
convening meetings.47 It takes a certain level of knowledge and confidence to engage 
with other people on a communal effort. The civic skills of education, language 
(measured by country of birth) and job skills are therefore expected to have significant 
positive effects on working with like others. For the same reasons, but to a lesser 
degree, they should have positive effects on expressing views to an official in writing or 
in person. Civic skills are not expected to be as important a factor in predicting email 
contact with officials: email allows for anonymity, quick drafting and immediate 
transmission. Moreover, email is the dominant format for mass mail campaigns among 
Australian activist groups, as it allows supporters to 'copy and paste' prewritten text 
into an email and send an unlimited number of emails to representatives and other 
officials (Peatling, 2005). The implications of mass email contacting are discussed in 
Section 6.6. 
The barriers to engaging in communal participation are expected to be broadly 
in line with Verba et al.'s (1995) civic voluntarism model: civic skills should be a 
necessary requirement of contacting officials and working with like others; time should 
be necessary to write to officials or work with others; and anyone participating in 
collective action is likely to have more money than those who do not participate. 
Having shown in Chapter 5 that citizens born in non-English speaking countries have a 
propensity to join political parties and contribute time and money to parties and 
candidates, their engagement in communal participation is of some (secondary) 
interest here. Based on the likely explanations given for their partisan participation -
namely strong social networks and consequently strong recruitment networks - those 
born in non-English speaking countries are expected to be overrepresented in 
communal participation as well. 
6.3 Collective action, social capital and the internet 
Reducing the transaction costs of communal participation is not the only 
solution to the collective action problem. Social capital, variously defined, incorporates 
47 One of the measures of civic skill s - memberships of non-political organisations - is not included in the model to predict working with like others, because of the similarities between it and th e dependent variable. Although they are only correlated at r=.179 (p=.000), they are th eoretically similar enough for autocorrelation to be a potential issue. There is also time order problem: the organisational membership variable measures current 
memberships, while the dependent variable covers the previous five year period. 
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levels of interaction with and trust in other members of a society - can induce an 
individual to seek outcomes for others than themselves. The more embedded a person 
is within his society, the more likely he is to work on behalf of others in that society (for 
example Putnam 2001). With increasing social and geographic mobility, workforce 
participation and use of single-audience communications media - Putnam uses the 
examples of television and video cassette recorders - societies are arguably becoming 
more fragmented (Putnam, 199 Sa; 1995b ). The advent of the internet was initially 
believed to compound the fragmentation of societies and the decline of social capital 
(Huysman and Wulf, 2004; Nie, 2001; Norris, 2001a; Putnam, 2001). However more 
recent studies have found evidence that the internet, particularly interactive Web 2.0 
features, allows for online sociability and can enhance users' levels of social capital 
(Dalton and Kittilson, 2012; Gibson and McAllister, 2009; Kittilson and Dalton, 2011). 
Putnam (2001) defines social capital as encompassing social networks and 
social trust: the former meaning interactions between people, which can give rise to the 
latter, namely, feelings of generalised reciprocity. Social interactions can be 
categorised as producing either 'bonding' or 'bridging' social capital. Bonding social 
capital describes the thick, within-group interactions that citizens share with their 
family, friends, neighbours and peers. Bridging social capital describes those 
interactions that 'build bridges' between the citizen and individuals..and groups who do 
not regularly come into contact. For instance, a citizen volunteering at a migrant 
resource centre or travelling to Africa to work in a local community exhibits bridging 
social capital. The categorisation of the 2007 AES online social interaction measures as 
producing either bonding or bridging social capital in this analysis follows Gibson and 
Mc:Allister's (20 09b) study. 'Bonding social capital' comprises using the internet to 
interact with people the respondent feels close to such as family and friends, and 
people who share the respondent's hobbies, or religious or political beliefs. 'Bridging 
social capital' comprises using the internet to interact with people of different ages, 
ethnic backgrounds and countries to the respondent. 
An expression of social trust - "the belief that others will not deliberately or 
knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is 
possible" - is the most appropriate proxy for measuring social capital (Newton 2 007, p. 
342). In survey research, this is measured by the extent to which a respondent can 
trust other people, or believes society is becoming more or less trustworthy in general. 
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The importance of social trust to democracy is its capacity to "oil the wheels of... 
democratic politics"; the assumption of reciprocity eases collective action problems, 
allowing democratic institutions to function efficiently and economic markets to grow 
(Stolle, 2007, pp. 655-6). Without social capital - particularly the generalised trust in 
other citizens' capacity to think civically and not exclusively selfishly - democratic and 
economic processes which require decision-making for the benefit of not just the 
decision-maker would be fundamentally impaired. The same holds for citizens' 
decision-making processes: without that trust that behaviours will be reciprocated in 
some form, there is no incentive to act any other way but selfishly. In Putnam's words, 
"a society characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a 
distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter. 
lfwe don't have to balance every exchange instantly, we can get a lot more 
accomplished" (2001, p. 21). 
Accordingly, societies with high levels of social trust should experience 
correspondingly high rates of communal participation, with less socioeconomic bias 
among participants than in low social capital societies. Early studies of the internet's 
effects on society feared that internet users would retreat to their bedroom_s, engage 
with ever fewer 'real' people and even withdraw from society, resulting in a general 
depletion of social capital (Nie, 2001; Putnam, 2001). More recent studies have found 
the reverse, however (Best and Krueger, 2006; Pasek et al., 2009; Penard and Poussing, 
2010; Robinson and Martin, 2010; Williams, 2007). Kittilson and Dalton's (2011) study 
of American internet users finds that on line social interactions, for instance on social 
media or email, produce the same levels of social capital as offline social interactions. 
More importantly, the authors (Dalton and Kittilson, 2012) find similar effects among 
Australi an citizens, as do Gibson and McAllister (2009b ). The internettherefore 
appears not to erode social capital, but to have the capacity to produce social capital, in 
terms of social trust and offline involvement in social networks, as traditional, offline 
social interactions. This is an important finding as it applies to communal participation, 
which as discussed has a collective action problem that social capital can help to 
overcome. 
Australians use the internet in a number of ways to create social capital. Data 
from the 2007 AES reveal the distribution of online social interactions among 
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Australian internet users.48 Interacting with friends and family online is easily the most 
popular activity, with 26 per cent of respondents reporting that they do so 'a lot; 11 per 
cent report interacting online with people who share their hobbies, 10 per cent with 
people from other countries and 10 per cent use the internet to become more involved 
with groups to which they already belong. Smaller numbers use the internet to 
interact 'a lot' with people of different ages (6 per cent), different ethnic backgrounds 
(3 per cent), shared religious beliefs (2 per cent) and shared political beliefs (2 per 
cent). Adding respondents who use the internet for these purposes 'some' and 'only a 
little' of the time increases the percentages of respondents to as many as 58 per cent 
(for interacting with family and friends) of the population, but still large numbers of 
internet users in Australia do not engage in any of these interactions online. 
The strongest predictors of engaging in bonding or bridging interactions online 
are educational attainment, youth, and being born in a non-English-speaking country 
(Table 6.1). The models predicting bonding and bridging interactions are quite 
similar: household income has no effect on either bonding or bridging interactions; 
educational attainment has strong positive effects on both; and age as a small negative 
effect on both. Being born in an English-speaking country - a measure of language 
proficiency - has a strong negative effect on both types of interaction, but particularly 
on bonding social capital. Australian citizens with ethnically diverse_backgrounds are 
much more likely to interact with family, friends, neighbours and peers online than 
Australians from English-speaking backgrounds. However, they are also more likely to 
engage in bridging interactions online, net of all other factors. This finding has 
important implications for the diversity of participants in all forms of political 
behaviour in Australia (including campaign participation, as discussed in Chapter 5), 
but particularly for communal participation. 
To explore how levels of bonding and bridging social capital affects communal 
participation in Australia, binary logistic regression models predict whether citizens 
worked to others to a express a view about a government decision or policy between 
48 Social capital measures in the 2007 AES were a feature of that study, and not repeated in 
2010. 
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Table 6.1: Predictors of on line interactions producing social capital among Australian citizens, 2007 
Bonding social capital 
b SE B b 
House hold income 
.002 
.017 
.003 
-.002 
Educational attainment 
.330** .034 
.220 
.151 * * 
Born in English-speaking country 
- .187** .204 
-.019 
-.603** 
Age 
-.049** .005 
-.220 
-.045* * 
Sex (female) 
.400 
.143 
.061 
.209 
Constant 10.070 
.574 11.328 2 
.113 3.082 
.100 
r 
Adjusted r2 
.109 
.096 Ordinary least squares regre ssion analysis.** = p<.01, *= p<.05 (two-tailed) . n=1183 (bonding), 1175 (bridging) . Source: 2007 Au stralian Election Study (Bean et al., 2007) . See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
Bridging social capital 
SE B 
.016 -.004 
.034 
.131 
.208 -.081 
.005 
-.259 
.141 
.041 
.689 
3.054 
2002 and 2007. The results in Table 6.2 show that, in the restricted model containing 
only offline predictive factors, only educational attainment and social trust (a binary 
value measuring the belief that 'people can be trusted most of the time') have 
significant (positive) effects. In the full model, with online resources (time spent online 
only, as internet skills were not measured in 2007) and social interactions included, 
educational attainment and social trust retain their significant effects, while both 
measures ofonline interaction also have positive, but smaller, effects. Notably, online 
social interactions have significant positive effects, while frequency of internet use has 
a significant, strong negative effect. For this form of communal participation, online 
social interactions, and the resulting bonding and bridging social capital, are vastly 
more important than general internet use. 
Using the same model to predict whether Australians contacted a government 
official or representative to express their views between 2002 and 2007 yields similar 
results (Table 6.3). Educational attainment and social trust again have significant 
positive effects, while 'household income has a small negative effect and coming from an 
English-speaking country has a strong positive effect. The latter is not surprising, as 
contacting requires language skills that working with like others generally does not 
With the inclusion of measures of time spent online and online social interactions, only 
online bonding interactions have a significant effect on contacting. Across the model, 
educational attainment, language skills and social trust have the most influence on 
whether an Australian contacts an official or representative. Online social interactions 
have only a small total effect on the behaviour. However, of the resources per the civic 
voluntarism model - time, money and civic skills - only civic skills have significant 
effects. The following section explores the role of resources on communal participation 
in further depth, using the wider range of predictors in the 2010 AES dataset. 
6.4 Civic voluntarism, internet use and ofjline and online 
contacting 
Social capital - including that produced online via virtual social interactions -
has strong positive effects on communal participation in Australia. This section 
examines whether internet resources have similar effects. Verba and Nie's (1972) US 
study found that communal participants have higher incomes, are more educated, more 
likely to be white, and more likely to be from rural or suburban areas than non-
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Table 6.2: Predictors of working with like others to express a view, 2007 
Online resource model All resource model B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) Money 
Household income 
-.003 
.018 0.997 
.003 
.019 1.003 Time 
Frequency of internet use 
-.178** .058 0.837 Employment status 
.037 
.040 1.038 
.086 * 
.042 1.090 Civic skills 
Educational attainment 
.154 ** 
.035 1.167 
.123** .037 1.131 Born in English-speaking country 
.011 
.216 1.011 
.162 .226 1.176 Social capital 
Online bonding 
.144** .031 1.154 Online bridging 
.077* 
.038 1.080 Socia l trust 
.364* 
.155 1.439 
.300* .159 1.351 Controls 
Age 
.006 
.006 1.006 
.018** .006 1.018 Sex 
.090 
.148 1.094 
.003 .153 1.003 
Constant 
-2.518 
.561 
-4.034 
.668 xi 
33.141 85.497 
-2 log likelihood 1151.476 1099.120 Nagelkerke r2 
.046 
.116 Binary logistic regression analysis. **p<.01 * p<.05 (two-tailed) . n=1047 . 
Source: 2007 Au stralian Election Study (Bean et al. 2007). See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
participants. Putnam (2001) observes that writing letters to congressman remained as 
popular among Americans aged 60 and over in 1997-98 as in 1973-7 4, but half as 
common among 18 to 29 year olds. Verba et al. (1995) note that the poorest 
Americans, including those receiving means-tested welfare, are much less likely to 
contact government officials. Based on these findings from a different country, it is 
very loosely expected that 'contactors' in Australia will have higher incomes, higher 
educational attainment and are older than the population average. Online contactors 
are likely to have even higher incomes and educational attainment - characteristic of 
internet users generally - but be closer to the mean population age, as internet uses 
and age are inversely related (Chapter 3). 
In Australia, offline contactors are older, possess more formal education, more 
political knowledge, more job skills and earn a higher income than non-contactors 
(Table 6.4) . They are slightly less likely to be in full time employment, but this is an 
artefact of the high number ofretirees and part-time workers (53 per cent combined) 
among offline contactors rather than a reflection of the median position. Likewise, the 
average amount of free time available to non-contactors and offline contactors reflects 
the high number of older retirees and part-time workers. Offline contactors are the 
more likely to be born in an English-speaking country. There do not appear to be any of 
the 'diaspora effects' observed with regard to partisan participation.jn Chapter 5. 
Interestingly, the data show that offline is still the most popular mode of contacting an 
official, and that most online contactors also expressed their views to an official offline 
as well. There is likely a persistent belief that offline contacting is the most effective 
way of getting your view heard (this is discussed at greater length in section 6.6). 
As anticipated, on line contactors (including those who contact officials both 
online and offline) possess even higher educational qualifications and earn higher 
household income than offline contactors. Accordingly, they also possess more political 
knowledge, job skills and internet skills, and spend more time online. They are, in line 
with internet usage patterns, also younger (52 years) than both offline (58 years) and 
non-contactors (57 years), but not to a remarkable extent. The older age of online 
contactors in these results is slightly surprising: the advent of web-based activist 
groups such as GetUp! in Australia (which is described at more length in Chapter 7) has 
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Table 6.3 : Predictors of contacting an official to express a view, 2007 
Online resource model All resource model 
B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) 
Money 
Household income 
-.046* 
.019 0.955 
-.048* .019 0.953 Time 
Frequency of internet use 
-.026 .059 0.974 Employment status 
.015 
.040 1.015 
.037 .041 1.037 Civic skills 
Educational attainment 
.185** .036 1.204 
.147* * .038 1.159 Born in English-speaking country 
.392* 
.230 1.480 
.459* .236 1.583 Socio/ capital 
Online bonding 
.120** .031 1.127 Online bridging 
.017 .039 1.017 Social trust 
.405** .159 1.499 
.350* .161 1.420 Controls 
Age 
.021 ** .006 1.021 
.029** .006 1.030 Sex 
-.010 
.150 0.990 
-.070 .153 0.932 
Constant 
-2 .999 
.580 
-4 .367 .675 xi 56.601 83.453 
-2 log likelihood 1127.122 1100.270 
Nagelkerke r2 
.077 
.112 Binary logistic regression analysis . **p<. 01 * p<.05 (two-tailed) . n=1073. 
Source: 2007 Austra lian Election Study (Bean et al. 2007) . See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
Table 6.4: Mean characteristics of Australians who did and did not contact a government official to express views, 2010 
Did not Contacted 'offline' Contacted 'online' Contacted 'offline 
contact only only and online' 
(n=1697) (n=206) (n=85) (n=153 ) 
"# 
Mon ey 
Household income 10.04 (5.92) 10.87 (5 .66) 12.24 (5 .66) 11.73 (6 .14)** 
Time 
Time to self 7.44 (7.38) 6.82 (5.79) 6.00 (6 .00) 6.08 (5 .73)** 
Time spent on internet 4.47 (2.55) 4.79 (2.41) 6.15 (1.39) 6.27 (1.31)** 
Employment status 4.16 (2.52) 4.10 (2.43) 4.60 (2.48) 4.61 (2.53) 
Civic skills 
Educational attainm ent 3.01 (2.08) 3.58 (2.17) 3.92 (2 .27 ) 4.19 (2.33)** 
Born in English-speaking cou ntry .73 (.44) .77 (.42) .76 (.43) .76 (.43) 
Membership of non-political organisations .38 (.68) .74 (.89) .80 (.92) .82 (.92) ** 
Job skills 1.20 (1 .45) 1.84 (1.55) 2.03 (1.53) 2.36 (1.50) ** 
Internet skill s 1.35 (1.36) 1.47 (1.28) 2.40 (1.16) 2.60 (1.09) ** 
Engagement 
Interest in politics 3.17 (.79) 3.17 (.84) 3.20 (.68) 3.37 (.73 ) 
Political knowledge 2p (1.79) 3.11 (1.73) 3.19 (1.65) 3.39 (1.57) ** 
Controls 
Sex (female) .53 (.SO) .SO (.50) .53 (.SO) .52 (.50) 
Age 56.81 (16.65) 58.36 (15.46) 52.01 (15.39) 53.67 (16.07)** 
One-way ANOVA. Standard deviations in parentheses. Between-group differences: **p<.01 *p<.05 (two-tailed) . 
Source: 2010 Australian Election Study (McAllister et al., 2010a). See Appendix 1 for variable cod ing. 
been accompanied by stereotypes of young, enthusiastic student online activists (see 
for example Gladwell 2010; Jenkins 2012; Carroll 2012). Examination of contact 
behaviour by age cohort, however, shows a different reality. Figure 6.1 shows the total 
numbers of people contacting officials peaks in middle age, starting from a low base 
among 18 to 24 year olds and declining among those 65 and over. While older 
contactors prefer offline modes of contacting, more Australians aged 55 to 64 than 
those aged 18 to 24 (12 per cent compared with 11 per cent) contacted an official 
online between 2005 and 2010. 
As hypothesised, internet skills and frequency of time spent online both 
positively affect online contacting (Table 6.5). Being born in an English-speaking 
country has a significant negative effect on online contacting, and education a very 
small, non-significant positive effect. Membership of non-political organisations has a 
strong positive effect, which may be a result of direct mobilisation by those 
organisations and indirect mobilisation by others within them. The possession of job 
skills also positively predicts online contacting, even controlling for internet skills. The 
evidence here indicates that online contacting is not an act of whimsy performed by 
citizens who have put little thought into what they are sending, but an act performed 
primarily by highly skilled (in both online and offline competencies) internet users. 
The multivariate analysis also confirms that online contactors are slightly older than 
the population mean, other factors being equal. 
It was hypothesised that online contacting would require fewer civic skills, 
either on line or offline, than offline contacting. The extra pressure facing an offline 
contactor - particularly if contacting an official in person - compared with the ease of 
sending an email should mean that greater civic skills are required. However, the 
results in Table 6.5 indicate that online contactors display very high levels of internet 
skills, job skills and organisational membership. The partial effects from the restricted 
model shown in Table 6.6 suggest that offline contactors possess even more traditional 
civic skills than online contactors. They are more likely to belong to non-political 
organisations, have more job-related skills and higher educational attainment They 
also have lower household incomes than the population mean, which might be 
explained by different motivations for contacting, be they appeals for casework 
assistance or expressions of opinion on a particular issue. 
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Figure 6.1: Contact type by age cohort (excludes non-contactors) 
Source: 2010 Australian Election Study (McAllister et al., 2010a) 
65 plus 
■ Both 
II Online 
Offline 
Results from the full model analysis show that the addition of online resources 
does little to change the effects of offline resources on offline contacting. This is not 
surprising, as the time and particular civic skills required for offline contacting cannot 
be substituted (conceptually, at least) with online equivalents. Moresurprising is the 
strong effect of internet skills on offline contacting, suggesting that many individuals 
who are comfortable using the internet still choose to express their views either in 
writing or in person with a government official. Frequency of time online has no effect 
on offline contacting, throwing up a further possible explanation: regardless of how 
proficient somebody is in using the internet, if they do not spend a good deal of time 
online they will not contact an official over the internet. It may be that, with increased 
time online, the cost of sending an email instead of writing is so small as to be the 
preferable mode of contact. For those who spend less time online, the costs of email -
in terms of time - are relatively high, and combined with the assumed higher payoff of 
writing over emailing an official, the preferred option is to write ( or meet in person) 
instead. 
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Table 6.5: Predictors of contacting a government official via email to express views in Australia, 2010 
Online resource model All resource model B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) Money 
House hold income 
-.006 
.013 0.994 
-.038 ** .015 0.963 Time 
Hours to se lf 
-.011 
.012 0.989 Frequency of internet use 
.183** 
.062 1.201 
.147* .064 1.158 Civic skills 
Educational attainment 
.013 .036 1.013 Born in English-speaking country 
-.331 * .178 0.718 Organisational memberships 
.450** .088 1.568 Job ski ll s 
.177** .054 1.193 Internet ski lls 
.454 ** 
.083 1.574 
.396** .086 1.486 Con trols 
Age 
.024** 
.005 1.025 
.016* * .005 1.016 Sex 
.210 
.142 1.234 
.218 .147 1.244 
Const ant 
-.5.3 32 
.538 
-4 .558 
.590 x 2 
97.380 157.336 
-2 log likelihood 1356.139 1296.183 Nage lkerke r 2 
.095 
.150 Binary logisti c regression analysis . **p<.01 *p<.05 (two-tailed) . n=l740. 
Source: Australian Election Study 2010, n=1987 (McAllister et al. , 2010a). See Appendix 1 for variable codi 
Table 6.6: Predictors of contacting a government official in writing or in person to express views in Australia, 2010 
Money 
Household income 
Time 
Hours to self 
Frequency of internet use 
Civic skills 
Educational attainment 
Born in Engli sh-speaking country 
Organisationa l memberships 
Job skills 
Internet skills 
Controls 
Age 
Sex 
Constant 
x2 
-2 log likelihood 
Nagelkerke r2 
B 
-.041** 
-.007 
.057* 
- .~O 
.457** 
.243** 
.010* 
.127 
-2 .493 
112.125 
1615.665 
.097 
Offline resource model 
SE 
.013 
.010 
.032 
.158 
.082 
.047 
.004 
.128 
.398 
Binary logistic regression analysis . **p<.01 *p<.05 (two-tailed) . n=1755. 
Exp (B) 
0.960 
0.993 
1.058 
1.923 
1.579 
1.275 
1.010 
1.135 
Source: Australian Election Study 2010, n=1987 (McAllister et al., 2010a). See Appendix 1 for coding. 
B 
-.047** 
-.006 
.045 
.034 
.066 
.448** 
.211 ** 
.167** 
.019** 
.149 
124.774 
1603.017 
.108 
All resource model 
SE Exp(B) 
.013 0.954 
.009 0.994 
.047 1.461 
.033 1.035 
.159 0.936 
.083 1.565 
.048 1.235 
.075 1.182 
.005 1.019 
.129 1.160 
The overwhelming message from these analyses of political contacting in 
Australia is that skills matter. Contactors possess more internet skills and job skills 
than the rest of the population, controlling for other factors. Income and education 
differences do not matter, except in the case of offline contacting, where contactors 
earn less than the population mean. Contacting is therefore not the domain of the 
socioeconomic elite, but of those with the skills and consequent confidence to express 
themselves to someone in a position of power. Further, these skills can be learnt by 
anyone, regardless of means. Internet skills are concentrated among the young. Job 
skills are a factor of employment, and to an extent professional employment, but 
organisational membership is open to all. Internet resources do not appear to be 
substituting for traditional resources with regard to online or offline contacting in 
Australia; rather they seem to be complementing each other. An individual possessing 
one job related skill is 24 per cent more likely than someone without to contact an 
official offline; possessing one internet-related skill can add 18 per cent to that 
likelihood ( compared with somebody possessing neither internet or job skills). 
Combined, offline and online resources make a powerful difference to whether an 
individual is likely to contact an official to express his views. 
6.5 Civic voluntarism, internet use and working together 
There is likely to be some crossover between Australians who contact a 
government official to express their views and those who work with others to express 
their views; Australian data have shown that they are related acts (Bean, 1989). At 
their core, the intention of both activiti es is the same: to effect some kind of social or 
political change, either big or small. Free time is the one factor that is expected to 
separate contactors from communal workers. Time to oneself was not a significant 
factor in predicting either online or off1ine contacting; indeed, contactors reported 
having less free time than non-contactors. Among communal workers and non-
workers, communal workers are likely to have more free time, in line with findings 
from the US (Verba et al. 1995; Krueger 2002; Best & Krueger 2005). The importance 
of free time to communal work (especially compared with contacting) is two-fold: work 
takes more time than contacting; and there is no online equivalent for communal work 
in this study, and so the time-saving benefits of the internet are not available to make 
participation easier. 
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The mean characteristics of communal workers and non-workers are listed in 
Table 6. 7. Expectations about the distribution of free time among workers and non-
workers are proven wrong: communal workers in Australia report less free time than 
non-workers (6.1 hours per day compared with 7.4). They also spend more time on the 
internet and possess more internet skills than non-workers, which is likely associated 
with their higher educational attainment and rate of employment. The differences in 
internet skills and usage are smaller between workers and non-workers here than 
between online contactors and non-contactors, however (see Table 6.4). Lacking 
internet skills and time online should not be a barrier to working with others to 
express a shared view. Communal workers are more likely to be born in an English-
speaking country (80 per cent compared with 73 per cent), and are disproportionately 
male (54 per cent of workers are male, compared with 46 per cent of non-workers). In 
all, communal workers appear to be predominantly male, with high socioeconomic 
status, strong language competence, internet proficiency and little free time. 
The results of the multivariate binary logistic analysis presented in Table 6.8 
confirms that communal workers in Australia are more likely than not to be male, 
belong to non-political organisations and have a higher than average educational 
qualification. They also possess more job skills and internet skills than the population 
mean. Two things stand out in this analysis. First, communal workers report having 
less free time than non-workers, net of other factors. This suggests that those who 
work with others to express a view place a particularly high value on that activity, and 
are willing to forgo what free time they have to participate. Second, the amount of time 
spent online has a negative effect on whether somebody engages in communal work, 
whereas possessing internet skills has a positive effect. Much like in the analysis of 
offline contacting, this may be because the less time an individual spends online, the 
more valuable that online time becomes, and he will spend it doing things which are the 
most important to him. and which can only be done online. Political activism then, to 
the extent that he will participate anyway, is therefore better undertaken offline, where 
his time is less valuable. Individuals with similar socioeconomic characteristics and 
interest in politics but who spend more time online are probably more inclined to 
pa·rticipate online than offline. 
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Table 6.7 : Mean cha ra cteristics of types of communal workers in Australia , 2010 
Did not work with 
others 
(n=1662} 
Money 
Household income 10.33 (5.86} 
Time 
Tim e to se lf 7.38 (7.43} 
Time spent on internet 4.70 (2 .52} 
Employment status 4.19 (2 .52) 
Civic skills 
Educational attainment 3.09 (2 .15} 
Born in English-speaking country 
.73 (.44} 
Membership of non-pol iti cal organisations 
.41 (.71) 
Job ski ll s 1.28 (1.47} 
Internet skills 1.48 (1.37} 
Engagement 
Pol it ical know ledge 2.46 (1.79) 
Interest in po litics 3.18 (.80} 
Controls 
Age 56.36 (16 .54} 
Sex (female) 
.54 (.SO) 
Independent samples t-test. Standard devi ations in parentheses. 
Between-group differences: **p<.01 *p<.05 (two-tailed). 
Did work with 
others 
(n=385} 
11.36 (6 .13} 
6.13 (5.49)** 
5.18 (2 .19}* 
4.76 (2.36} 
3.74 (2.14}** 
.80 (.40) 
.73 (.87}** 
1.97 (1.55)** 
1.91 (1.37}** 
2.92 (1.78)** 
3.19 (.77) 
53.47 (15.93)* 
.46 (.SO)* 
Source: 2010 Australian Election Study (McAllister et al ., 2010a). See Appendix 1 for variable codi ng. 
The portrait of communal workers drawn by this analysis is one of middle aged, 
employed, highly skilled men, who are proficient at using the internet but spend less 
than average time online. The obvious assumption, based on the descriptive data in 
Table 6.7 and the characteristics described here, is that communal workers are more 
likely to be employed. They also earn marginally less than the population mean, 
despite having a higher rate of employment. To draw out this profi le, the reported 
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Table 6.8: Predic.tors of working with like others to express views in Australia, 2010 
On line resource model All resource model 
B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp{B) 
Money 
Household income -.048** .012 0.953 -.047** .013 0.954 
Time 
Hours to se lf -.019* .010 0.981 -.019* .010 0.981 
Frequency of internet use -.074* .046 0.928 
Civic skills 
Educational attainment .018 .031 1.018 .013 .031 1.013 
Born in English-speaking·country -.013 .155 0.987 -.010 .156 0.990 
Organis_ational memberships · .378** .078 1.305 .388** .079 1.473 
Job skills .203** .045 1.225 .184** .046 1.202 
Internet skills .182** .072 1.200 
Controls 
Age -.010** .004 0.990 -.006 .005 0.994 
Sex (fema le) -.243* .122 0.784 -.237* .122 0.789 
Constant -.471 .366 -.612 .440 
x 2 84.114 90.613 
-2 log likelihc;iod 1751.610 I 1745.111 
Nagelkerke r2 .071 .076 
Binary logistic regression analysis. **p<.01 *p<.05 (two-tailed). n=1742. 
Source: Australian Election Study 2010, n=1987 (McAllister et al., 2010a). See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
issue salience of communal workers and non-workers is reported in Table 6.9. The 
most outstanding differences between the two groups concern the environment, 
industrial relations and refugees and asylum seekers. Research from the US shows that 
communal activity tends to be concerned with education, the environment and law and 
order issues (Verba et al., 1995). There is an established network of protest and lobby 
groups concerned with these issues, namely environmental activist groups such as 
Greenpeace, trade unions, and human rights organisations such as Amnesty 
International. The existence of organised networks infers the existence of strong 
recruitment networks to mobilise workers as well as contactors. The politics of 
communal workers help to explain their participation, then, but offers few clues as to 
the contradictory effects of internet skills and time online. Instead, the most fitting 
explanation seems to be the respective values placed on time online and offline, and the 
perceived effectiveness of offline participation over online participation. 
Has the internet made contacting a local representative so easy that the 
representative is likely to disregard it? The flipside of lowering the cost of participation 
at the participant's end is that the act also has a lower value in the eyes of the recipient. 
Several Australian politicians have laid forth their views on the merits of constituents' 
letters versus emails; for instance, Malcolm Turnbull has stated that, 
"When you get 1000 emails, all in exactly the same form, it's not exactly as 
persuasive as a bunch of emails people have written to independently express 
themselves" (in Peatling 2005). 
New South Wales state representative Penny Sharpe advises constituents on how to 
lobby effectively: 
"If you want your email read and responded to - original is better. When my 
blackberry filled up this morning with exactly the same email I did two things. I 
set up a rule so the emails are diverted into a folder that I won't look at again. I 
tl1en drafted a standard response for automatic reply. For many MPs they will 
simply delete" (Sharpe, 2011). 
Witl1 such examples of the low value representatives place on (particularly mass, pro 
forma) email contacting, it stands to reason that even citizens who have internet 
experience will still choose to communicate their views offline. For those who spend 
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Table 6.9: Issue salience among communal workers and non-workers, 2010 
Did not work with like others 
(n=1662) 
% believe Mean response 
'extremely (l=extremely; 
important 3= not very) 
Taxation 39 1.69 (.74) 
Education 61 1.46 (.61) 
Unemployment 45 1.73 (.68) 
Environment 40 1.74 (.67) 
Interest rates 44 1.70 (.69) 
Industrial relations 27 1.91 (.65) 
Health and Medicare 76 1.31 (.52) 
Refugees and asylum seekers 36 1.92 (.78) 
Resources tax 31 1.95 (.73) 
Population policy 36 1.90 (.72) 
Independent samples t-test. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Between-group differences: * *p<.01 *p<.05 (two-tailed) . 
Source: Australian Election Study 2010, (McAllister et al., 2010a) . 
Did work with like others 
(n=385) 
% believe Mean response 
'extremely (l=extremely; 
important 3= not very) 
41 1.72 (.80) 
65 1.39 (.57)* 
40 1.75(.68) 
49 1.63 (.69)** 
42 1.76 (.69) 
30 1.88 (.73) 
78 1.29 (.52) 
44 1.79 (.79)** 
34 1.93 (.74) 
33 1.91 (.71) 
little time in front of a computer or smartphone, the relative cost of their time online 
makes offline participation a preferable option. For frequent internet users, the very 
small cost - in terms of time - of online contacting makes it the preferred option. 
The underrepresentation of low income earners among contactors is 
problematic for a healthy democracy: "contacting is, presumably, especially important 
for citizens who receive government benefits, since ensuring the flow to benefits may 
entail the need to deal with officials" (Verba et al., 1995, p. 213). More generally, if the 
correspondence a representative receives comes predominantly from high income 
e;;irners and concerns their views and. interests, the representative will receive a 
skewed portrait of the population: However, communal workers have lower household 
incomes than the population mean, suggesting that they make their voices heard in 
other ways. While the intern~t does not seem to be lowering the barriers of entry to 
political contacting so that more low income earners participate, it may be that low 
income earners are instead choosing other ways to express their views. 
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The pessimism of researchers such as Putnam (2001) regarding the 
generational decline in political participation and the death of a golden age of civic 
mindedness jars with optimistic media accounts of young people flocking to online 
activism (Carroll, 2012; Gladwell, 2010; Jenkins, 2012) . The Australian reality seems to 
lie somewhere in between. Political contactors and communal workers are largely 
middle aged. Although email contactors are younger than the rest of the population on 
average, multivariate analysis shows that they have similar socioeconomic profiles to 
offline contactors and communal workers; young people are just more likely to be 
online than older people. As with the discussion of partisan participation in Chapter 5, 
it appears here that the internet is not changing the profile of political participants; it is 
not atb·acting the under-educated, the low income earning or the unemployed. Rather, 
it seems to be bringing well resourced citizens into the fray of political participation 
earlier than they otherwise would. In the long term, this likely has positive 
consequences for the rate of political participation in Australia. 
An alternate explanation for this finding is that the current period is a 
transitional stage from offline to online participation. Where offline participation has 
been the domain of the middle-aged and retired, online participation is currently the 
domain of internet users (albeit those above the mean age of internet users generally). 
As generations are replaced, the average age of internet users will increase, and the 
average age of online participants may increase accordi ngly. A range of studies argue 
that tl1e relationship between the internet and participation generally has become 
entrenched over time, and with increasing speed since the early 2000s and the advent 
of Web 2.0 fun ctions (Bimber and Copeland, 2013; Boulianne, 2009; Gil de Zuniga et al., 
2010; Gil De Zufi.iga et al., 2009; Xenos and Moy, 2007). If this is both the case at the 
current time and continues going forward, it may be that any effects of the internet in 
bringing younger people into participation will dissipate over time. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined whether internet use - the amount of time an 
individual spends onlin e and the internet related skills he possesses - has any effect on 
whetl1er he engages in communal participation. Theory suggests that tl1at the most 
significant input to political contacting and communal work is opportunity, and 
specifically free time (Verba et al., 1995). It was expected tl1at tl1e internet, witl1 its 
capacity to reduce the time required to participate wo uld have positive effects. It was 
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theorised that the possession of civic skills would be necessary for participation, 
particularly the acts of writing a letter to or meeting with a government official or 
working with like others to express a view. The advantages that accrue to somebody 
with high educational attainment, English language competency and job-related skills 
should make those acts easy to perform. On the contrary, someone who speaks English 
as a second language, did not complete high school and has not written a letter as part 
of their job is likely to view an act of communal participation with trepidation. 
Social capital has the capacity to overcome the collective action problem of 
communal participation (Putnam, 2001). It has been shown in this study and 
elsewhere that online social interactions have a positive effect both on the production 
of social capital and on individuals' propensity to engage in both political contacting 
and working with others to express a view about government policy (Dalton and 
Kittilson, 2012; Gibson and McAllister, 2009; Kittilson and Dalton, 2011). Data from the 
2007 AES show that online social interactions are most common among the young, 
well-educated and those born in non-English-speaking countries. That profile is 
carried through to communal participation, where the bonding and bridging social 
capital produced in online social interactions is also important in predicting an 
individual's participation. Social trust is also a strong predictor of both forms of 
communal participation, suggesting that social capital plays an important role in the 
decision to contact a government official or representative or work with others in · 
Australia. 
Communal participants do not have high socioeconomic status, adding weight 
to the argument that social capital facilitates communal participation in Australia. The 
multivariate analyses of the effects of free time, money, civic skills, time spent online 
and internet skills on communal participation found that time is not an important 
predictor of communal participation in Australia. Rather, participants reported having 
less free time (before their participation in contacting or communal work) than non-
participants. Online contactors - individuals who reported contacting a government 
official via email in the previous five years - spend more time online, possess more job 
and internet skills and belong to more non-political organisations than the rest of the 
. population, all of which are in line with what is known about internet users generally. 
More interestingly, internet skills positively predicted participation in offline 
contacting - via letter or in person - and offline communal work. The argument drawn 
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from these results is that frequent and infrequent internet users value the time they 
spend online differently, with frequent internet users more likely to engage in online 
modes of participation while light users, regardless of their proficiency in using the 
internet, choose to participate offline. Section 6.6 furthered discussion of this 
argument with early evidence that parliamentary representatives value written or 
personal contact over email contact, which is likely to inform participants' choice of 
offline over online modes of participation. The following chapter extends the 
discussion of informal, non-electoral modes of participation in Australia to protest 
activity. 
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Chapter 7 - information and opportunity: 
internet use and protest participation 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues the analysis of informal modes of political participation 
in Australia, focusing on protest. In this context, 'protest participation' encompasses 
two specific activities: first, signing a petition and second, protesting, marching or 
demonstrating ( described herein as 'demonstrating'). Petition signing can take place 
either offline or online (described hereafter as offline petition signing and e-petition 
signing respectively). Offline and e-petition signing are both non-confrontational ways 
of expressing one's views, in contrast to the confrontational nature of demonstrating. 
As with communal participation (Chapter 6), protest participation usually focuses on a 
single issue or goal (Dalton 2008b): participants engage on a sporadic basis, according 
to the salience of different issues and the opportunity to protest with others. Protest 
and communal participation do not differ so much conceptually as historically: Verba 
and Ni e's (1972) study of participation observed communal participation as the more 
common form of informal (i.e. non-electoral or partisan) participation, while a 
subsequent study by Kaase and Marsh (1979b) showed the growing popularity of 
protest politics in advanced democracies. 
The academic literature variously describes the advent of protest participation 
with regard to traditional forms of electoral, partisan and communal participation. 
Norris (2002) refers to 'new repertoires' of political activism fostered by new 
'agencies' or collective organisations, and focused on new 'targets'. Dalton (2008a, 
2008b) describes new citizenship norms as moving away from the focus on civic duty 
to interest in self-expression and engagement with society. He draws on Inglehart's 
(1990) observation of increasingly postmaterialist values in advanced democracies to 
'?rgue, against Putnam (2001), that the concept of citizenship remains strong among 
Americans, at least, and that political engagement is not declining but taking on new, 
previously unmeasured, forms. In Australia, Vromen (2007, 2003a) likewise cites 
evidence that younger generations are as political engaged as their predecessors, but 
display their engagement through forms of protest not traditionally considered 
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'participatory'. Bean (1991) finds a mediated causal relationship between traditional 
(including communal) forms of participation and protest. He also finds evidence of a 
'slippery slope' relationship between low-level protest, including petition signing, and 
more confrontational forms of protest in Australia. 
More recently, research has focussed on emerging opportunities to participate 
online. Some studies, such as Bimber, Stohl and Flanagin's (2012) work on collective 
action in online organisations, focus on the opportunities created by the internet for 
mass, geographically diffuse protest. Carty (2010a, 2010b, 2002) observes the 
connections between grassroots mobilisation in traditional-style protests, for instance 
those against sweatshop labour and the corporate practices of multinational 
companies. Her findings suggest that the internet has allowed for the consolidation and 
expansion of existing protest movements. Similarly, Van Laer (2007; and Van Aelst 
2009; 2010; and Kruikemeier et al. 2013) has studied the relationship between online 
mobilisation and offline protest. He and others find that protestors who also use the 
internet heavily become, by sharing information among a small channel ofprotestors 
and reinforcement of political engagement, 'superactivists' who engage in several forms 
of participation. 
Protest participation here includes offline petition signing, e-petition signing 
and demonstrating. The Australian Election Study (AES) has collected data on both 
forms of petition signing since 2004 and demonstrating since 2001. Multivariate and 
descriptive analyses in this chapter use data from the 2010 AES. The three measures 
are straightforward, asking respondents whether or not they signed a petition or · 
participated in a protest, march or demonstration (respectively) in the previous five 
years. The measures of petition signing are exact offline and online equivalents, 
providing useful data for comparison. There is no online equivalent of demonstrating 
within the data. The World Values Survey (WVS) has collected international 
comparative data on offline petition signing and demonstrating since 1981, including in 
Australia, and they are presented here to situate Australia in a global context. The WVS 
measures are not strictly comparable to the AES measures, but provide an informative 
overview. 
This chapter draws primarily on Verba et al.'s (1995) civic voluntarism model 
of political participation in making assumptions about the effects of internet use on 
protesting in Australia. It also draws on Barnes and Kaase's (1979) Political Action. It 
is expected that petition signing is contingent on opportunity- being emailed a 
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petition, belonging to an organisation, etc - rather than particular resources. Internet 
use, in terms of both skills and time spent online, is expected to positively affect e-
petition signing, while offline petition signing should be positively affected by 
membership of non-political organisations. There seems little reason that other factors 
would have specific effects on petition signing, according to the civic voluntarism 
model. Demonstrating is expected to be a factor of civic skills and opportunity, 
specifically oflanguage proficiency and the social confidence associated with it. The 
time an individual spends online and his membership of non-political organisations are 
likely to increase the opportunities for exposure to information about a protest, and 
consequent recruitment. It is not expected that the internet resources of time spent 
online and internet skills will be able to substitute for traditional resources in 
participating in offline forms of protest. The time spent online should however be more 
important than offline free time in e-petition signing. 
This chapter begins by expanding on these hypotheses in the context of the 
civic voluntarism model of participation (section 7.2). It discusses the competing 
theorised effects of resources and deprivation in mobilising protestors, noting that 
Dalton et al. (2010) argue persuasively that protestors are more often opportunistic 
than aggrieved. Section 7.3 examines the history of protest participation in Australia, 
with emphasis on empirical data from recent years. It also details _the advent of online 
advocacy group GetUp!, which is expected to have had a positive effect on the overall 
rate of petition signing in Australia. Sections 7.4 and 7.5 conduct cross-sectional 
analyses of petition signing and demonstrating in Australia in 2010, using descriptive 
data and binary logistic regression analysis. There is a particular focus on the effects of 
internet resources on the three measures of protest behaviour, including whether they 
supplement traditional resources or can substitute for them in their absence. Section 
7:6 concludes the chapter with a discussion of the implications of the findings for 
democracy in Australia. 
7.2 Internet resources and protest: new opportunities to 
participate 
Protest participation differs from conventional forms of participation in two ey 
ways. First, it tends to occur outside of traditional political structures, instead of within 
them. Protestors typically have low satisfaction with democracy and less trust in 
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government, leading them to go outside of those structures to make their voices heard 
(Kaase and Marsh, 1979a). Second, protestors have traditionally displayed 'relative 
deprivation' rather than high socioeconomic status (Kaase and Marsh, 1979b; Verba 
and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995) . Kaase and Marsh (1979b, p. 186) observed in the 
1970s that "protest is very much the political style of the young and less educated -
men and women equally". More recent research finds that 'new era' protestors, 
including anti-globalism and anti-racism activists, generally have high socioeconomic 
status (Norris, 2002; Norris et al., 2005). By the end of the 20 th century, protestors 
were on average young, well-educated men (Norris, 2002, pp. 201- 2; Volkov, 2012). 
This section explores whether, using the civic voluntarism (Verba et al., 1995) 
framework, Australian protestors match Kaase and Marsh's (1979b) profile. It is 
hypothesised that internet use will decrease the influence of free time and civic skills 
on protest participation. It is further hypothesised that the increasingly popularity of e-
petitions is increasing the overall number ofprotestors in Australia. 
Verba et al. (1995) theorise that free time is a necessary condition of all forms 
of political participation, including protest. Certainly, participation in demonstrations 
requires some time out of an individual's day, making it a less likely prospect for a 
parent of small children, someone caring for an elderly or disabled relative or those 
with work commitments. This effect (alongside value orientations and recruitment) 
may explain the high numbers of students among protestors (Dyke, 1998; McCarthy 
and Zald, 1977; Soule, 1997). However, this study has consistently shown that free time 
does not have the same positive effect in Australia that it does in the American case. 
Where it was theorised that citizens who volunteered their time to campaign for a 
political party would have more free time than the rest of the population, the opposite 
was found (see Chapter 5) . 
Therefore, while the bulk of existing research on the determinants of 
participation suggests that free time is necessary, it is reasonabl e to expect that free 
time will not have the same predictive effect on demonstrating or marching in 
Australia. Petition signing is not expected to be directly affected by whether an 
individual has free time or not, as the act itself is able to be completed quickly.49 
Signing e-petiti ons should require even less time to complete. Rather, e-petition 
signing will likely be a factor of time spent online: time spent online, independent of 
49 It is also assumed here that petition signing does not rely on travel to a particular location; 
anecdotally, petitions are often made available for signing at shopping centres, schoo ls and 
community organisations or centres. 
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internet proficiency or other traditional civic skills, should positively affect whether an 
individual signed an e-petition between 2005 and 2010. Further, the more time a 
person spends online, the more likely it is that they will come across or have an e-
petition sent to them. 
Money is a theorised predictor of conventional forms of political participation; 
previous studies have generally found that demonstrators have less money than the 
rest of a population (Kaase and Marsh, 1979b; Verba et al., 1995). Kaase and Marsh 
(1979b) find that demonstrators in the Netherlands, Britain, United States, Germany 
and Austria are also younger and have less formal education than non-demonstrators, 
suggesting that the lack of money among protestors is as much an effect of lifecycle as 
of entrenched poverty. Certainly, a history of student protests from the 1968 strikes in 
Paris to the 'Arab Spring' uprisings of 2010 and 2011 supports the stereotype of 
student protestors, but there is an empirical basis to the popular image. Therefore, 
there is reason to expect that Australian petition signers and demonstrators will be 
younger than the population mean, but more importantly that they have lower annual 
incomes than the mean. 
Political sociologists have long explored the concept of 'relative deprivation' -
having less of something than others around you - as a pathway to political 
participation (for example Kaase & Marsh 1979a; Walker & Mann l 987; McVeigh & 
Smith 1999; Dalton & van Sickle 2005; Dalton et al. 2010). Deprivation theory runs 
counter to the resource theory espoused by Verba et al. (1995): deprivation theory 
looks at the socioeconomic factors that spur citizens to political action, whereas 
resource theory focuses on what citizens need in order to participate. Comparing the 
effects of deprivation and resources at both national and individual levels, Dalton, van 
Sickle and Weldon find that 
" ... it is certainly true individuals in lower income nations have greater objective 
grievances about their life conditions. Yet, without the resources and skills to 
become politically engaged, these grievances are typically not translated into 
political action ... The general pattern is clear: protest does not occur primarily 
because people have a grievance and are blocked from other forms of action -
people protest because they can" (2010, p. 22). 
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Further to this, internet users - who are the focus here - have higher average 
household incomes than non-users, and the most frequent and highly skilled internet 
users tend to have the highest incomes (see Chapter 3 for details). Accepting Dalton et 
al.'s (2010) evidence that resources are more important than deprivation in mobilising 
protestors, the internet presumably provides high income earners with more 
opportunities to protest. 
The third factor in the civic voluntarism model (Verba et al., 199 5) is civic 
skills, consisting of educational attainment, language competency, job-related skills and 
organisational memberships. They are expected to positively affect whether an 
individual demonstrated between 2005 and 2010. The importance of educational 
attainment to demonstration activity has been well established (Inglehart 1981; Norris 
2002; Dalton 2008b; Dalton et al. 2010). Dalton et al. (2010) find that organisational 
memberships have a positive effect on demonstrating, which they ascribe to the 
increased likelihood of recruitment via those organisations. The other civic 
voluntarism factors of job skills, language competency and the additional internet skills 
have not been tested systematically for their effects on protest participation, but there 
is reason to expect that they will all be positive and strong for the same reasons as 
education. A demonstrator is likely to have well formed opinions on political and civic 
issues and the confidence to participate effectively, both artefacts of possessing civic 
skills. 
Civic skills generally are likely less important to petition signing, an act that 
requires few civic skills. Petition signing is likely to be a factor of organisational 
membership; an individual already belonging to an active group should have more 
opportunities to sign a petition, either online or offline, than non-members. 
Educational attainment should have a positive role for the reasons stated above: a 
highly educated individual is likely to be more confident about their capacity to 
participate and influence political outcomes (see Chapter 2 for details) . Language 
competency ( measured by whether an individual was born in an English-speaking 
country) should increase someone's understanding of a petition and the consequent 
likelihood of signing it. Multivariate analysis revealed that Australians born in a non-
English speaking country are, all else being equal, more likely to participate in partisan 
activity and less likely to participate in communal activity than the rest of the 
population, suggesting mixed effects of recruitment throughout diaspora networks. 
Given the similarities between communal activity and protest activity it is expected that 
Australians born in an English-speaking country will be the most likely to protest. 
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Internet skills have been shown throughout this study to have significant effects 
on whether an individual participates in political activity. Two possible effects of 
internet skills have been theorised: either that they complement traditional civic skills 
in making participation possible, or that they can substitute for traditional civic skills. 
Evidence so far has shown some signs of substitution, where the addition of internet 
skills to a model predicting an offline participatory behaviour has decreased the effects 
of traditional civic skills (see for example Sections 5.5 and 6.4). It is not expected that 
internet skills will have similar effects on participation in demonstrating or petition 
signing. Unlike the contribution of time or money to a political party or writing a letter 
to a government official, demonstrating and petition signing do not require specific 
civic skills; rather those skills increase the propensity for someone to participate. 
Demonstration seems to be a factor of a more general interest in politics, educational 
attainment and distrust of traditional political structures (Dalton et al., 2010). Internet 
skills, and time spent online, are likely to instead affect protest participation by 
bringing citizens into contact with other protestors and making them aware of 
opportunities to protest or sign a petition. Opportunity, according to Dalton et al. 
(2010), is the most important determinant of protest participation. Both measures of 
internet use are likely to capture the effects of increased protest and petition signing 
opportunities available to internet users. 
The civic voluntarism factors of time, money and civic skills are each expected 
to affect whether Australians engaged in demonstration activity or petition signing in 
the five years prior to the 2010 AES. There are competing theories as to whether 
people protest because they have the capacity and the potential (resource theory) or 
because they are deprived of wealth or other resources and want to convey their 
dissatisfaction with government (deprivation theory). On the weight of existing 
evidence, it is expected that Australian demonstrators and petition signers will possess 
more time, money and civic skills than the rest of the population. More time spent 
online is likely to bring internet users into greater contact with information about 
protests and offline petitions, increasing their opportunities to participate. Frequent 
internet users should also have access to more e-petitions than light internet users and 
non-users. Internet skills likewise should increase the likelihood that a citizen comes 
into contact with individual activists and groups online, leading to their recruitment 
into demonstration activity and petition signing. In short, internet resources are not 
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expected to substitute for traditional resources with regard to protest participation, but 
to complement them by creating increased opportunities to participate. 
Protest opportunities available exclusively to internet users are expanding. At 
the extreme end of protest and internet proficiency is 'hacktivism', in which internet 
users deface or disable targets' websites or internal networks as an act of protest. 
Protestors in the 'Arab Spring' uprisings beginning in 2010 used social media 
(particularly via mobile phones) to coordinate initial protest events, mobilise others 
and express their support for the various revolutionary movements (Hussain and 
Howard, 2013). In 2012, an existing, 'offline' charity used the internet to create 
international support for its campaign to find Ugandan guerrilla leader Joseph Kony, 
while major online media outlets replaced their regular content wi th messages 
protesting proposed United States government reforms to intellectual property laws 
(Carro ll, 2012; Dailey, 2012; Fahrenthold, 2012). Since the early 2000s, social media 
has enabled the mass mobilisation of protestors in a range of regimes throughout the 
former Soviet bloc and the Middle East (White and McAllister, 2013) Previously, 
websites such as MoveOn.org provided a base for American citizens to connect with 
like-minded others and campaign for preferred political candidates and causes, while 
Change.org and similar websites allow registered users to create and distribute on line 
petitions. In Australia, GetUp! (and its associated website, GetUp.org.au) originated in 
2005 based on the MoveOn.org model. GetUp! offers free membership, and members 
are able to create and distribute petitions on the GetUp.org.au website. GetUp! also 
initiates and promotes its own campaigns on ideologically progressive causes (Vromen, 
2008b). 
GetUp!'s membership has reached a scale unmatched by many other groups in 
Australian civic life. Figure 7.1 shows the enormous growth in GetUp! members since 
2005 (Mclean, 2013) .. Acknowledging some ongoing debate over the accuracy of these 
figures (see for example Andrews 2011), the total number of individual petition 
signatories in 2010-11 represents a sizable proportion of the Australian population. 
The increase in GetUp! 's membership figures suggests that data from the forthcoming 
2013 AES will show a sharp increase in the number of Australians who have signed a 
petition in the previous five years. However, the steady increase in GetUp! 
memberships since 2005 has not been reflected in the AES data; the increase between 
the 2004 and 2007 studies presumably takes in the rise of GetUp!, but the subsequent 
(small) decline runs counter to the GetUp! figures . Contrary to this study's findings so 
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far, which suggest that the internet is mobilising citizens into political activity earlier in 
their life than would happen otherwise, published membership figures show that 
GetUp! members are older than the national population (Mclean, 2013) . Indeed one 
third (33 per cent) of all members are aged between 50 and 64 years. GetUp! members 
are also disproportionately female: 58 per cent among members compared with 49 per 
cent of the Australian population. The typical GetUp! member is therefore female and 
above average age; not the stereotyped young, male internet activist. 
By contrast, Vromen (2011) notes that GetUp! is operated by young people, and 
that their campaigns often focus on young Australians and youth-related issues. GetUp! 
was established with the view of replicating the processes and aims of social 
movements in mobilising as many citizens as possible, and channelling their 
participation into one (usually government-based) target (Vromen, 2008b). With time, 
however, GetUp's campaigns have become more mainstreamed, focused on election 
campaigns and 'moral urgency' (Vromen and Coleman, 2013, 2011) . The subtle shifts 
in campaign style observed by Vromen and Coleman may either explain, or be 
explained by, the demographic profile of its members. Rather than an outsider-style 
social movement agitating for radical changes, the organisation has instead become a 
part of Australia's political, and even electoral, landscape. It is through an idiosyncratic 
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style of campaigning - using anecdotes and autobiographical story-telling - that GetUp! 
differentiates itself from the political party establishment, rather than through a 
diverse or young membership base (Vromen and Coleman, 2013). Similarly, it may be 
that GetUp! members participated in mainstream politics before commencing their 
membership, explaining why AES data show net increases in petition signing since 
GetUp!'s establishm ent. 
7.3 Petition signing, the internet, resources and gender 
It is hypothesised that, as shown in this study and elsewhere, offline petition 
and e-petition signing will attract different types of individuals (Cantijoch and Gibson, 
2011; Gennaro and Dutton, 2006; Oser et al., 2013). Drawing on Verba et al.'s (1995) 
civic voluntarism model of participation, Table 7.1 explores the mean characteristics of 
Australians who did not sign a petition, signed an offline petition, signed an e-petition 
or signed both between 2005 and 2010. The most notable difference among the four 
groups concerns gender: the AES data here show that 68 per cent of Australians who 
signed both online and offline petitions are female, compared with 47 per cent of those 
who signed e-petitions only. It seems that males sign e-petitions, but not offline 
petitions; they may not be exposed to as many offline petitions. Alongside being 
predominantly male, the younger age, higher employment status, higher household 
incomes and higher educational attainment of e-petition signers are all characteristic of 
internet users generally. 
Likewise, e-petition signers also possess greater internet skills and spend more 
time online than the rest of the population. Counter to this is that e-petition signers are 
the least likely to have been born in an English-speaking country, suggesting that 
language proficiency is not a barrier to signing online petitions. job and internet skills 
and are the least likely to belong to a non-political organisation. They are also the 
oldest group on average, with the least political knowledge, the lowest rate of 
employment (and the most free time) and the lowest household incomes. They are far 
less likely than offline petition signers to be born in an English-speaking country, but 
slightly more likely than exclusively online petition signers (70 compared with 67 per 
cent) . As far as anything can be inferred from this descriptive analysis, it is expected 
that civic skills will be strong determinants of online petition signing, and less strong 
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Table 7.1: Mean characteristics of petition signers and non-signers in Australia, 2010 
Did not Signed 'offline' Signed 'o nline' Signed 'offline' 
sign a petition petition petition and 'online' 
(n=l331) (n=563) (n=63) petition 
(n=257) 
~ 
Money 
Household income 9.34 (5.82) 11.26 (5 .91) 13.41 (5 .60) 12.46 (5 .49)** 
Time 
Time to se lf 7.88 (6.53) 6.30 (6.09) 6.20 (5 .65) 6.31 (10.73)* * 
Time spent on internet 4.12 (2 .60) 4.98 (2.29) 6.66 (0 .96) 6.47 (1.05)** 
Employment status 3.89 (2.56) 4.40 (2.47) 5.03 (2.28) 5.14 (2 .04) ** 
Civic skills 
Educational attainment 2.81 {1.99) 3.49 (2.18) 4.02 (2.24) 4.18 (2 .29)** 
Born in English-speaking country .70 (0.46) .82 (0 .39 ) .67 (0 .47) .80 (0.40) ** 
Membership of non-political organisations .36 (0.66) .58 (0.80) .62 (0.96) .70 (0.90) ** 
Job ski lls 1.10 {1.42) 1.73 (1.53) 1.56 (1.52) 2.02 (1.53)** 
Internet ski lls 1.13 (1.29) 1.67 (1.33) 2.83 {1.10) 2.69 (0.97)** 
Engagement 
Interest in politics 3. 16 (0.79) 3.20 (.77) 3.16 (0.87) 3.24 (0.79) 
Political knowledge 2.28 (1.81) 2.84 {1.73) 2.62 (1 .77 ) 2.98 (1.68) ** 
Controls 
Sex (female) .51 ,(0 .50) .so (0.50) .47 (0 .50) .68 (0.47)** 
Age 59. 73 (16.27) 55.96 (14.48) 42.02 (16 .19) 45 .49 (14.98)** 
One-way ANOVA. Standard deviations in parentheses. Between-group differences: **p<.01 *p<.10. 
Source: 2010 Australian Election Study (McAllist er et al., 2010a) . See Appendix 1 for variab le codin g. 
(but sti ll posi tive) determinants of offline petition signing. In both cases, signers 
possess greater civic skills - both online and offline skills - than non-sign ers. 
The results of a binary logistic regression analysis predicting e-petition signing 
show the importance of civic skills (Table 7.2) . First, the results from the restricted 
model, with internet resources and control measures included only, reveals the strong 
posi tive effects of how much time an individual spends online and how internet 
proficient he is. Age has a small negative effect, even taking into account the relative 
youth of internet users generally, while household income - the measure of money in 
this model - has no effect at all. Testing the full model, with offline resources included, 
sees the effect of money become significant but negative. Frequency of time spent 
online retains a strong positive effect, while free time offline has no effect. The civic 
ski lls measures of educational attainment, organisational memberships and internet 
skills each have strong positive effects; combined, an individual possessing all of these 
skills has a much greate r likelihood of signing an e-petition. 
E-petition signers are less likely to be born in an English-speaking country, 
although the relatio nship is not significant (Table 7.3); language pro fici ency does not 
seem to be a barrier toe-petition signing. Further, the effects of gender are significant: 
a female is twice as likely to sign an e-petition as a male, with all other factors being 
equal. This reverses the univariate analysis in Table 7.3, which showed that e-petition 
signers were predominantly male. The mul tivariate result here indicates that men are 
more likely to be exposed to e-petitions because they are more likely to use the 
internet. However among internet users, and with all other factors held constant, 
females are much more likely to sign a petition. This confirms previous findings on the 
gender skew among petition signers, with the most common explanation being females' 
preference for non-confrontational modes of protest participation (for example Caren 
et al., 2011; Coffe & Bolzendahl, 2010). 
Importantly, the analysis shows that online resources are more important than 
traditional resources in predicting e-petition signing. An individual without formal 
educational qualifications, with no job-related skills and little language proficiency is 
almost as likely to sign an e-petition as somebody with all of those resources, so long as 
he spends time online and has at least some internet-related skills. When government 
208 
Table 7.2: Predictors cit signing an e-petition, 2010 
Online resource model All resource model 
B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) 
Money 
Household income 
-
-.013 .012 0.987 -.029* .013 0.972 
Time 
Frequency of internet use .510** .081 1.666 .482** .082 1.620 
Hours to self .012 .008 1.012 
Civic skills 
Educational attainment .080* .031 1.083 
Born in English-speaking country -.067 .173 0.935 
Organisational memberships .273** .083 1.314 
Job skills .031 .049 1.032 
Internet skills .377** .081 1.458 .356** .074 1.428 
Controls 
Age -.012 ** .005 0.988 -.015** .005 0.985 
Sex .768 * * .129 2.156 .791** .132 2.205 
Constant -5.926 .615 -5.944 .657 
x 2 330.054 357 .271 
-2 log likelihood 1544.498 1517.282 
Nagelkerke r 2 .258 .278 
Binary logistic regression analysis. **p<. 01 *p<.05 (two-tailed) . n=l 725. 
Source: Australian Election Study 2010 (McAllister et al., 2010a). See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
official or parliamentary representative reads an e-petition, she can be confident that 
its signatories do not represent any particular socioeconomic bias. Rather, they 
represent the increasingly diffuse population of internet users in Australia. The effect 
of organisational memberships one-petition signing is likely the result of members' 
increased exposure toe-petitions; belonging to both formal organisational networks as 
well as informal networks with like others should mean an individual is emailed or 
comes across more e-petitions than someone outside of those networks. Likewise 
educational attainment has a small positive effect one-petition signing, probably 
reflecting the increased political knowledge and political efficacy that come with formal 
education (see Chapter 4 for details). 
The adapted civic voluntarism model is tested here to predict offline petition 
signing in Australia (Table 7.3). The restricted model includes only the measures of 
offline resources: free time, money and civic skills. As expected, civic skills have strong 
positive effects on offline petition signing. While being born in an English-speaking 
country negatively predicted e-petition signing, here it increases the likelihood of 
signing an offline petition by 57 per cent. The other civic skills measures of educational 
attainment, organisational memberships and job skills have smaller effects, but all are 
positive and significant. The full model, with online resource measures added, does 
little to change the effects of civic skills. While educational attainment loses some 
predictive power, the language proficiency measure (being born in an English-speaking 
country) becomes more important. Job skills become slightly less important, while 
internet skills - the online alternate to job skills - have a strong, significant effect. 
Indeed in the unrestricted model, internet skills have a stronger effect than job skills on 
offline petition signing. The implication here is that internet skills can substitute for job 
skills as a barrier to signing a petition, but that job skills are still important. An 
individual who possesses job skills, and as such has always been a likely candidate for 
this form of political participation, is more than twice as likely to sign a petition ifhe 
also possesses internet skills. 
The overwhelming result from these analyses predicting e-petition and offline 
petition signing is that civic skills are the largest barrier to entry, but that emerging 
forms of online skills can supplement the effects of offline civic skills. Online resources 
are the most important factors in predicting e-petition signing: signatories to an online 
petition are more likely to be frequent, proficient internet users than to have high 
socioeconomic status or to have job-related skills. Offline resources have almost no 
impact on whether or not somebody signs an online petition. On the contrary, online 
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Table 7.3: Predictors o"f signing an offline petition, 2010 
Offline resource model All resource model 
B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) 
Money 
Household income .. -.021* .010 0.979 -.029* * .010 0.972 
Time 
Frequency of internet use .044 .036 1.045 
Hours to self -.005 .007 0.995 -.005 .007 0.995 
Civic skills 
Educational attainment .077 ** .025 1.080 .047* .025 1.048 
Born in English-speaking country .453 ** .126 1.573 .474* * .127 1.606 
Organisational memberships .225 ** .070 1.253 .218* * .071 1.244 
Job skills .164** .037 1.178 .123** .038 1.131 
Internet skill s .235 ** .057 1.264 
Controls 
Age -.005 .003 0.995 .007* .004 1.007 
Sex .395 ** .098 1.485 .424** .099 1.528 
Constant -1.309 .297 -2.393 .363 
X2 111.924 148.914 
-2 log likelihood 2428.257 2391.268 
Nagelkerke R-squared .079 .104 
Binary logistic regression analysis. * *p<.01 * p<.05 (two-tailed). n=1779. 
Source: Austral ian Election Study 2010 (McAllister et al. , 2010a) . See Appendix 1 for vari able coding. 
resources - specifically internet skills - have a strong positive effect on whether an 
individual signed an offline petition in the previous five years. The combined results of 
these analyses indicate that not only do equivalent online forms of traditional acts of 
participation attract different types of participants - particularly ones without a 
systemic socioeconomic bias - but also that online resources can supplement and even 
substitute for offline resources in enabling offline participation. The findings here add 
further weight to the mounting evidence that internet use is materially changing the 
profile of who participates in political life. The following section replicates the analysis 
of offline petition signing to predict demonstration participation. 
7.4 Demonstrating, protesting and marching: student 
protest ors in the internet age 
The most obvious difference between petition signing and demonstrating is 
that the former is a peaceful, non-confrontational act while the latter is often 
confrontational, with the potential for violence. However, as many studies have 
observed, demonstrating is an increasingly mainstream form of participation, and 
consequently less likely to involve violence or physical confrontation (for example 
Dalton, 2008b; Norris et al., 2005; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). Accordingly, the 
predictors of petition signing and demonstrating are likely to be fairly similar. The 
positive effect of civic skills on petition signing should be replicated here; indeed, civic 
skills should be more important, as physical presence and interaction with other 
protestors are required of demonstrators. Measures of free time and money are a]so 
likely to be prevalent among protestors genera lly, as the weight of evidence now 
indicates that demonstrators are more commonly motivated by opportunity than by 
deprivation (for example Dalton et al. 2010). 
The amount of time somebody spends online should have had a negative effect 
on demonstration activity, as the more time spent in front of a computer, the less time 
is a ailable for offline activities (Nie, 2001; Putnam, 2001). However, the advent of 
smartphone technology means that somebody who uses the internet several times a 
day is not necessarily home- or office-bound. Instead, the more time spent online will 
increase an internet user's potential exposure to online information about offline 
demonstrations. There is no theorised reason why internet skills should have a direct 
effect on demonstration activity, except that, as with time spent online, an internet 
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proficient person is likely to come across demonstration information online that he 
would not have been exposed to without the internet. 
The different mean characteristics of demonstrators and non-demonstrators 
show a slight socioeconomic bias among demonstrators (see Table 7.4). 
Demonstrators are more likely to be employed, be born in an English-speaking country, 
have formal educational qualifications, be a member ofa non-political organisation and 
have job- related skills. They have higher household incomes and more political 
knowledge than non-demonstrators, but significantly less free time. The gender 
distribution is similar between demonstrators and non-demonstrators. 
Demonstrators also spend more time online, have greater internet proficiency, and are 
on average six years younger than non-demonstrators. The overall profile of 
demonstrators is similar to that of frequent internet users: well educated, employed, 
high-income earning, skilled and young. This profile also highlights the evidence 
collected so far in this study pointing to the internet's role in mobilising citizens to 
political action earlier in their life than would happen otherwise. Demonstrators, per 
the descriptive data in Table 7.6, fit the socioeconomic profile of activists described by 
Verba and Nie (1972), Verba et al. (1995) and Dalton et al. (2010), among others. 
However they are younger than participants in more traditional political acts. 
The bias towards youth among demonstrators holds even when other factors 
are held constant (see Table 7.5). Results from a binary logistic regression analysis 
predicting participation in a protest, march or demonstration reveal first the partial 
effects of offline resources in a restricted model. Educational attainment and job-
related skills have significant positive effects on demonstration, while age has a small 
negative effect; no matter the resources possessed, demonstrating is still a young 
person's game. With online resources added to the model, the unrestricted analysis 
reveals the distinctive characteristics of Australian demonstrators. The frequency of 
an individual's internet use has a positive effect on demonstration activity, but internet 
proficiency has no effect at all. This is presumably a result of increased exposure to 
information about demonstrations online, and online contact with other 
demonstrators. However, the internet skills measure should pick up some of that 
effect, so there may be another causal mechanism at play here. The positive effects of 
educational attainment and job skills are diminished very 
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Table 7.4: Mean characteristics of Australians who did and did protest, march or demonstrate 
between 2005 and 2010 
Money 
Household income 
Time 
Time t o se lf 
Time spent on internet 
Employment status 
Civic skills 
Educational atta inment 
Born in English-speaking country 
Membership of non-political organisations 
Job skill s 
Internet ski ll s 
Engagement 
Interest in politics 
Pol iti ca l knowledge 
Controls 
Age 
Sex (fema le) 
Did not demonstrate 
(n=1697) 
10.42 (5 .89 ) 
7.23 (6 .96) 
4.71 (2.50) 
4.24 (2.50) 
3.13 (2.14) 
.74 (0 .44) 
.44 (0 .73) 
1.34 (1.49) 
1.5 1 (1.37) 
3.18 (.79) 
2.49 (1.79) 
56.22 (16 .43) 
.53 (0.50) 
Independent samples t-test. Standard deviation s in parentheses. 
Between-group differences: **p<.01 * p<.05 (two-tail ed). 
Did demonstrate 
(n=206) 
11.95 (5 .92)** 
5.88 (7.97)* 
5.70 (1.96)** 
4.86 (2.39)** 
4.09 (2.22)** 
.81 (0.39)* 
.70 (0.90)** 
2.04 (1.54)** 
2.10 (1.31)** 
3.22 (0.77) 
3.13 (1.76) ** 
50.49 (15.18)* * 
.53 (0.50) 
Source: 2010 Australian Election Study (McAll ister et al., 2010a). See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
slightly by the inclusion of online resources, but retain their significance. 
It is worth noting the significant negative effect of income on participation in 
demonstrations in Australia. The relationship is negative but insignificant in the 
restricted model, but becomes stronger and significant (p=.051) in the full model. The 
inclusion of the measures of internet time and internet skills appears to reduce the 
importance of education and job skills, but increase the importance of household 
income. It may be that the youth bias among frequent internet users combined with 
the increasing amount of information (including on specific demonstrations but also on 
the types of issues that lend themselves to this ki nd of participation) mobilise a 
younger group of demonstrators, almost as educated and skilled but with lower 
household incomes than when measures of internet use are discounted. The small 
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Table 7.5: Predictors of protesting, marching or demonstrating to express views 
Offline resource model All resource model 
B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) 
Money 
Household income ., -.041 ** .016 0.960 -.049** .016 0.952 
Time 
Frequency of internet use .142* .063 1.153 
Hours to self -.042 ** .016 0.959 -.040* .016 0.961 
Civic skills 
Educational attainment .101 * * .039 1.107 .082* .039 1.085 
Born in English-speaking country .092 .206 1.096 .098 .206 1.103 
Organisational memberships .152 .096 1.164 .138 .096 1.148 
Job skil ls .203 ** .057 1.225 .190** .058 1.209 
Internet skills -.007 .088 0.993 
Controls 
Age -.014 * * .005 0.986 -.008 .006 0.992 
Sex -.099 .155 0.906 -.089 .156 0.915 
Constant -1.480 .474 -2.372 .597 
x 2 58.671 65.801 
-2 log likelihood 1209.198 1202.068 
Nagelkerke r 2 .063 .071 
Binary logistic regression analysis. * *p<.01 *p<.05 (two-tailed) . n=1734. 
Source: Australian Election Study 2010 (McAlli ster et al. , 2010a). See Appendix 1 for variable coding. 
decrease in the effect of youth in the full model supports this explanation: heavy 
internet users are generally younger than the rest of the population, so the effects of 
time spent online account for the youth bias among demonstrators evident in Table 7.6. 
Taking internet use into account therefore lessens the effects of education, job skills, 
household income and age. While heavy internet use is currently concentrated among 
the educated and employed, with higher than average household incomes and lower 
than average age, the ongoing diffusion of internet access suggests that this will 
decrease. 
The combined effects of frequent internet use, high educational attainment, 
accrued job skills and relatively low household income paint a picture of demonstrators 
that conflicts with Dalton et al. 's (2010) rejection of the deprivation theory hypothesis. 
To triangulate the analysis of socioeconomic and resource factors, the different policy 
and issue interests, and attitudes towards institutions, of demonstrators and non-
demonstrators are compared. Understanding more of the motivations behind 
demonstration behaviour helps to assess whether deprivation theory does apply in 
Australia, or not. The overarching picture from Table 7.6 is that demonstrators display 
more postmaterialist attitudes than non-demonstrators: they are interested in the 
environment, global warming and refugee policy, while the rest of the population 
demonstrates interest in taxation, economic management, interest rates and health 
policy. However, demonstrators do rate education and industrial relations as 
comparatively important, reflective of the large numbers of university students and 
trade union members among their ranks.50 
There are fewer differences in political confidence between demonstrators and 
non-demonstrators: demonstrators report relative confidence in the legal system, trade 
unions, universities and political system generally, but less confidence in the armed 
forces, police, major companies and banks. Overall, they appear to have more 
confidence in civi l society institutions than non-demonstrators, but less confidence in 
formal institutions. Where differences exist in issue salience and political confidence 
exist, they are likely influenced by the same factors that influence demonstration 
behaviour, namely age, educational attainment and employment. All of these factors 
5° Current university students comprise 1.8 per cent of non-demonstrators and 2 per cent of 
demonstrators in the sample. However, individuals with a bachelor degree or higher 
comprise 22 per cent of non-demonstrators but 42 per cent of demonstrators. The measure 
of demonstration activity spans the five years prior to the survey, taking in both current and 
recently graduated students: the high number of graduates among demonstrators likely 
accounts for at least student demonstrators. Trade union members comprise 20 per cent of 
non-demonstrators but 44 per cent of all demonstrators. 
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Table 7.6: Mean issue salience and political confidence among demonstrators and 
non-demonstrators in Australia 
Issue salience (3 =most, l=least) 
Global warming 
Taxation 
Edu cation 
Unemployment 
Environment 
Interest rates 
Indust ria l relations 
Health and Medicare 
Refugees and asylum seeke rs 
Resources tax 
Population po licy 
Management of the economy 
Political confidence (4=most, l=least) 
Armed forces 
Legal system 
Press 
Television 
Trade unions 
Police 
Federa l government 
Political parties 
Federa l parliament 
Public service 
Major Aust ralian companies 
Banks and financial institutions 
Universities 
Australian political system 
Did not 
demonstrate 
(n=1697) 
1.00 (.75) 
1.33 (.66) 
1.54 (.63) 
1.28 (.68) 
1.25(.69) 
1.32 (.69) 
1.18 (.67) 
1.70 (.49) 
1.09 (.78) 
1.06 (.72) 
1.10 (.72) 
1.67 (.SO) 
2.23 (.64) 
1.36 (.70) 
0.97 (.66) 
1.13 (.66) 
1.06 (.75) 
1.95 (.68) 
1.35 (.70) 
1.21 (.64) 
1.40 (.69) 
1.31 (.72) 
1.55 (.68) 
1.34 (.79) 
1.92 (.64) 
1.50 (.76) 
Independent samples t-test. **p<.01 * p<.05 (two-tailed) . 
Did demonstrate 
(n=206) 
1.36 (.73)** 
1.10 (.70)** 
1.66 (.55)** 
1.18 (.68) 
1.56 (.60)** 
1.01 (.75)** 
1.25 (.72)** 
1.61 (.55)* 
1.19 (.76)* 
0.96 (.76) 
1.06 (.73)* 
1.57 (.57)** 
2.06 (.69)** 
1.47 (.76)* 
1.03 (.72) 
0.99 (.66)* 
1.47 (.71)** 
1.86 (.74)* 
1.37 (.69) 
1.24 (.63) 
1.43 (.64) 
1.55 (.78)** 
1.36 (.70)** 
1.24 (.84) 
1.98 (.67)* 
1.61 (.68) * 
Source: Austra lian Election Study 2010, (McAllister et al., 2010a). See Appendix 1 for va riable coding. 
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are likewise associated with postmaterialism (lnglehart, 2008). Demonstrators in 
Australia therefore match the profile observed by Van Alest and Walgrave (2001) and 
Norris et al. (2005) in Europe: they are not anti-state rebels, but traditional participants 
with an expanded repertoire of acts (Dalton, 2008b; Norris, 2003b). Moreover, they do 
not appear deprived; rather, relative deprivation among Australian demonstrators is 
likely a factor of their age (i.e. university student or early career stage) or occupation 
(i .e. tradespeople, as opposed to highly-skilled professionals) . 
One hypothesis on the relationship between internet use on political 
participation is that the medium has a reinforcing effect (Norris, 2000). There is 
evidence of reinforcement among Australian internet users' political knowledge: the 
politically knowledgeable use the internet more, they learn more about politics onlin e, 
and the gap between the knowledgeable and the unknowledgeable widens (McAllister 
and Gibson, 2011) . A similar effect is evident here. The profile of people who use the 
internet frequently largely matches the profile of people who demonstrate, except with 
regard to income. The combination of high educational attainment and low income 
seems to mobilise demonstrators. An individual with these traits has the ski lls and 
requisite confidence in their own political efficacy to demonstrate, but also presumably 
some sense of relative deprivation - of not earning as much as they could, or of not 
having the socioeconomic opportunities they may have expected - which mobilises 
them to demonstrate. The dual effects of resources and grievance is exacerbated by 
internet use, as shown when measures of internet resources are added to the 
multivariate analysis. Again, the internet does not appear to be mobilising the 
previously disengaged into action, but reinforcing the divide between demonstrators 
and the rest of the population. 
7.5 Internet useJ protest and attitudes towards government 
If protestors in Australia possess both the necessary resources (including 
internet resources) to enable them and the grievances to mobilise them into protest 
activity, does it follow that they are aggrieved with the political system generally? In 
their study of participation across Europe, Farah et al. observe that 
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"Conventional participation was largely a function system responsiveness, or 
support for the rules of the game, while unconventional activity [i.e. protest] 
was attributable to unhappiness with the existing political agenda" (1979, p. 
444). 
In that case, Australian protestors will be marked by their lack of what Easton (1975) 
describes as 'diffuse support': political trust, efficacy and satisfaction with government 
that create legitimacy and consequently stability in a democracy. However, it has been 
confirmed here and elsewhere that protestors increasingly resemble conventional 
participants (Dalton and van Sickle, 2005; Dalton et al., 2010; Norris et al., 2005; Van 
Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). Norris et al. (2005) find that Belgian protestors are not 
'anti-state rebels'; is it also the case that Australian protestors display positive attitudes 
towards government. Moreover, as Donovan et al. (2007) note, by having the 
opportunity to participate, protestors may increase their diffuse support. This section 
examines whether the internet, by facilitating protest behaviour, has positive 
implications for support for Australia's democratic system. 
Analyses of the mean differences between protestors and non-protestors show 
that protestors exhibit greater external political efficacy than non-protestors. Beyond 
efficacy, however, there are almost no differences between the two groups: satisfaction 
with democracy and political trust exist in equal measure among protestors and 11011-
protestors. Table 7.7 shows that offline petition signers, e-petition signers and 
demonstrators are more likely to believe that their vote matters, and who is in power 
f!1atters. This study makes no claims as to the causality of the relationship between 
protesting and efficacy, instead noting considerable evidence that while efficacy can 
lead a citizen to his first act of participation, participating has positive effects on 
efficacy, creating a non-recursive relationship (Finkel, 1987, 1985; Kenski and Stroud, 
2006) . Based on those previous findings, it can be expected that participants in protest 
acts in Australia, while already demonstrating significantly higher levels of political 
efficacy than non-protestors, will become increasingly confident in their ability to have 
a say in political outcomes. 
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Table 7.7: Attitudes towards government among protestors and non-protestors 
Did not sign 
e-petition 
(n=1697) 
-Dissatisfaction with Austra lian democracy 2.23 (0.70) 
Gove rnments look after themse lves 2.07 (0.99) 
Trust politicians generally 3.84 (2.33 ) 
Doesn't make a difference who is in power 2.41 (1.22) 
Doesn't make a different who you vote for 2.11 (0.95) 
Independent sa mpl es t -test . Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Between-group differences: **p<.01 * p<.05 (two-tailed) . 
Signed 
e-petition 
(n=206) 
2.21 (0 .71) 
2.10 (0 .96) 
3.82 (2 .24) 
2.23 (1.00) ** 
1.94 (0.90)* * 
Did not sign 
written petition 
(n=1121) 
2.25 (0.71) 
2.06 (0.98) 
3.76 (2 .36) 
2.49 (1.24) 
2.18 (0.96) 
Source: 2010 Australian El ection Study (McAlli ster et al., 2010a) . See Appendix 1 for variable cod in g. 
Sign written Did not Demonstrated, 
petition demonstrate, protested or 
(n=880) protest or march marched 
(n=1756) (n=210) 
2.19 (0.70)* 2.22 (0.70) 2.24 (0.75) 
2.11 (0.99) 2.07 (0.99) 2.13 (0 .99) 
3.98 (2.29) 3.83 (2.31) 4.02 (2 .37) 
2.22 (1.09)* 2.40 {1.19) 2.22 (1.12)* 
1.95 (0.90) ** 2.11 (0.95) 1.85 (0 .87)** 
Taking previous research and the evidence here that e-petition signers display 
high levels of political efficacy together, it can be argued that the internet has positive 
effects on citizens' attitudes towards government. 51 Table 7.6 shows that, although 
lower than among those who signed written petitions, e-petition signers are 
significantly more likely than non-signers to believe that it matters who is in power, 
and that their vote matters. Moreover, analysis of the attitudes among communal 
participants, per the measures in Chapter 6, finds significant differences in efficacy and 
political trust among Australians who contacted a representative via email (Table 7.8). 
Furthermore, online contactors demonstrate greater efficacy than offline contactors, 
suggesting that any effects of participation on reinforcing efficacy will be most evident 
among online contactors. 
The overarching message of these analyses is that protestors, as well as 
communal workers, in Australia have greater external political efficacy than non-
participants, and that this pattern holds for both online and offline participants. By 
participating, they are likely to increase their political efficacy (Finkel, 1987, 1985; 
Kenski and Stroud, 2006). Accordingly, while the internet has been shown throughout 
this study to have mainly reinforcing effects on individuals' propensity to participate, it 
is also likely to have reinforcing effects on participants' political efficacy. This does not 
seem to hold for political trust or satisfaction with democracy, whis;h are more evenly 
distributed among participants and non-participants. The implications for democracy 
in Australia - and in any advanced democracy where the same relationships between 
internet use, participation and efficacy are evident - appear grim, although isolated 
among efficacy. While internet users' participation will make them increasingly 
efficacious, the gap between individuals who believe they can impact political outcomes 
and those who do not will increase. 
On a more positive note, the online participation of groups not normally 
associated with participation indicates that the internet is having indirect effects on 
efficacy among those traditionally underrepresented groups. The two most obvious 
examples are young people, who are more likely to participate online than offline both 
in Australia and internationally, and citizens from NESB in Australia (Hirzalla and 
Zoonen, 2010; Macnamara, 2012; Schlozman et al., 2012; Vromen, 2008a). By creating 
51 There is no consistent evidence that internet use has a direct effect on attitudes towards 
government, including political efficacy (for example Jennings and Zeitner, 2003; Scheufele 
and Nisbet, 2002; Shah et al., 2002) . 
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Table 7.8: Attitudes towards government among communal workers and non-workers 
Did not contact Contacted Did not contact Contacted Did not work Worked with 
official via emai l official via email official in writing official in writing with others others (n=1616) (n=363) or person or person (n=1582) (n=391) 
(n=17 12) (n=260) 
Dissatisfaction with Austra lian democracy 2.2 1 (0.73) 2.27 (0.73) 2.24 (0.71) 2.22 (0.70) 2.22 (0.70) 2.22 (0 .73) 
Governments look after themse lves 2.07 (0.98 ) 2.14 (1.03) 2.06 (0.98) 2.11 (0.99) 2.07 (0.99) 2.14 (0.98) 
Trust politician s generally 3.79 (2 .3 1) 4.19 (2.39)** 3.76 (2.36) 3.98 (2 .29) 3.84 (2.33) 3.84 (2 .33) 
Doesn't make a difference who is in power 2.41 (1 .19) 2.15 (1.12)** 2.49 (1.24) 2.22 (1.09) * 2.39 (1 .12) 2.23 (1.19) * 
Doesn 't make a different who you vote for 2. 11 (0.95 ) 1.86 (0.87 )** 2.18 (0.96) 1. 95 (0.90) * * 2.11 (0.94) 1.81 (0.87)* * 
Independent samples t -test. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Between-group differences: ** p<. 01 *p<.05 (two-tail ed) . 
Source: 2010 Australian Election Study (McAlli ster et al., 2010a). See Appendix 1 for variable codi ng. 
new opportunities for such groups to participate, the internet will indirectly enhance 
their political efficacy, and increase the likelihood that they will support the democratic 
regime: 
"While no one should assume exact correspondence between efficacy and 
support, it nonetheless is surely true that when a supposedly democratic 
system is seen to have failed in its promise of citizen efficacy it is likely to lose 
the support of its disillusioned members" (Madsen, 1978, p. 868). 
The implications for democratic support among these traditionally disengaged groups -
with the caveat that both young and NESB Australians also participate offline, and were 
not fully disengaged prior to the internet - are therefore substantial. They are 
discussed in further detail in the following chapter. 
7. 6 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed protest behaviour, comprising petition signing and 
demonstrating, in Australia. The two measures provide a broad view of both 
nonconfrontational and confrontational forms of protest. Australians rank hi ghly 
among similarly advanced democracies in both activities, but parti_cularly in petition 
signing. Although rates of overall petition signing have remained relatively stable over 
recent years in Australia, the share of offline and e-petitions has shifted withe-petition 
signing on the rise. This is in part attributed to the advent of online progressive 
advocacy group GetUp! which reports that as many as 578,059 individuals have 
registered their support for their predominantly petition-centred campaigns (Mclean, 
2013). From trend data however, it appears that despite the mass organisation of 
GetUp! overall petition signing is not increasing. Demonstration activity has fallen very 
slightly in recent years; more complete time series data is required to make any 
assertions as to a real trend. 
Petition signers in Australia possessed greater socioeconomic resources and 
civic skills than the rest of the population. E-petition signers in particular are younger 
than the population mean, and significantly less likely to be born in an English-speaking 
country. There is also a notable gender divide among petition signers, with offline 
signatories overwhelmingly female and online signatories predominantly male. 
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Combined with the high rates of non-political organisational memberships among 
offline and e-petition signers, the descriptive evidence suggests that exposure and 
opportunity are key factors in petition signing generally. Similarly, Dalton et al. (2010) 
argue that opportunity is more important than deprivation in the pathway to 
demonstrating, and the descriptive evidence here concurs. Demonstrators on average 
have higher incomes, educational attainment, employment status, job skills, internet 
skills and rates of organisational membership than non-demonstrators. They are not 
relatively deprived, in net terms. They display the skills necessary to participate and 
also belong to the types of recruitment networks that provide opportunities to 
participate. 
Multivariate analyses shed more light on the relative resources and 
deprivations of Australian demonstrators. Internet skills had positive effects on both 
forms of petition signing, but no effect on demonstrating (which is positively affected 
by the frequency of time spent on line). Educational attainment had significant and 
positive effects on each activity; this was also reflected in the high number of bachelor 
and postgraduate degree holders among demonstrators particularly. On the other 
hand, household income has negative partial effects on each activity, suggesting some 
role for relative deprivation in mobilising protestors. Specifically, there may be an 
effect of dissonance between educational attainment and actual earnings which leads to 
protest activity. The addition of internet resources to the respective models predicting 
offline and e-petition signing did little to reduce the effects of traditional civic skills. 
However, individuals born in English-speaking countries were less likely than those 
from non-English-speaking countries to sign online petitions, with other factors 
controlled. This unexpected result warrants further investigation. 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion: internet use, 
participation and democracy 
This study has examined the effects of internet use on Australians' participation 
in a comprehensive range of political activities. Internet use was operationalised as 
two distinct resources similar to time, money and civic skills (Verba et al., 1995): time 
spent online and internet-related skills. Two potential effects of internet use were 
hypothesised: that time spent online and internet skills can substitute for the 
traditional resources of time, money and civic skills in enabling participation, or that 
internet resources can only supplement traditional resources in enabling participation. 
If the first scenario held, it could be deduced that the internet is mobilising previously 
inactive citizens into action. If the second held, the study could be taken as further 
evidence for the argument that the internet - specifically the 'digital divide' between 
users and non-users - reinforces existing gaps between the active and the inactive 
(Norris, 2000) . The findings inform the literature on internet effects on participation, 
socioeconomic quality among participants, and Australia's democratic health. 
Using longitudinal and cross-sectional data from the Australian Election Study, 
the World Values Survey, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics census, the study found limited evidence that the 
internet is mobilising citizens into political participation. While the internet has 
created new opportunities for citizens to participate, and that citizens are participating 
earlier in life than if they did not use the internet, internet use is largely reinforcing the 
socioeconomic divide between participants and non-participants. From the descriptive 
and multivariate analyses of this study, a range of findings emerged. They are 
categorised into four themes, based on existing academic literatures: the advent of 
online participation as a new mode of political activity; the reinforcing effect of internet 
resources on participation; the disaggregation of 'internet use' and the different effects 
o_f internet skills and time spent online; and the evidence of 'Australian exceptionalism' 
among political participants. After discussing each of these, this chapter goes on to 
consider the implications of the findings for democratic politics in Australia, with 
emphasis on how participation can be encouraged and any existing biases among 
participants can be reduced. Next, the limitations of this study are outlined and 
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discussed, and followed by recommendations for future research on the internet and 
political participation. 
8.1 Main findings 
This study asked how internet use is affecting political participation in 
Australia, at a time when internet adoption in Australia has transitioned into a 
mainstream medium characterised by interactivity and portability. Specifically, it 
examined whether internet use complements the effects of traditional resources (time, 
money and civic skills) or replaces them. The results can be grouped into four key 
findings: the rise of online participation; the complementarity of internet and 
traditional resources vis a vis the substitution of traditional resources for internet 
resources; the multidimensionality of internet use; and the notable differences between 
the socioeconomic profile of Australian participants and those in Europe and the United 
States. These findings touch on several different areas of research, including political 
participation, e-participation and e-governance, comparative electoral systems and 
representation. They also complement the existing empirical research on Australian 
political behaviour. 
First, the advent of online forms of participation has increased the overall rate 
of participation in Australia. It has also changed the profile of participants. This is most 
obvious where offline forms of participation now have online equivalents, for example 
offline and e-petition signing, offline and online sharing of partisan information, and 
offline and online contacting of a government official. The different mean 
characteristics of online and offline participants suggests that some Australians who 
participate online might not participate at all in the counterfactual scenario (i.e. if the 
internet did not exist). Numerous studies have found significant differences between 
the profiles of offline and online participants, providing some external validity to these 
findings (Cantijoch and Gibson, 2011; Hirzalla and Zoonen, 2010; Krueger, 2006b, 
2002; Vissers et al., 2012). However, it does not follow that the internet is mobilising 
previously disengaged Australians into action. Instead it appears that, by reducing the 
costs of participating in terms of time and money, the internet is hastening the 
engagement of the types of Australians who would participate at some point in their 
lives anyway. The effect of this is to reinforce the divide between people who 
participate, and those who do not The mean profile of online participants showed that 
226 
they were young, had high educational attainment, possessed relatively low household 
incomes (reflecting both early career status and living either alone or sharing a house), 
did not necessarily possess job-related skills but were internet proficient and spend 
more time online than the rest of the population. Socioeconomically, they fit the profile 
of participants observed by many other researchers (Almond & Verba 1963; Verba & 
Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Schlozman et al. 2012, among others), except that they 
were relatively young, starting out their careers and had not accumulated the high 
incomes and the skills that come with employment experience. 
The lifecycle effects of online participation were evident among e-petition 
signers, for example. E-petition signers were on average 10 years younger than offline 
petition signers (see Table 7.3). They had significantly higher educational attainment, 
higher household incomes, were more likely to be employed, but had fewer job skills 
than offline petition signers. They had less time to themselves, but spent more time 
online and were far more internet proficient than offline signatories. With other 
factors controlled, the multivariate analysis (Table 7.4) showed that household income 
had a significant negative effect one-petition signing while being female had a 
significant positive effect. All else being equal, e-petition signers had above average 
educational attainment, below average household income, were female and younger 
than the population mean. They were also active in non-political organisations. In 
time, it is likely that they will more closely resemble the archetype of participants in 
Participation in America (Verba & Nie 1972) and the other major studies of 
participation. Currently, e-petition signers resemble younger versions of offline 
petition signers: earning less and possessing fewer job skills, but witl1 greater 
educational attainment and online skills, and on the path to becoming highly skilled and 
highly paid. 
The second major finding is that internet use usually complements traditional 
resources in predicting who participates in Australian political life, but there is also 
evidence that internet resources can substitute for traditional ones. Testing a 
restricted and an unrestricted model predicting the different forms of participation 
parsed the effects of traditional resources in the absence of and then alongside online 
resources, and vice versa. The results showed that for the most part internet resources 
complement time, money and civic skills in increasing the propensity that an individual 
will participate. For example, job skills had a significant positive effect on participation 
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in offline volunteering for a party or candidate. When internet resources were added to 
the model, the effect of job skills decreased and became insignificant. The effect of 
internet skills, new to the model, was positive and significant, as well as larger than the 
effect of job skills in both the restricted and unrestricted analyses. Internet skills were 
the more important of the two determinants, and were seemingly able to substitute in 
the absence of job skills. 
For the most part the analyses in this study showed internet resources 
complementing rather than replacing traditional resources. Norris (2000) refers to this 
process as 'a virtuous circle'; it is elsewhere called the 'knowledge gap' (Anduiza et al., 
2009b; Genova and Greenberg, 1979; McAllister and Gibson, 2011; Tichenor et al., 
1970) . Citizens who are already politically engaged consume more media, and 
consequently more political information, than disengaged citizens. In the process, the 
engaged become even more engaged, and the gap between the engaged and disengaged 
widens. Here, citizens with money and civic skills (but not free time, which negatively 
predicts most forms of participation in Australia) were the most frequent internet 
users. An individual with high educational attainment, job skills, language proficiency 
and memberships of non-political organisations was already the most likely to 
participate in elections, work with others to express his views, contact a government 
official, sign a written petition and participate in a demonstration. Ifhe also spent time 
online and is internet proficient - and it is likely that he was - he was more likely to 
participate. Accordingly, the divide in the propensity for him to participate and the 
propensity for someone who does not use the internet to participate widened. Much 
has been made of the capacity for the internet to make political activity more attractive 
by lowering the costs of entry. Currently, the evidence suggests that the internet is 
instead making the active more active and the inactive only slightly, if at all, active. 
In regards to the reinforcing effects of the internet, Australia is no different 
from many other countries. The large majority of research on internet effects has 
looked for signs of mobilisation, but found only reinforcement (Mossberger, 2010). 
Results from the US closely resemble this study: internet use reinforces the 
socioeconomic bias among participants, while lowering their average age (Park, 2013; 
Schlozman et al., 2012; Weber et al., 2003). Some American studies have found 
evidence of limited mobilising effects of internet use, while noting the unfulfilled 
capacity for large scale mobilisation (Morris and Morris, 2013; Tolbert and Mcneal, 
2003). Other evidence from the US isolates the mobilising effects of specific aspects of 
internet use on specific activities, but not consistent or large scale mobilisation (Best & 
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Krueger 2005; Kruikemeier et al. 2013). Elsewhere, reinforcement has been the 
consensus finding: in Australia (Gibson et al., 2008; Vromen, 2007), the UK (Gibson et 
al., 2005) and Belgium (Van Laer, 2007). The general findings of this study concur with 
this literature, suggesting that the findings here are valid and that Australia, despite the 
differences in electoral laws and early adoption of the internet, is experiencing the 
same effects of internet use on political participation as other advanced democracies. 
The study's third major finding was that different aspects of internet use have 
different effects on political participation. Evidence has suggested that internet use 
mobilises citizens into online participation, but not necessarily offline participation 
(Gennaro and Dutton, 2006; Vissers et al., 2012). Accordingly, this study found that 
time spent online and internet skills work together in positively predicting the four 
measures of online participation in the study, namely distributing partisan information 
over the internet, donating to a party or candidate online, contacting a government 
official via email and signing an e-petition. By dividing internet use into two 
components - time and skills - this study found that the internet does affect offline 
participation. Specifically, online resources positively predicted offline partisan work 
(i.e. volunteering time to a party or candidate's campaign), offline petition signing and 
contacting a government official in writing or in person. Spending time online had no 
effect on any of these acts. However, time online did positively pr~dict participation in 
a demonsb·ation or march. 
This reflects the fact that people use the internet in different ways, in different 
places and for different things. How long an individual spends in front of a computer 
screen has different impacts on his day than whether he can use the internet effectively. 
Nie (2001) notes that time is an inelastic commodity: it does not change in supply, no 
matter the demand for it. The internet, with the infinite abundance of information 
available on the World Wide Web, creates new demands on time which means that 
other activities miss out52 Time spent online is time that cannot be spent doing 
something else, including participating in political acts. Accordingly, the time an 
individual spends online has a negative effect on whether he donates money to a party 
or candidate offline and works with others to express a view. By spending more time 
.online, the opportunities to participate offline are reduced, as offline time becomes 
52 This equation is not unique to the internet; Putnam {1995) observes that television 
monopolises the time of its audience. 
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scarce. Moreover, where an online equivalent to an offline activity exists, as with 
offline and online donating, an individual who is online several times a day has more 
online time at hand to use one-participation activities. The relative abundance of 
online and offline time is dictated by how much time someone spends in front of a 
computer (or internet-enabled smartphone), and in turn dictates the opportunities for 
online and offline participation. Where online time is scarce, offline participation is 
more likely, and vice versa. 53 
On the other hand, internet skills appear to accurately measure proficiency, and 
not just an artefact of frequent internet use. For instance, internet skills positively 
affected working with like others to express a view, while time spent online has a 
negative effect (Table 6.5). Skills had an effect distinct from time, and in this case, the 
completely reverse effect. That effect seems to be more closely related to the 
traditional civic skills in Verba et al.'s (1995) model; educational attainment, language 
proficiency, experience with job-related skills and in non-political organisations 
provide individuals with the tools and confidence to be able to participate, and internet 
skills appear to perform a similar role. Internet skills positively predicted whether an 
individual contacted a government official in person or writing between 2005 and 
2010, which is arguably the most skills-intensive act included in this study. Likewise, 
internet skills positively predicted ( offline) voluntary work for a party or candidate, 
which requires the confidence to work alongside other volunteers and at times 
persuade members of the electorate how to vote. Internet skills had no direct effect on 
an individual's abi lity to perform either of those tasks, but constituted an additional 
civic skill which added to the propensity to participate. They also likely reflected an 
individual's overall technological competence. 
The fourth major finding from this study concerns Australia's place alongside 
the other advanced democracies of North America and Europe. For the most part, the 
results of this study resemble what has been found elsewhere: that internet use tends 
to reinforce existing socioeconomic divides between participants and the rest of the 
population, but that it decreases the average age of participants (see for example Best & 
53 The effect of time spent online on an individual's participation in a demonstration or march 
runs counter to this explanation. However, demonstration is a less time intensive activity 
than working with like others, for example, requiring a one-off commitment of time as 
opposed to ongoing activity. This might explain why time spent on line does not negatively 
affect demonstration, but not necessarily why it has a positive effect. Further research 
would be required to provide a comprehensive explanation. 
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Krueger 2005; Cantijoch 2009; Schlozman et al. 2012; Park 2013). It also reflects 
previous findings from Australia (Gibson et al., 2008). However, two factors central to 
theories on who participates in politics, and foremost in the civic voluntarism model 
(Verba et al., 1995), have the opposite effects in Australia to the United States. 
First, participants in Australia reported having less free time than the rest of the 
population, even before accounting for political activity. They had on average more 
intensive work and family commitments than non-participants. The theoretical 
justification for including free time in the model is sound, and has an empirical basis 
(Verba et al., 1995). It is reasonable that free time would negatively predict online 
participation, as one feature of the internet is its capacity to make tasks such as political 
participation less constrained by time and space (Quintelier and Vissers, 2008; Shah et 
al., 2002). A parent who is also employed full time should find it easier to sign an e-
petition than an offline petition, for instance. However, offline participants also 
reported having less free time than other Australians. This is difficult to account for. It 
may have been an artefact of a slightly younger pool of participants than is reported in 
American studies, or perhaps a feature of Australia's political culture that participation 
is viewed as something performed outside of work hours, rather than in lieu of work. 
This finding warrants further research. 
The second area in which Australian participants differed from the other 
advanced democracies is in language proficiency. Depending on the act, language 
proficiency - measured by whether an individual was born in an English-speaking 
country or not (a binary condition) - had a varied effect, moving from strongly positive 
to strongly negative and back. Being born in an English speaking country had a 
negative effect on the majority of acts studied: party membership, online partisan work 
(distributing partisan information via the internet), offline partisan work (volunteering 
for a party or candidate), online donations to a party or candidate, offline donations to a 
party or candidate and signing an e-petition ( although the last effect was large, but not 
statistically significant at p<.05). 
Being born in an English-speaking country positively affected electoral 
enrolment and voter turnout ( aggregated at the federal electoral division level), 
working with like others, offline petition signing and demonstrating. It could be argued 
that language proficiency is particularly important to these acts; voting and petition 
signing require at least some language comprehension, while demonstrating and 
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communal work require interpersonal skills including language (unless the group 
consists entirely of non-English speakers). However, the same can be said of the acts 
negatively predicted by language proficiency. Party membership and online and offline 
partisan work particularly require some language comprehension. 
The alternate explanation for the varied effects of being born in an English-
speaking country is that the measure was not only accounting for the proxy effects of 
language proficiency but also demographic characteristics of non-Anglo immigrants. 
Specifically, it might be the case that the effects found here reflected strong recruitment 
networks among Australia's ethnic diasporas. There is an extensive literature on ethnic 
politics, group consciousness and mobilisation, social capital and political participation 
that cannot be covered adequately here, but it stands to reason that Australian citizens 
who identify closely with any particular group, ethnic or otherwise, have come across 
more opportunities to participate than individuals outside of a group. Moreover, there 
is at least anecdotal evidence oflarge numbers of immigrant and non-English speaking 
Australians being recruited to join the major political parties (Dryzek, 2002; Zappala, 
1998). Including the negative effects of being born in an English-speaking country on 
the partisan acts of party membership, online and offline partisan work and online and 
offline donations, the weight of evidence suggested that ethnic diasporas in Australia 
constitute strong networks for political recruitment. However, much more research 
would shed genuine light on the causal mechanisms at work; little can be inferred from 
the evidence presented here. 
8.2 Implications for democracy in Australia and 
internationally 
Australia's history of compulsory voting and electoral experimentation lends 
itself to modest claims of 'Australian exceptionalism' regarding political behaviour 
(Bryce, 1921; Sawer, 2001). Declining participation rates are not viewed as crises, as in 
the United States and Europe. Indeed the 'crisis of democracy' thesis espoused by 
Lijphart (1997), Pharr, Putnam and Dalton (2000) and Putnam (2001) has found little 
sympathy in Australia (Gibson et al., 2008). Australia appears in good democratic 
health (McAllister, 2011; Norris, 2001b). However, beneath the surface are some signs 
of malaise within Australian democracy, from declining voter turnout as a proportion 
of the voting age population and an increasing number of Australians not enrolled to 
vote to recent (likely cycl ical) falls in satisfaction with democracy and trust in 
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government (Australian Electoral Commission, 2012a; McAllister et al., 2010a). While 
the trend data in this study showed no systematic declines in participation rates in 
Australia, the biases among participants - even among internet users - constitutes 
some cause for concern. 
Who participates is at the heart of the democratic system of government. Dahl 
(2000) contends that 'effective participation' is one of five crucial criteria for any 
democratic process: "before a policy is adopted by the association, all the members 
must have equal and effective opportunities for making their views known to the other 
members as to what policy should be" (p.3 7). All members of a democratic system 
must equal opportunities to vote, and "within reasonable limits as to time ... equal and 
effective opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative policies and their 
likely consequences" (p.37). It is perhaps easy to declare that Australia has strongly 
democratic political institutions, which with the addition of compulsory voting 
facilitate very high levels of voter turnout. All citizens have equal opportunities to 
participate, at and in between elections, but from the evidence presented here (and in 
any study of participation), not all citizens.do. Furthermore, those who do possess 
resources and socioeconomic characteristics that distinguish them from the rest of the 
population. With a view to expanding rates of participation among Australian citizens, 
this section discusses three specific implications of these findings: the importance of 
future internet diffusion, the role of educational attainment and the flow on effects (if 
any) of compulsory voting to non-electoral participation. 
Early ( optimistic) studies of internet use and participation predicted that the 
internet would both increase rates of participation and equality among participants 
and non-participants (for example Norris 2001b; Gibson et al. 2000; Bimber 2001; Agre 
2002; Norris 2002). Studies since have tended to observe that while the internet has 
the capacity to increase participation, evidence has not materialised to match the 
optimism (for example Bimber et al., 2012; Boulianne, 2009). The major period of 
growth in internet usage occurred between 2000 and 2007 in Australia, during what is 
termed here the transitional phase of Australian internet adoption. In 2013, as the 
social phase of internet usage is well established, it is not plausible to argue that further 
diffusion of internet access in Australia can significantly affect participation rates. As 
discussed, approximately 80 per cent of Australian households already have access to 
the internet, while 87 per cent of households with children under 15 have access 
233 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). The technological barriers preventing access in 
rural and remote regions have largely been overcome due to federal government 
policies; further diffusion of internet access will rely on generational replacement 
Relying on further roll-outs of broadband cable or optical fibre to increase access (and 
political engagement along with it) ignores the reality that any Australian who wants to 
be politically active likely already uses the internet. However, the roll-out of faster, 
more reliable broadband infrastructure may have the effect of increasing the amount of 
time that users spend online. It will also likely decrease the time taken to perform 
tasks online. The overarching effect would therefore be reinforcing, as existing users 
spend more time online, performing more activities online. 
Future increases in participation rates as a result of internet use will instead be 
due to the consolidation of internet use among political organisations and citizens, and 
due to increasing use of social networking applications. As 'Generation X' becomes 
middle aged, and Baby Boomers become elderly, even the residents of retirement 
homes will have some internet experience. Time will tell whether the comparatively 
young participants in this study will continue to participate as they get older, or 
whether the responsibilities of work and family that come with age will take 
precedence. In other words, this study cannot say whether the relative youth of 
Australian participants is a lifecycle or generational phenomenon. In the meantime, it 
is likely that political parties and other civil society groups will continue to move more 
of their organisational processes and communications online, and as a consequence 
move offline participation online. For example, political party memberships can not 
only be initiated online (i.e. processed and paid), but carried out on line. Branch 
meetings can be replaced by online forums, targeted at members with specific 
geographic or policy interests. Participating online may become the norm in many 
instances, reducing the costs of participation in terms of both time and money and 
attracting more participants as a result. 
Any normalisation of online party and campaign participation will depend on 
the willingness of political organisations to innovate, not on further internet diffusion. 
As has been shown, parties in Australia are not incentivised to mobilise voters, as the 
task of getting voters to polling booths falls to the state. While the findings here do not 
suggest that online innovations will necessarily mobilise party members from within 
previously disengaged sections of the population, providing more membership options, 
including online, will likely attract younger members. Any organisational reforms to 
that effect will entrench the major parties' role at the centre of Australia's democracy. 
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Parties in other democracies are already innovating (Dalton et al., 2011; Scarrow, 
2013); contagion to Australia is not assured, and will likely take some time. However, 
the relative ease and inexpensiveness of online mobilisation, compared with traditional 
grassroots recruitment efforts, makes it seem likely that contagion will occur 
eventually. 
This study's findings have implications for other political institutions in 
Australia, but perhaps particularly for electoral management bodies. The analyses in 
Chapter 4 indicated that the roll-out of dial up internet access through rural areas had a 
positive effect on electoral enrolment Likewise, it is shown here and in other studies 
that EMBs can successfully add social media campaigns to their repertoires of 
mobilisation strategies. Online enrolment was introduced in 2013, although internet 
voting is not feasible in the short term (Holmes, 2012; Trechsel, 2007) . Only Estonia 
has implemented a system allowing citizens to vote over the internet (rather than 
electronically, at a polling booth). Internet voting is 'an unlikely prospect' in that 
country, due to its established and trusted electoral practices (Holmes, 2012; Electoral 
Council of Australia and New Zealand, 2013). However, the concept of internet voting 
is popular among the population, with 45 per cent saying that being able to vote online 
would make voting 'much easier' (McAllister et al., 2010a). This numb er is 
concentrated among young Australians, who would perhaps be mQSt likely to increase 
their electoral participation rate were more online options available. 
In Australia, as elsewhere, education is consistently and highly important in 
predicting political participation. Again, this is not unique to the Australian case; in fact 
itis one of the notable similarities to studies such as Schlozman, Verba and Brady 
(2012). What is exceptional about the Australian analysis is that, while educational 
a~ainment has generally significant positive effects on participation, household income 
has generally negative effects. It suggests the mobilising effects of being highly 
educated but having less available income than the population mean. In practical 
terms, people with these characteristics might be underemployed, working in entry 
level jobs or occupations outside of their expertise, working in a low paid job of their 
choosing (such as in the community or not-for-profit sector) or temporarily out of the 
workforce due to family or other non-work related responsibilities. 
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· As the proportion of Australians possessing a university degree increasess4 it 
can be expected that a greater number find themselves in one of these positions. 
Assuming that there is a causal mechanism at play- that is, a mobilising effect of being 
educated but underemployed or underpaid - participation rates in Australia should 
increase accordingly. To the extent that participation determines the quality of 
political representation, these Australians are the ones making expressing their views 
to members of Australia's parliaments. Moreover, most acts of participation are 
affected by education and income in this way: party membership, online partisan work, 
online donation, contacting a government official in writing or person, working with 
like others, offline and e-petition signing and demonstrating. 
The third implication for democracy in Australia concerns compulsory voting. 
Mandating voter turnout is said to have several benefits for democratic health, 
including buffering Australia from the global trend towards civic apathy, spillover 
effects on participation rates, 'educative effects' on citizens' political knowledge and 
competence, and "cushion[ing] the impact of wealthy, vested interests on political 
agendas and outcomes" (Hill, 2001). Indeed, the negative effects of household income 
are evident in multivariate analyses, but the descriptive profiles of participants 
presented in this study show that politics in Australia suffers from the same 
socioeconomic biases as in other democracies where voting is voluntary. The view of 
compulsory voting as a panacea to disproportionate representation of citizens' voices 
or as a pathway to non-electoral participation among high and diverse numbers of 
Australians is not supported in this study. 
That is not a reason to discard this view entirely, however. First, compulsory 
voting, by mandating that all voting-aged citizens engage with the electoral process, 
provides a pathway to at least a small level of political engagement, if not to 
participation in further forms of participation. Second, the range of factors predicting 
participation in Australia is varied. From the inverse effects of education and 
household income to the strong effects (in both directions) of language proficiency, it is 
difficult to detect the kinds of patterns here that have leant themselves to typologies of 
participants elsewhere (for example Almond & Verba 1963; Verba & Nie 1972). It may 
be that compulsory voting has a more latent, less discussed effect of making 
participation in Australia less predictable: something to which the consistently poor 
model fit results throughout this study attest 
54 The percentage of Australians with a Bachelor Degree or higher increased from 3.4 in 1967 
to 23 .8 in 2010, according to AES data (McAllister et al., 2010). 
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Finally, international evidence shows that political efficacy, and other positive 
attitudes towards government and politics, is both an input and an output of 
participation (Finkel, 1987, 1985; Kenski and Stroud, 2006). The relationship is non-
recursive: efficacy positively affects participation, which positively affects efficacy. 
While the effects do not appear to extend to other attitudes, such as satisfaction with 
democracy and political trust, significantly higher rates of external efficacy among 
protestors and communal workers in Australia will likely be enhanced each time they 
participate. Consequently, the 'efficacy gap' between participants and non-participants 
will increase. However, by lowering the barriers to entry for many forms of 
participation, the internet has created participatory opportunities for traditionally 
underrepresented groups in Australian society. While young and NESB Australians 
participated before the advent of the internet, and continue to participate offline (for 
example the comparatively high rates of political donations among NESB Australians), 
this study indicates that online activities (such as e-petition c.f. offline petition signing) 
require fewer resources. 
In all, the state of participatory democracy in Australia appears robust. While 
resources are important for participation, the resources required vary between 
participatory acts. If a citizen does not possess the language skills required to write a 
letter to or meet with a government official, he can - and apparently does - choose to 
donate time or money to his preferred candidate, and achieve his desired political 
outcome through those means. Further, internet skills have positive effects on almost 
all of the acts analysed in this thesis. Internet skills are easier to acquire than job skills, 
language proficiency or educational attainment, and in many cases had larger effects on 
participation than any of those more traditional civic skills. Thus, the costs of entry to 
participation have been lowered, but citizens must still be necessarily engaged to 
participated, and ideally recruited into participation. 
8.3 Directions for future research 
A range of possible directions for future research emerge from this study, 
informed by the limitations encountered in conducting this analysis. For instance, the 
data used here are general use datasets and not specific to the research question, some 
of the relevant measures are cross sectional only, and not all of the measures are 
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consistent with international data, limiting the possibility of cross-national replication. 
The study relies mostly on the publicly accessible and extensive Australian Election 
Study (AES) dataset, particularly those variables reflecting the civic voluntarism model 
of political participation in the 2010 AES. However, the data were not collected 
specifically for this study and as such do not always provide precise measures of the 
factors described here. For instance, respondents are not asked to report their 
language proficiency, and so country of birth is used as a proxy for that civic 
voluntarism measure. Questions on free time, job skills and internet skills were not 
asked before 2011, making accurate longitudinal analysis impossible. Similar problems 
were faced during the analyses of electoral enrolment, voter turnout and party 
membership. In each case, the study proceeded with the best available data and drew 
on theory and existing empirical evidence to assist with interpretation. 
The implications for immigrant and ethnically diverse Australians' adaptation 
to the country's democratic system are substantial, and warrant further research. More 
extensive analysis of the reciprocal relationship between efficacy and participation, 
focusing on young or NESB Australians, will shed light on the strength and significance 
of the hypothesised non-recursive effects. Panel data would provide the best basis for 
analysis, per Finkel's (1987, 1985) studies of the US and West Germany. However, in 
li eu of panel data, future studies of large, cross-sectional datasets can explore the 
partial effects of efficacy on participation, and vice versa, using structural equation 
modelling. There is a range of possible outcomes for Australian democracy stemming 
from this study, and ample opportunities to look more closely at specific findings using 
the AES and similar national and cross-national datasets. 
Despite this study's limitations, it constitutes a comprehensive, empirical 
acco unt of political participation in Australia. The resources available have helped to 
answered the research questions, namely how the internet is directly affecting political 
participation in Australia, an d whether the internet as a resource can substitute for or 
co mplement traditional resources. The analysis here constitutes the most 
comprehensive study of political participation in Australia to date. However, much 
more remains to be known. First, longitudinal study of the effects of internet use on 
participation over time, preferably with panel data, would add much needed detail to 
what is known. This has been undertaken elsewhere with regards to civic engagement 
(see for example Jennings & Zeitner 2003), but th e long term material effects of 
internet use on participation are harder to identify. 
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The diffusion of internet access in Australia provided opportunities for natural 
experimental studies, but those opportunities are easier to identify after the fact, when 
internet penetration spans the country. There may be opportunities for studies with 
similar designs in democracies where internet penetration is still low, such as India. 
Any study where the independent variable is allowed to vary within the unit of analysis 
will elicit the best information on long term effects. Specifically, panel data could help 
to answer whether online participants proceed to participate offline. There is some 
limited evidence that online participation can be a pathway to offline participation, but 
currently most research suggests that internet use mobilises e-participation and offline 
resources mobilise offline participation. 
Second, the counterfactual scenario - where the internet does not exist - is hard 
to imagine, and harder to study empirically. Difference-in-difference analysis with 
larger datasets may provide some answers to the 'what if question, but the window for 
contemporary study is closing as internet penetration continues apace across the " 
world. Third, the unexpected effects of language proficiency in this study- particularly 
the high rates of Australians born in a non-English speaking country- suggest 
previously unasked questions about the capacity of the internet to mobilise specific 
demographic groups into participation. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, more 
should be known about Australian political behaviour generally, but participation 
specifically. There is a dearth of systematic, empirical research on participation in 
Australia. Future research should place an emphasis on comparative datasets and 
cooperation with researchers internationally, with a view to enhancing the external 
validity of what we know about politics in Australia. 
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Attr:ibute · Meas.ure Survey question 
., 
.~ 
Civic skills G3. Educational Have you obtained a trade qualification, a degree 
attainment or a diploma, or any other qualification since 
leaving school? What is your highest 
qualification? 
H3OWN. Language In .which country were you born? 
proficiency 
-
G7. Membership of Are you an active member of any of the following 
non-political organisations, an inactive member or not a 
organisations member? 
- Business or employers' association 
- Farmers' association 
- Professional association 
- Charitable organisation 
- Sport or recreation organisation 
G8. Job-related In the last 12 months, have you done any of the 
skills following activities as part of your involvement 
with your job, community or other organisations 
you belong to? 
- Written a letter 
- Gone to a meeting where you took part in 
making decisions 
Planned or chaired a meeting 
Notes Mean 
Recoded from least to most: 3.39 
l=No qualification since leaving schoo l 
2=Non-trade qualification 
3=Trade qualification 
4=Associate Diploma 
S=Undergraduate Diploma 
6= Bachelor Degree (including honours) 
?=Postgraduate Degree or Postgraduate 
Diploma 
Variable recoded into l=Australia, .78 
England, New Zealand, Ireland (i .e. all 
English-speaking countries listed); 0=all 
others. Recoded variable used as proxy 
for language proficiency. 
Scale variable created using count of .49 
'active member' responses 
Scale variable created using count 1.45 
(value=l) of four binary variables 
SD 
2.17 
.41 
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- Given a presentation or speech 
H12. Internet ski ll s Have you done any of the following tasks on the Scale variable created using count 1.91 .40 
internet? (value=l) of three binary variables 
- Sent at attachment wi th an emai l 
- Posted aud io, video or image files 
- Perso nally designed a web page or blog 
- Downloaded a software program to your 
computer 
Controls Hl. Sex Are you male or female? l=Female 
.51 .SO 
Age (derived) In what year were you born? 48.17 17.62 
Engagement Al . Political interest Generally speaking, how much interest do you Recoded from least to most: 3.20 .78 
usually have in what's going on in politics? l=None 
2=Not much 
3=Some 
4=A great deal 
C14. Political Some people say that no matter who people vote Recoded from least to most 2.10 .94 
efficacy (external) for, it won't make any difference to what l=Who people vote for won't make any 
happens. Others say that who people vote for difference 
can make a big difference to w hat happens. S=Who people vote for can make a 
Using the sca le below, where wou ld you place difference 
yourself? 
F13. Political And finally, a quick quiz on Australian Scale va ri able created measuring 2.41 1.72 
knowledge government. For each of the following number of correct answers 
statements, please say whether it is true or false. 
If you don 't know the answer, cross the 'don't 
know' box and try the next one. 
- Australia became a Federation in 1901 
- There are 75 members of the House of 
Representatives 
- The Constitution can only be changed by the 
High Court 
- The Senate election is based on proportional 
representation 
- No one may st and for Federa l parli ament unless 
they pay a deposit 
, 
- The longest time allowed between Federal 
elections for the House of Representatives is four 
years 
Recruitm ent A8. Contact by Du ring th e election campaign, did a candidate or Sca le variable created using count 1.03 .31 
parties or anyone from a po litical party contact you to (value=l} of four binary variab les 
candid ates persuade you to vote for them? 
- By te lephone 
- By mail 
- By face-to-face 
- By email or through the web 
Socia l capita l H12. On line H12. Thinking about the time you spend using Count measure of 'yes' responses to 9.45 3.37 
bonding social the Internet, can you say how much it has helped H12. 
capital you do each of the fo llowing th ings? Interact Range= 0 to 4. 
with peop le or groups who share your hobbies or 
interests. Interact with peop le or groups who 
share your religious be liefs. Interact with peop le 
or groups who share your political vi ews. 
Interact more with the people I feel really close 
to such as family and very close fri,ends. 
' 
H12. On line H12. Thinking about t he time you spend using Count measure of 'yes' responses to 5.19 2.54 
bridging socia l the Internet, can you say how much it has helped Hl2. 
capita l you do each of the fol lowing things? Range = 0 to 3. 
- Interact with people from different ethnic 
backgrounds 
- Interact with people from other countries 
- Interact with people of different ages or 
generations 
Fl5. Socia l trust Generally speaking, would you say that most 0= Can't be too carefu l 
.57 .50 
people can be trusted or that you can't be too l =Most people can be trusted 
carefu l in dealing with people? 
Tim e H8. Free time per On an average weekday, how mariy hours per 6.80 7.58 
day (hours) day do you have to yourse lf (that is, time awake 
without having to work, spend time at college or 
other educational programs, do housework, look 
after ch ild ren or deal with other peop le's needs}? 
Please give your answer to th e nearest hour. 
HlO. Tim e spent In general , how often do you use the internet? Recoded from least to most: 5.28 2.27 
on lin e l=Do not use the internet 
2=Less often 
3=Every f ew week 
4=One to two days a week 
5=Three to five days a week 
6=About once a day 
7=Several tim es a day 
G4. Employment Now some questions about the work you are Recoded so that valu es reflect the time- 4.85 2.33 
status doing now. Last week, w hat were you mainly intensity of employment: 
doing? l=Retired from paid work 
2=Unemployed (looking for part-time 
work) 
3=Unemployed (looking for full-time 
work) 
4=Keeping house 
5=Working part-time for pay 
6=Ful l-time schoo l or university student 
7=Working full-time for pay 
Beha,viour Measure Survey question 
Politica l AlS. Politica l During the 2010 election campa ign did you read or 
internet use internet use access any of the following websites? 
- Party or candidate campaign sites (e.g. home 
pages, official Facebook profiles, official 
You Tube channe ls) 
- Mainstream news media (e.g. ABC Online, SMH 
site etc) 
- Unofficial online videos (i. e. non-party 
produced) with campaign or political content 
(e.g. YouTube) 
- Federal Parliam ent site 
- Austral ian Electoral Commission site 
- Political blog 
Partisan B2 . Party Would you ca ll yourself a very strong, fair ly strong 
participation identification or not very strong supporter of t hat party? 
Party membership Now I am going to read off a list of vo luntary 
organization s. For each one, could you tell me 
whether you are an active member, an inactive 
member or not a member of that type of 
organization? 
- Politica l party 
ASPS . Donation How often did you do any of these things during 
the recent election? ' 
- Contribute money to a political party by mail or 
phone 
ASP7. Online How often did you do any of these things during 
donations the recent election? 
- Contribute money to a political party or election 
Notes Mean 
Same question wording (excluding .56 
year) used in 2007, 2004 and 2001 AES 
'Party' refers to Bl response 1.90 
World Va lues Survey data. Binary .10 
variable created of 'active member' 
and 'inactive member' respon ses. 
Recoded (binary) .02 
Recoded (binary) .03 
SD 
.98 
.69 
.30 
.14 
.18 
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candidate using the internet 
ASP3. Offline How often did you do any of these things during Recoded (binary) 
.17 .38 
partisan work the recent election? 
- Show your support for a particular party or 
candidate by, for example, attending a meeting, 
putting up a poster, or in some other way 
Al6. Online partisan During the 2010 election campaign did you do any Scale variable created using count .10 .30 
work of the following activities online? (value=l) of three binary variables; 
- Posted comments on a blog, twitter feed or wall scale variable recoded to binary due to 
of a social network site (either yours or someone sma ll number of positive answers 
else's) 
- Shared unofficial campaign content (e.g. links to 
videos, news stories) with others via ema il , 
Face book, twitter or SMS 
- Reposted unofficial campaign content (e.g. blog 
posts, links to videos) on your own page 
(Facebook or twitter profile, blog) 
Communal CllPl. Contacting a Over the past five years or so, have you done any Binary 
.18 .39 participation government official of the following things to express your views 
offline about something the government sho uld or 
should not be doing? Contacted a politician or 
government official either in person, or in writing 
C11P6 . Contacting a Over the past five years or so, have you done any Binary 
.13 .34 
government official of the following things to express your views 
online about something the government should or 
should not be doing? Contacted a politician or 
government official by emai l 
CllP3. Working Over the past five years or so, have you done any Binary 
.20 .40 
with like others of the following things to express your views 
about something the government should or 
should not be doing? Worked with people who 
shared the same concern 
Protest C11P4. Petition Over the past five years or so, have you done any Binary .44 .50 
participation signing of t he following thin gs to express your views 
about something t he government shou ld or 
should not be doing? Signed a written petition 
CllPS. E-petition Over the past five years or so, have you done any Binary .20 .40 
signing of the following th ings to express your vi ews 
about something the government should or 
should not be doing? Signed an on line ore-
petition 
C11P2 . Over th e past five years or so, have you done any Binary .11 .31 
Demonstrating of the fo llowing thin gs to expre ss your views 
or marching about something th e govern ment shou ld or 
shou ld not be doing? Taken part in a protest , 
march or demon stration 
Issue sa lience Dl. Issue sa lience Here is a li st of important issues that were Recoded from least to most : n/a 
discussed during t he election campaign. When you l =Not very importa nt 
were deciding about how to vote, how important 2=Quite important 
was each of these issues to you personally? 3=Extremely important 
Attitudes E8. Confidence in a How much confidence do you have in the Recoded from least to most: n/a 
towards range of institutions followin g organ isations? l =None at all 
government 2= Not very much confidence 
' 3=Quite a lot of confidence 
' 
4=A great dea l of confidence 
C7. Dissatisfaction On the whol e, are you very sati sfi ed, fair ly l =Very satisfi ed 2.22 .71 
with democracy satisfied, not very satisfi ed or not at all sat isfi ed 2= Fairly satisfied 
with the way democracy works in Au stra li a? 3= Not very satisfi ed 
4=Not at all sati sfied 
C9/C1. Political trust In general, do you feel that the people in l=Usually look after themselves 2.08 .99 
government are too often interested in looking 2=Sometimes looks after themselves 
after themselves, or do you feel that they can be 3=Sometimes can be trusted to do the 
trusted to do the right thing nearly all the time? right thing 
4=Usually can be trusted to do the 
right 
thing 
How much do you trust politicians general ly? 3.87 2.35 
Please use a scale from Oto 10, where 0 mean s no 
trust and 10 means a great deal of trust. 
C13/C14. Political Some people say it makes a big difference who is l=lt makes a big difference who is in 2.37 1.19 
efficacy (external) in power. Others say it doesn 't make any power 
difference who is in power. Using the scale below, S=lt doesn't make any difference who 
where wou ld you place yourse lf? is in 
power 
Some people say that no matter who people vote l=Who people vote for can make a big 2.10 .94 
for, it won't make any difference to what happens. difference 
Others say that who peop le vote for can make a S=Who peop le vote for won't make 
big difference to what happens. Using the scale any 
below, where would you place yourself? difference 
Attr[butel Me.asur.e , Survey question ' 
•\i 
1 
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.:r., 
Money Household income On this card is an income scale on which 1 
(deciles) indicates the lowest income group and 10 the 
highest income group in your country. We would 
like to know in what group your household is. 
Please, specify the appropriate number, counting 
all wages, salaries, pension s and other incomes 
that come in . 
Time Employment status Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how 
many hours a week? If more than one job: only 
for the main job. 
. 
Frequency of PC use How often, if ever, do you use a personal 
computer? 
Civic skills Educational What is the highest educational l~ve l that you 
attainment have attained? [NOTE: if res pondent indicates to 
be a student, code highest leve l s/he expects to 
complete] 
Notes ,, 
.-1 
Recoded from least to most time-
intensive: 
l=Retired/pensioned 
2=Unemployed 
3=Housewife not otherwise employed 
4=Part time employee (less than 30 
hours a 
week) 
S=Student 
6=Self employed 
?=Full time employee (30 hours a week 
or 
more) 
l=Never 
2=Occasionally 
3=Frequently 
l=No formal education 
2=Incomplete primary school 
3=Complete primary ,school 
4=Incomplete secondary school : 
technical/vocational type 
S=Complete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type 
6=Incomplete secondary: 
Mean- SD 
'~' 
4.90 2.04 
4.61 2.61 
2.62 .67 
4.84 2.95 
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university-preparatory type 
7=Complete secondary: 
university-preparatory type 
8=Some university-level ed ucation, 
without degree 
9=University-leve l education, with 
degree 
Intern et as a Information source Peopl e lea rn what is going on in thi s country and Recoded from least to most : n/a n/a 
source of the world from various sources. For each of the l=Never 
information followin g sources, please indicate whether you 2=Less than monthly 
use it to obtain inform ation daily, weekly, 3=Monthly 
monthly, less than monthly or never: 4=Weekly 
- Daily newspaper S=Daily 
- Printed magazines 
- TV news 
- Radio news 
- Mobile phone 
- Email 
- Internet 
- Talk with friend s or colleagues 
Engagement Interest in politics How interested wou ld you say you are in politics? Recoded from least to most: 2.83 .72 
Are you ... l=Not at all interested 
2=Not very interested 
3=Somewhat interested 
4=Very interested 
Campaign Party membership Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary .10 .30 
participation organizations. For each organization, could you 
tell me whether you are an active member, an 
inactive member or not a member of that type of 
organization? 
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